The recent meeting between Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Uzbekistan has been commented on in the West in light of Chinese concerns about the ongoing war in Ukraine. Indeed, the Kremlin’s official announcement that the Russian president would try to provide answers to the relevant Chinese questions is of particular interest. It is a public admission on the part of Russia at least that China is worried about the current situation.
Obviously we don’t know what was said behind closed doors, but in the discussion between the two presidents we do know that for Chinese philosophy any world unrest let alone a war is traditionally a source of danger that can delay or even derail the Chinese Communist Party’s program of improvement the living conditions of Chinese citizens. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has created new data for energy food security around the world. Meeting the needs of China’s 1.4 billion people is far from easy. In parallel, the implementation of the Silk Road naturally suffers in times of hostilities.
China maintains excellent relations with Russia but has no reason to disrupt the one it has built up over the years with Ukraine, so Beijing has chosen neutrality as a tactic endorsed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. If we carefully observe the Chinese positions from February 24 onwards we will see that they focus much more on criticizing NATO and its enlargement policy than actively supporting Russia. China is diligently concerned with its own security. the expansion of NATO after the end of the Cold War is a model that the United States is trying to implement in Asia, either through the North Atlantic Alliance or in other ways. The effort is expected to intensify in the coming years. China, therefore, is trying to learn lessons both from the implementation of the American strategy before February 24 in Russia’s neighborhood and from the evolution of the war, but the simultaneous isolation of Russia from the West.
The development of Sino-Russian relations, which includes military exercises from time to time in various parts of the world, does not mean that there is an alliance on the issue of Taiwan. For example, China does welcome Russia’s diplomatic positions in favor of its positions, but it is unlikely to expect active military involvement of the latter in the event of a crisis. China and Russia’s shared understanding of American ambitions on the international geopolitical chessboard brings the two countries closer, as their joint declaration just before the start of the Beijing Winter Olympics last February reminds us, but beyond that there are some limits.
Strategically, China has the potential to emerge victorious, strengthening its position vis-à-vis Russia—with the latter eagerly seeking partners outside the West. How the war in Ukraine eventually ends, however, will determine the tone of Russian foreign policy, whose future direction it can only dictate. Therefore, the Chinese government is asked to take into account various parameters, not necessarily convenient ones. In any case, its priority is to withstand the enormous American pressure, showing that it has the strength to overcome adversity, cooperate with the West despite their differences, and detect possibilities of stability in the China-United States-Russia tripartite to balance the international system, for its benefit.
