“War begins when you want it, but it does not end when you want it.” Niccolo Machiavelli
For decades, the US has tried to starve the Iranian people into submission. From banking embargoes to the assassination of scientists, Washington has used sanctions, sabotage and covert violence to break Iran’s hard-won sovereignty. Now, US warships are taking up strike positions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea to try to do what the international lenders’ banks could not.
US aircraft carrier strike groups are routinely deployed when economic pressure fails. For more than 40 years, US military and economic centers have encircled Iran. Since the 1979 Revolution, each US administration has tightened the noose. Iran’s real “crime” was the revolution itself. In 1979, the Iranian people overthrew a US-installed dictator, the Shah, who had been placed on the throne in a CIA-led coup in 1953 to ensure that Iranian oil would enrich foreign companies and not the Iranian people. By regaining control of its own resources, Iran crossed a red line that the US-Zionist system cannot tolerate.
The presence of this “vast armada” is a physical blockade, for now, a desperate attempt by a declining empire to choke off Iran’s oil routes and reassert dominance in a region that increasingly looks to independent trade with China, Russia, and India for a future without Washington’s permission. Today, nearly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports go to China, in currencies other than the dollar. New shipping lanes now connect Russian industry and Indian markets directly through Iranian territory, bypassing the traditional shipping lanes that the U.S. Navy has controlled since 1945.
Iran is the geopolitical boulder that prevents the U.S. and Israel from reshaping the Middle East and shifting energy flows away from China and gaining leverage over oil prices. Iran stands in the way of this plan, not just as a hostile state, but as a systemic obstacle in a reshaping region.
For much of the past few decades, the Middle East has had a bipolar order. On one side, American-Israeli hegemony. On the other hand, Iran as the region’s only coherent counter-system to this hegemony. Through the so-called Axis of Resistance, linking Tehran with Hezbollah, Syria, Palestinian militias, and allied forces across Iraq and Yemen, Iran imposed a form of negative order.
This bipolar structure limited Israel’s freedom of action, limited Arab strategic autonomy, and set an informal ceiling on regional realignment by threatening escalation on multiple fronts. Regional competition operated within these limits, and Iran’s presence helped to suppress open rivalry among Arab states by imposing costs on unilateral moves. However, this bipolar order is now ending. Palestinian militias, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Assad’s Syria have suffered a painful defeat, while Yemen, cut off and exhausted in the Red Sea region, is Tehran’s allies in Iraq, facing the Sunni establishment at home in a potentially civil war situation.
The result is the collapse of bipolarity. A regional system once defined by the US administration on one side and the Iranian-led resistance on the other has lost its constraints, creating an environment in which the security architecture is being redefined. Regional powers, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel, are expanding their reach to secure their interests and fill the void. New alliances are forming and new poles are emerging. On the other hand, the Arab neighbors, while preferring a weaker Iran, do not want to see it collapse. It is within this context that the desire of the US and Israel to now escalate military pressure on Iran must be understood.
The possible scenarios that may arise
1. Scenario
The first is that the Turks, Arabs, Chinese, and Russians manage to convince the Trump administration of the dangers of a military strike and persuade it to accept some symbolic concessions through negotiations. This scenario is unlikely. If the US military buildup against Venezuela is any guide, Trump will demand a trophy, ideally Iran’s Supreme Leader, Khamenei, which the Iranians will not accept. Analysts note that Iran could deter an attack by agreeing to divert oil flows from China to India, which it sees as one of the US’s goals. While this logic is sound, it is doubtful that such a concession would now be enough to justify de-escalation.
2. Scenario
The second scenario is that the US launches a targeted attack that causes the collapse of the Iranian government. The ensuing chaos would lead the country to civil war and possible dismemberment. In this scenario, the US would support a regime to control oil production under its supervision, as it claims to do in Venezuela (unconfirmed), even if that regime held limited territory. This is the preferred outcome for Israel, but most Arab states will actively try to prevent it. Why?
Because Israel’s strategic horizon is regime change and the return of the descendant of the last Shah, Reza Pahlavi. It is not simply trying to limit Iranian visibility or degrade its capabilities; it seeks to permanently dismantle the Islamic Republic, without the possibility of revival. This goal is evident in both the ongoing military pressure and Israeli messaging to Iranian protest movements, which consistently frame the collapse of the regime as an acceptable, desired end result.
Arab preferences are fundamentally different. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states do not want regime change in Iran. They may prefer an Iran that is weakened, contained, and internationally isolated, but not a collapsing state whose internal convulsions could spill over borders or escalate uncontrollably. At the same time, they also oppose the opposite outcome: a secular, wealthy, internationally reintegrated Iran, normalized with the West, and capable of stable relations with both Washington and Israel. Such an Iran would become a formidable competitor for regional primacy. More specifically: Israel seeks the collapse of the regime as the ultimate victory. Saudi Arabia seeks a weakened but intact Islamic Republic that will remain a pariah state. Both countries are trying to influence Trump, Israel in favor of a military attack, Saudi Arabia in favor of de-escalation.
3. Scenario
The third scenario is a protracted conflict. The US and Israel will achieve initial strikes, but as air defenses are depleted, Iran will begin to strike sensitive targets, as was seen in the so-called “12-Day War.” If the battle lasts more than two weeks, US operations will become extremely difficult, especially if the Strait of Hormuz is closed.
A variation on this scenario is a naval blockade, which the US government perceives as a success in Venezuela, to force concessions or internal defections from Tehran. This variant fundamentally misunderstands the situation. Iran has regional leverage that Venezuela never had. China and Russia, due to proximity and strategic interests, would be much more willing to provide support. And for Washington, maintaining a prolonged pressure campaign without a clear justification would be politically costly.
What do these scenarios not take into account?
What these scenarios do not take into account is that Iran may view US and Israeli military and economic pressure from a “manageable conflict” to an “existential threat.” That is, Iran’s leadership may conclude that the US/Israel problem, if not resolved immediately, will cause the Islamic Republic to collapse under the crushing weight of economic sanctions, socio-economic turmoil, and the system’s internal contradictions. That is, it may decide that a comprehensive solution to the US/Israel problem is needed, here and now. This will force Iran’s leadership to seek conflict and try to inflict maximum damage, something the Islamic Republic has been preparing for almost since its founding.
