In our previous tribute to the F-35 (https://www.liberalglobe.com/?p=7985) we examined the operational advantages and disadvantages of the fighter in air-to-air outputs (missions). Due to the larger dimensions of the weapons used, but also their heavier weight, there are many bigger restrictions in terms of maintaining the VLO (Very Low Observable) characteristics of the fighter.
That is, the stealth characteristics, or low observability. This is an extremely operational factor from the operational point of view, given the fact that the F-35 was primarily designed as a strike platform (Strike Fighter). On the other hand, as we will see, as an important advantage of the F-35 should be counted here its large internal capacity in fuel (hence a large combat radius), combined with its large carrying capacity in external weapons cargo.
The Achilles heel of the 5th generation fighter, is the software for operation and interconnection of all its systems. In order to present a single image in the cockpit (on the single touch screen and the projection system on the pilot-HDU helmet) from elements and images that come from all the sensors but also from the fighter systems, an attempt was made to write code 8.6 millions of lines! Something that turned out to be more difficult than expected. In recent years, research centers of major American universities have been involved in trying to solve software problems for F-35 systems still there (U.S. Air Force).
CAS-Close Air Support
The same things apply here as for the role of policing a country’s FIR. In VLO configuration the fighter can carry only two 500 or 1000 or 2000 pound INS / GPS guidance (JDAM) or laser guidance (LGB) guidance bombs. Along with two air-to-air missiles for self-defense purposes. This weapon load is considered rather insufficient for the role of close support. Even provided the internal transport of eight SDB-I bombs. Under this configuration, therefore, despite its large radius and autonomy (long stay time above the field of operations), it is not suitable for such missions.
On the other hand, its great autonomy combined with its large carrying capacity in external weapons (total weight 22,000 pounds – about 11 tons) in beast mode configuration, do not negate the fact that it will work just like a conventional fighter. Or like a purebred attack aircraft, for as long as the air force continues to keep the species in service.
Therefore the F-35 can be utilized like the A-10 or the Russian Su-25, remaining above the area of interest loaded with several weapons for a long time. Compared to the F-35A’s 18,000 pounds of internal fuel, the aggressive A-10 weighs just 11,000 pounds (about 5,500 kg). However, the fuel consumption, due to the heavier weight and the larger engine of the F-35, is about 50% higher (https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Gilmore_04-26-16 .pdf) in relation to the A-10.
In terms of the vulnerability of the F-35 from short-range or portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS), it is the same or even more vulnerable, due to its greater thermal footprint (compared to the A-10). For such anti-aircraft missiles therefore the F-35 is an easy target. At the same time, like all multi-role fighters, it does not have the special characteristics of attack aircraft. Which of course have been abandoned (mainly due to MANPADS) for decades.
Like the A-7 Corsair, for example, the A-10, or the Russian Su-25 Frogfoot, incorporated special features for CAS operations. Large wing range for excellent flight characteristics and flexibility at low altitudes and low flight speeds, turbofan engines to reduce fuel consumption (long range and autonomy) and reduce the aircraft’s thermal footprint, armor and in the abdomen of the aircraft for the protection of critical systems from small arms fire and of course dual hydraulic systems and fuel and lubricant supply systems.
All these special features have disappeared in modern multi-role fighters (not just the F-35), because the portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS – Man Portable Air Defense Systems) have made them redundant. A huge recent confirmation of this fact is the fact that the Russians permanently stopped the operations of Su-25 attackers in Syria, after the loss of two such aircraft during the initial period of their engagement in the fall of 2014.
They continued to attack ground targets with Su-24 aircraft first and then Su-34 from high altitudes, evaluating the results of each mission using drones and UAVs.
As for the suitability of the F-35 for CAS missions, the Americans themselves (https://www.afrc.af.mil/News/Article/2894534/idaho-ang-a-10-marine-f-35 -pilots-train-together /) describe their cooperation with A-10 attackers as follows:
“The 190 Squadron A-10 (modernized A-10C) operated on F-35B (USMC) F-35B Forward Air Control (Airborne) missions, locating targets and transmitting their position (via data link) on the F-35Bs (which flew backwards and higher), in order for them to attack them with the appropriate weapons, ensuring the friendly forces on the ground, greater safety and ease of movement”.
This is an indirect admission that CAS attacks, in the strict sense of the word, are not carried out by F-35 fighters. The advantage of the fighter in all three versions is its ability to hit mostly fixed high-altitude targets with guided weapons such as JDAM (GBU-31) bombs and laser guidance (GBU-12), utilizing both radar. AN / APG-81, as well as the EOTS electro-optical assembly at the lower part of the muzzle. At present, however, these weapons do not allow him to operate from safe distances. We are talking about well-organized anti-aircraft defenses with medium and long-range missile systems.
Accurate Impacts from long distances
Penetration from a small height:
Like a fourth-generation fighter equipped with LANTIRN short-range targeting and navigation missiles, the F-35, even with a larger range and weapon load, can perform strike missions, penetrating over enemy territory at low altitudes and suddenly attacking ground targets. Using laser guidance bombs and secondarily JDAM. Its sensors (APG-81, EOTS, DAS) make it ideal for this role.
At present, the problem with the fighter in such missions lies in the limitations of the $400,000 HMDS (Helmet Mounted Display System) or HDU (Helmet Display Unit) helmet in the Collins Aerospace GEN III version. Restrictions apply to operations from aircraft carrier decks in dark conditions (F-35Cs currently operate only in daylight), while according to AirforceTimes (https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air -force / 2021/12/08 / f-35-helmets-that-fix-green-glow-are-on-their-way-but-not-to-the-air-force /), το πρόβλημα του “green glow effect ”still exists in the upgraded Gen III systems.
In terms of the ability to strike ground targets (fixed and moving) from long distances over 100 km, at present and in purely practical level are limited to the only weapon that can be used as a stand off, on the F-35A. It is the GBU-39 SDB I wind bomb, with a radius of about 110 kilometers. Eight units can be transported internally to the aircraft armature hatches, and there is no reliable information to confirm that more such bombs can be transported externally. We are referring to the F-35A that is proposed in Greece and not to the F-35B and -C.
Air-to-surface / surface-to-surface weapons remain one of the major issues in the F-35 program. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service (https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf) all of the new advanced, long-range weapons are referred for certification – integration into Block 4 aircraft from 2025 – 2026 and after that. Therefore, weapons such as the AGM-158 JASSM, or the JASSM-ER and the LRASM as external carriers, along with the JSM (Joint Strike Missile) which is primarily anti-ship or the AGM-88E AARGM missile (https://defencereview.gr / pyrayloi-anti-rantar-i-opla-makroy-pli /) which is an anti-radar weapon and will be carried inside, will be available in the… future!
And here, of course, is mentioned (in the report of the Congressional Research Service) an important and extremely critical detail that will surely concern us in the future. On page 20, among many other revelations, it is stated that: The Block 4 configuration will not be applicable to all F-35s. It will require the aircraft to be upgraded in terms of equipment to TR-3 (Technical Refresh 3) level. New production F-35 with the specification of TR-3 equipment, will be manufactured as Lot 15 within 2023!
It is at least questionable how, after more than 15 years of development (the SDD phase officially ended in 2018, leaving behind 873 observations – 13 categories 1- which will be restored through the C2D2 process), have been certified in F -35 so few weapons. Major program partners such as the British (Level 1) and the Norwegians (Level 2) were forced to pay significant amounts for the certification – integration of METEOR, SPEAR 3 and ASRAAM and JSM, without knowing if these costs will eventually be removed from their subscription to the program.
That said, the F-35A currently has extremely limited capabilities in long-range missile missions with stand-off weapons, and does not even have anti-ship capability.
Industrial and business exchanges
As in the past with the cases of the F-104G and the F-16, so today the US, by offering tempting prices, has managed to impose the F-35 on the European continent.
The exchanges we are talking about are industrial, economic, energy and armaments. The data reveal that the fighter will need significant funds to become fully operational in all roles and completely reliable. The European countries that chose the F-35, therefore, relied primarily on these exchanges and not on its operational virtues. This is also confirmed by the statements of senior officers of the American Air Force.
