Evidence of China’s growing emphasis on international developments is the constant reporting by politicians and analysts on its stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The Russians are increasingly relying on China to ease the economic pressure on the West. The United States has urged China not to arm Russia and not to facilitate Western economic sanctions. So what is China’s attitude towards the war in Ukraine and how will its leadership move?
An issue of international credibility
China has established a close working relationship with Russia and the leaders of the two countries, Putin and Xi Jinping, have developed a personal relationship.
It is therefore a matter of China’s international credibility to facilitate, as far as possible, Russia, without implying that it identifies with its policy in Ukraine.
Western leaders preferred a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, and could seize the opportunity to negotiate with the Chinese leadership to make China-Russia cooperation less close.
After all, the West triumphed in the Cold War when the United States made an impressive opening in China under President Nixon, taking advantage of the differences between China and the USSR.
Therefore, the US request for China to suddenly “empty” Russia is not considered very logical. The leaders of Russia and China have stated that the relationship between their countries goes beyond friendship and cooperation. In 2019, the last year before the pandemic, China had already become Russia’s largest trading partner, absorbing about 14% of Russia’s exports and sending it about 19% of its imports.
In addition, there are regional reasons why China is interested in having good relations with Russia. Competition with India, which at times turns into rivalry, does not allow China to alienate Russia.
The same is true of India (please read the analysis titled “India continues to support Russia“), which is participating in the wider Western effort to control China’s growing influence in the Indian and Pacific regions, but is watching its relations with Russia to avoid giving China a regional advantage.
More than 60% of Russian exports to China are crude oil and refined oil, while the share of natural gas in Russia’s exports to China is increasing. Therefore, cooperation can not be described as comprehensive, because it has too much emphasis on the energy dimension in terms of Russian exports.
The issue of sanctions
Western calls on China not to allow Russia to circumvent sanctions through it will not work.
1. The EU and NATO have failed to impose discipline on sanctions against major Western powers, such as Turkey and Israel. Turkey has not enforced sanctions since 2014 – when it was decided to annex Crimea by Russia – speculating unabated, as it did in breaking sanctions imposed on Iran.
Israel does not want to compete with Russia, because it has already welcomed in its territories about 1.5 million Jews from Russia and another 200 thousand from Ukraine. Therefore, he wants to maintain the flow and refuses to move against Putin.
From the moment, then, that the US and the EU can not convince their allies, Turkey and Israel, it is futile to wait for China’s adjustment.
2. Most of Russia’s exports to China are oil and gas. It is known that the EU Rejects Ukraine’s request for a global energy embargo on Russia, citing its energy needs. Consequently, the EU and the West can not ask China to implement what it avoids.
3. Third and most importantly, in recent years the Chinese economy has been tested by the economic sanctions imposed on it by the US. The Chinese leadership has a major objection to the economic sanctions policy, which it considers a method of enforcing US policy, so it can not support economic sanctions against Russia.
The US sanctions against China are very harsh and may prove politically “blind”. It is characteristic that the Chinese digital giant Huawei saw its turnover decrease by 30% in 2021, due to the US sanctions, which include the ban on the supply of microchips necessary for the manufacture of smartphones.
Taiwanese companies, which play a leading role in the production of the most advanced microchips worldwide, are also required to participate in these sanctions. By 2021, Taiwan had impressive trade with China – despite political rivalry – and recorded a staggering annual trade surplus of $ 80-90 billion.
As a result, US economic sanctions on China over microchips are causing problems for China’s digital giants, but they could also weaken Taiwan’s economic position as a strategic ally of the United States vis-.-Vis China.
The issue of strategy
China is the second superpower after the United States and has set a goal of becoming the No. 1 superpower in the coming decades.
The US considers it a key strategic opponent, while the EU has a more restrained approach and seeks to differentiate itself – as far as possible – from the US.
Ultimately, however, the war in Ukraine is strategically strengthening the two superpowers, the United States and China.
US sees EU to overcome, in the face of the Russian threat, its doubts and to proceed with the increase of defense expenditures and the strengthening of NATO discipline. This highlights the leading role of the United States, which is expected – after facing the Russian challenge in one way or another – to devote its own and allied forces to competition and rivalry with China.
The latter comes out of the war in Ukraine because Putin and Russia, internationally isolated and under great economic pressure, are forced to turn to China in an effort to reduce their problem. Beijing will satisfy Moscow to a considerable extent, but on terms that will reflect China’s great superiority over Russia.
