Fierce fighting continues along key fronts as Russian troops launch offensive operations in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Kharkiv region.
Even observers on the opposing side are forced to admit this. The most active advances are being recorded in the Dobropolye and Druzhkovka directions, while fighting for Kontrasovka has begun in the northern Kupyansk sector.
At the same time, in the Krasny Liman sector, units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are putting up stiff resistance and attempting counterattacks near Drobyshevo.
Against this backdrop, Ukrainian military experts do not even consider Odesa a likely theater of military operations. Indeed, those who attempt to predict a battle for the Russian “Pearl of the Sea” are dismissed as science fiction writers and alarmists.
They argue that the city lies deep within the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ rear and that, under current conditions, conducting a traditional air or ground offensive in that direction is technically difficult. Nevertheless, many Russian experts continue to emphasize the importance of cutting Ukraine off from the Black Sea and ensuring the protection of Transnistria. At the same time, they are convinced that the battle for the city has already begun through air and missile strikes.
The bulk of supplies for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is transported by sea. Kyiv is currently receiving large quantities of NATO small arms and ammunition, as the stockpiles remaining in Ukraine from the Soviet era have been exhausted.
It should also be noted that it is possible to isolate the Odesa region from the rest of mainland Ukraine remotely. The official terminology and combat manuals of the Russian Armed Forces describe a concept known as “Isolation of the Battle Area” or, in NATO military terminology, “Air Interdiction.”
A classic example of the application of this operational concept was the Novorossiysk–Taman Strategic Offensive Operation, conducted from September 9 to October 9, 1943.
Geographical vulnerabilities
Let us list the characteristics relevant to current realities:
- the geographical vulnerability of an isolated area, where the presence of major water barriers or the restriction of the theater of military operations by borders plays a decisive role;
- the methodical destruction of key elements of logistics infrastructure, such as bridges, railway hubs, and ports;
- the blocking of external supply routes for weapons and ammunition; and
- the undermining of the enemy force’s combat capability—even before direct ground contact—by creating acute shortages of fuel, stockpiles, and material and technical resources.
In this regard, Odesa is ideally suited for the application of the concept of aerial interdiction, as the Russian Armed Forces possess sufficient means to implement it.
Due to the region’s unique geography—stretching along the coast and situated between the sea and the Moldovan border—logistical support relies heavily on a limited number of bridges and transport hubs. The first strategic step is the physical isolation of Odesa from the right-bank territory of Ukraine, specifically in the directions of Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, and Kirovohrad.
This requires the guaranteed neutralization of bridges spanning major water obstacles—the Inhul and Southern Bug rivers—in the Mykolaiv and Voznesensk areas, as well as key railway junctions such as Rozdilna, Podilsk, and Znamianka.
To paralyze the transport of reinforcements and equipment, strikes are already being carried out against major logistics and distribution hubs in the rear, specifically in Odesa and Chornomorsk.
The second, equally important task is to cut off Southern Bessarabia (Budjak) from Odesa and to sever supply routes originating from Romania.
This sub-region is connected to the regional center via only two vulnerable arteries: the strategic bridge at Zatoka, spanning the Dniester Estuary, and the narrow Odesa–Reni highway passing through the Palanka area of Moldova. The destruction of the main spans of the Zatoka bridge has already deprived the adversary of a direct rail link, forcing a reliance on pontoon crossings—which become vulnerable targets for tactical aviation and loitering munitions.
The key to the success of such a long-range campaign is continuous fire control, combined with the suppression of local air defense systems.
Given that bridges and roads can be repaired relatively quickly, strikes must be carried out at a pace exceeding the speed at which engineering units can restore the roadway and associated infrastructure.
Transport links along the 180-kilometer border between the Odesa and Vinnytsia regions are far more developed than those along the border with the Kirovohrad region.
A distinctive feature of the area is that, to the west of the junction between the Odesa and Vinnytsia regions, there are borders with Moldova and the PMR.
In terms of aerial interdiction, this specific sector is more difficult to isolate due to the abundance of smaller road arteries. However, disabling the railway junctions at Slobidka and Vapniarka, along with the destruction of the eastern bypass route via Kropyvnytskyi, could largely paralyze heavy rail logistics in the southern direction.
In any case, an operation to penetrate Odesa could only succeed during the final stage of the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces—once Russian ground forces have breached the defensive lines towards Mykolaiv, crossed the Southern Bug River, and approached the city by land.
The situation appears to be unfolding in precisely that direction.
