In the modern world order, great power rivalry persists through various modes of confrontation. While the post-World War II era was characterized by the avoidance of direct military conflict between superpowers such as the United States and Russia (the former Soviet Union), the evolution of indirect conflict strategies, including espionage, information warfare, and proxy wars (proxy warfare) allowed these powers to compete without escalating the confrontation into a full-scale military conflict.
This article provides a sophisticated framework for understanding the current superpower confrontation, drawing on game theory and political realism theory (Prof. John Mearsheimer) to explain how conflicts can evolve from indirect confrontations to direct military engagements.
Stage 0: No military conflict (espionage, intelligence warfare, civilian confrontation)
At this stage, there is no direct military conflict between the superpowers, but competition is fierce with other non-military means. Espionage, cyber attacks, information warfare and the use of economic sanctions are common forms of competition. Both sides aim to weaken the other indirectly without crossing the threshold into open military engagement.
Realistic view:
From a pragmatic perspective, this stage aligns with peacetime competition. While military confrontation is absent, major powers are constantly engaged in covert operations, seeking relative gains in power and security. Security competition continues in full force, with efforts focused on undermining adversaries through asymmetric strategies such as financial coercion, disinformation campaigns, and intelligence gathering.
Implications of Game Theory:
This stage represents the lowest level of escalation in the conflict spectrum. The risk of war may be low but both sides maintain high levels of mistrust. Reward structures incentivize cooperation to avoid conflict, yet both superpowers are actively preparing for future escalation by enhancing their deterrence and defense capabilities.
Assessment:
This stage reflects the status quo of the Cold War, where neither side escalates to direct military involvement, but both work to destabilize and undermine the other’s position through covert means. It is a “shadow competition” where the goal is to maximize the relative profits without the parties involved being led into open conflict.
Stage 1: Brinkmanship (No attacks on superpower lands)
At this stage, tensions rise as both superpowers engage to the brink, bringing the situation to the brink of conflict without the superpowers involved crossing the line into full-scale war. There are no direct attacks on each other’s homelands, but military posturing, threats and provocations are common practices. This stage may include military exercises, troop mobilization or missile testing.
Realistic view:
Brinkmanship is a hallmark of great power rivalry, especially during the Cold War. Each superpower pushes the other to the brink, hoping to force concessions or signal resolve without provoking open war. The game at this stage is highly strategic and relies on credibility and deterrence to deescalate.
Implications of Game Theory:
In this phase of the confrontation both sides engage in threatening behavior designed to test the other’s resolve. The goal is to either win concessions or deter aggression without actually starting a military conflict. But miscalculation or over-escalation carries the greatest risk of creating the conditions for military conflict here, as the unintended consequences could lead to war.
Assessment:
This is the mildest form of aggressive behavior, with both sides engaging in signaling but warning of high-stakes situations to deter each other. Although conflict is not inevitable, the risks are heightened by the potential for misinterpretation or accidental escalation, and each side seeks to avoid overt retreat, while all warring parties avoid ending up in direct conflict.
Stage 2: Light Hawk-Dove (Proxy wars with plausible deniability, attacks on a superpower’s homeland)
As tensions rise, the conflict shifts toward proxy wars. A superpower can begin to support proxies that attack the homeland or interests of an adversary while maintaining a reasonable degree of plausible deniability. This refusal to engage directly allows the superpower to become indirectly involved in the conflict without being seen as a direct aggressor.
Realistic view:
Proxy wars are a common tactic in great power competition. They allow superpowers to engage in conflict indirectly, avoiding the dangers of direct confrontation. By supporting proxies, a superpower can destabilize or weaken its adversary without suffering direct retaliation. The defending superpower (Dove) may choose to counterattack only the proxies and avoid further escalation, preferring to endure the proxy war rather than risk a larger conflict.
Implications of Game Theory:
At this stage, the game takes on a Hawk-Dove dynamic, where the “hawk” (the attacker) supports the agents but hides his involvement, while the “dove” (the defender) must decide how much to escalate the conflict and in general, how much he will tolerate the attacks. In this case the reward structure favors the hawk, as he can damage his opponent while maintaining a high degree of plausible deniability.
Assessment:
This phase reflects controlled proxy warfare, with a heavy emphasis on plausible deniability to avoid immediate escalation. A typical example is the provision of NATO weapons to Ukraine while this “defense organization” claims limited responsibility for Ukrainian actions. So in this scenario the West’s ambivalent support prevents the conflict from escalating into a direct superpower confrontation.
Stage 3: Moderate Hawk-Dove (Proxy Wars, Reduced Plausible Denial, Attacks on Superpower Homelands)
At this stage, proxy wars continue, but the attacking superpower becomes more overt in its support of the attacking proxies. Plausible deniability declines, and attacks on the rival superpower’s homeland become more frequent, more aggressive, and more destructive.
Realistic view:
This stage represents a more dangerous form of proxy warfare, as the attacking superpower no longer hides its involvement. The lines between proxy war and direct attack are beginning to blur and the risk of direct confrontation is increasing. The defending superpower faces increasing pressure to respond more forcefully or risk losing credibility.
Implications of Game Theory:
The hawk becomes more aggressive, openly supporting proxy attacks. The pigeon must now decide whether to respond in kind or continue to absorb the attacks. The risk of war increases as the dynamic shifts toward more direct involvement.
Diplomatic Ambiguity Stage
The chances of escalation are increased due to the reduced margin for diplomatic ambiguity. The concept of Diplomatic Ambiguity has been established as early as the 18th century with the works of the diplomat and author François de Callières.
In simple and concise words, the attempts to disorient the defender from the attacker with diplomatic actions, that is to say that he does not want the development in a direct confrontation when in fact he is preparing it, at this stage have been dramatically reduced. The defender, based on some framework of analysis such as the Dempster-Shafer theory, largely does not believe that the attacking superpower desires peace, instead seeking both escalation of the confrontation and ideally some first strike.
More generally in any diplomatic mediation, especially between nuclear superpowers, the concept of Diplomatic Ambiguity has a pivotal role. Even Henry Kissinger had coined the term “Constructive Ambiguity”, trying to promote the concept that adding ambiguity to the text of a negotiation can have beneficial effects in the future for both parties involved.
This is of course impossible, since in order for one party to gain something, the other party must lose. There is enough evidence from real situations that the game where both parties have something to gain eventually turns into the win-lose game, that is, that just as someone wins something, someone else loses it.
Assessment:
This stage marks a shift from covert to overt support for proxy wars, making it harder for superpowers to avoid direct confrontation. For example, if NATO openly authorized Ukrainian strikes on Russian soil, it would signal a dangerous escalation and bring the conflict closer to direct military involvement between the superpowers. NATO’s excuses that they have simply handed over weapons to Ukraine would no longer have a serious diplomatic basis.
Stage 4: Heavy Hawk-Heavy Dove (Proxy Wars with open support, Attack on homelands, Threat of counter-attacks)
At this stage, proxy wars continue, but the attacking superpower no longer maintains any pretense of denial in military confrontation. Attacks on the enemy’s homeland are explicitly and publicly supported. Here the defending superpower will have to choose between direct military retaliation (also possible actions through its own proxy wars or sabotage of the adversary) or continued restraint in a defensive posture.
- Direct confrontation through proxies and sabotage:
Although the superpowers do not yet engage each other directly militarily, their open support for each other’s proxy forces or the use of sabotage means that they are directly involved in conflict by indirect means. The involvement is no longer hidden and both sides are actively involved in the war, albeit through proxies or paramilitary tactics such as funding insurgents and carrying out sabotage and even cyber attacks. But its intention and effects are immediate, even if the means are indirect.
- Endless Escalation into Full-Scale War:
At this stage, the confrontation is bordering on open war. By supporting proxy fighters or using material or electronic sabotage, the superpowers still face each other directly in a more escalating fashion than in previous stages. The threat of attacks and counterattacks on both superpowers’ homelands makes this a form of heightened indirect confrontation or direct confrontation at a distance, even though full-scale war is avoided for now.
- Game Theory and Realist Perspective for this case:
In game theory terms, this stage of mutual military or paramilitary conflict with proxies or guerrilla/sabotage tactics represents a high level of escalation where both sides are aware of the other’s involvement and directly influence the outcomes of the conflict, even if they avoid direct military conflicts. The political theory of Realism sees this case as direct involvement, as proxy actions or sabotage are fully supported by the respective superpowers.
Realistic view:
This is a very escalating phase of indirect conflict. The hawk superpower is fully committed to proxy warfare, openly supporting attacks on the opponent’s homeland. The defending superpower (dove) faces a difficult choice: either escalate by retaliating immediately, risking a full-scale war, or endure the status quo, hoping that hawkish aggression will cease with the advent of other, more political conditions, to avoid a catastrophic conflict with conventional and nuclear weapons.
Implications of Game Theory:
At this stage, the payoff structure of the game becomes extremely unstable. The hawk is no longer concerned with plausible deniability and is willing to risk a larger conflict. The dove must weigh the cost of retaliation against the risk of full-scale war. At this point, the probability of war becomes dangerously high, as each side prepares for the possibility of direct military confrontation with all applicable strategic protocols for conventional and nuclear weapons.
Assessment:
This stage represents the highest level of indirect conflict before transitioning to full-scale war. The attacking superpower is fully committed to proxy warfare, and the defending superpower is forced into a position where it must have immediate counterattack plans or risk losing its credibility and strategic position.
In particular counterattack plans should be communicated to the attacker so that there is a strong sense of deterrence.
Stage 5: Hawk-Hawk (direct military conflict between superpowers)
In the final stage, indirect conflict gives way to direct military confrontation between the nuclear superpowers. The attacked superpower states that further aggression will result in full retaliation by all available means, leading to immediate military engagement between the two superpowers.
Realistic view:
This is the ultimate stage of escalation, where all previous strategies of deterrence, and high-handed diplomacy have failed as indirect confrontation has now overwhelmed all patience. The superpowers are now engaged in open warfare, with the possibility of nuclear escalation looming large. This represents a catastrophic collapse of the balance of power and security competition, leading to a war that could have existential consequences not only for the parties involved but for the entire planet (nuclear winter).
Implications of Game Theory:
The game now shifts to a Hawk-Hawk dynamic, where both sides are fully committed to direct conflict. The reward of the game is existential, or rather the destruction of the defender’s existence will mark the destruction of the attacker’s existence. At the cost prices of the game, the probability of war is extremely high. The possibility of nuclear conflict becomes a real threat and the possibility of mutual assured destruction is significant.
Assessment:
This stage represents the failure of all prevention mechanisms. The superpowers are now in a full-scale war, with devastating consequences. The risk of escalation to nuclear conflict makes this the most dangerous and costly step on the escalation ladder.
The scale of confrontation evolution described in this article provides a structured way of understanding the stages from indirect confrontation to direct military conflict between nuclear superpowers. Using a combination of the political theory of Realism and Game Theory, this model shows how superpowers engage in strategic competition, testing each other’s resolve and capabilities while constantly trying to avoid full-scale war.
Of course, this is the most desirable situation, because the presented model of confrontation unfortunately also includes the possibility that an attacking superpower will seek full and direct military confrontation with another nuclear superpower with extremely destructive consequences for the entire planet.
Final thoughts
This framework provides a lens for analyzing contemporary great power competition, whether between the United States and Russia or other potential rivalries such as China and the U.S. By applying both realist theory and game theory, we obtain a deeper understanding of how superpowers manage conflict and escalation risks;
Structured stages help clarify risks at each level, providing a guide for policymakers and analysts to recognize signs of escalation and the fine line between strategic competition and catastrophic conflict.
