The New Security Architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East

The “certainties” of the era that has irrevocably passed included the special relationship of the US with Turkey and Israel. This was partly understandable due to geography. Greece, although always very important in American planning, could not compete with the strategic importance of Turkey. Athens cultivated relations with Washington in an effort to prevent Ankara from abusing the great importance of the “Turkey plot” for American geostrategy. Turkish diplomacy put everything under negotiation, managing to extract high-value compensation.

Israel has always been considered a cornerstone of US policy in the Middle East. Therefore, it effectively enjoyed the American security guarantee. Its military power was financed generously every year. Despite individual disagreements, the two countries generally appeared aligned on all issues.

The war in Ukraine that changed the world and the terrorist attack by Hamas in southern Israel on October 7, 2023 constitute the framework for the development of any plan. Turkey and Israel faced the war in Ukraine in the light of their national interests, leaving the “ideological” response to geopolitically naive Europe. The opening of the Middle Eastern front was probably not disconnected from that of Ukraine.

The implications at a global level are obvious. The new security architecture of the Middle East was affected, with Israel targeting Iran, in addition to its “proxies” (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis), managing to drag the USA along. The overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria initially appeared to lead to a convergence of Israeli and Turkish interests. However, it subsequently evolved into competition between the two countries, affecting Greece and Cyprus. Turkey wanted to be in Israel’s place and control the Middle East on behalf of the US.

The Trilateral Strategic Cooperation

The trilateral Greece-Cyprus-Israel fits into this environment. Netanyahu linked the Trilateral to the threat of the neo-Ottoman visions of the Erdogan regime. The strange amalgam of extreme nationalism and Islamism has changed the regional security equation for everyone. It has, however, opened an invisible front between the US and Israel. Washington avoids clashing with Ankara, even though the former has made life difficult for the latter, with the refusal to sell the F-35s being simply an emblematic conflict that conceals a particularly problematic symbiosis.

The inability of the Americans to become independent from the geopolitical obsession of the “irreplaceable Turkey” is being dealt with lazily by Athens and Nicosia. It is exhausted in a general “grumbling” behind closed doors, while in practice the approach with Ankara is sought, with “calm waters” having been reduced to a doctrine of Greek foreign policy.

This is not the case with Israel, despite the $3.8 billion in free annual military aid for a decade ($38 billion). The agreement was concluded in 2016 under the Obama administration and expires this year. The new negotiation, which may have already begun, is certainly a parameter that must be taken into account. The Israelis now consider Turkey a top threat and clearly do not follow Washington in its ambivalent stance towards Erdogan.

Jerusalem or Washington?

This stance creates a special situation for Athens to manage, which is called upon to decide whether to follow Jerusalem or Washington, since the two are following different paths. Although Greece formally follows a policy of deterrence, its political system fears the possibility of a deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations and military escalation. The political system in Athens indulges in national-patriotic coronations, but shows no willingness or intellectual readiness to manage the challenges.

The domestic audience is manipulated with easily digestible narratives. However, this does not work in the international environment, which credibly threatens to demolish the virtual reality built by partisan self-interest in Greece. Since the Tripartite focuses on security issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel’s motivation for strategic cooperation with Greece and Cyprus is the coordinated response to the common threat. Athens must align with Israel.

Jerusalem, however, focuses on the essence and is not interested in “calm waters” between Greece and Turkey, if the price includes giving up so as not to disturb Ankara. Having read Athens’s stance towards Turkey well, it considers the policy of harsh deterrence incompatible with meaningless discussions aimed at avoiding the exercise of legitimate rights, which it declares that the Tripartite wants to protect.

No matter how much it does not want to, no matter how inconvenient it is, Athens must make its choices. And given Washington’s stance towards Ankara, every choice has a cost. Greece’s choice will strengthen or damage the Tripartite’s credibility. Turkey knows from experience that exerting military pressure on Greece produces results. Even if Athens resists – as in 2020 – in the end it will again seek de-escalation and calm waters at the expense of the drastic change in the data on the ground.

If, for example, we return to the normality of daily violations and air battles with armed aircraft, will anyone bother to discuss at the level of strategic partnerships the possibility of a drastic response to Turkish challenges? Netanyahu did not hesitate to announce as a national goal the investment of 100 billion dollars, over the next decade, for the total de-reliance on foreign suppliers, as his country faced embargoes from various countries during the war in Gaza.

They know about embargoes…

The case is reminiscent of Turkey, after the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the American arms embargo, which is considered the beginning of the flourishing of the Turkish defense industry that we see today. The Turkish defense industry, at that time, was even behind the… Greek one! One can understand what the investment of such an amount in an existing industrial infrastructure that is considered one of the leading in the world could mean for the Israeli industry. And although the countries that imposed embargoes because of Gaza do not include the USA, it would be naive to exclude them from the recipients of Netanyahu’s message.

The decision may cause complications, given the abundant free military aid that the Jewish state receives. The agreement, which expires in 2026, provided for $3.8 billion per year for a decade! Consequently, in the best case scenario, the Israeli prime minister has created a very strong bargaining chip, as discussions on the renewal of the agreement have probably already begun.

However, when Israel passionately defends its independence and the ability to decide for itself and not Washington about its national security, one understands the criteria by which its strategic partnerships and the prospect of their development into alliances are evaluated… Does this seriously concern Athens, which is addicted to having… everyone happy?

This is objectively impossible and carries the real risk of everyone being dissatisfied! That is where the appeasing attitude towards actors who promote their own interests leads. A rational redefinition of Greek red lines is urgently needed, guided not by supposed third-party balancing, but by the national interest.

When Trump declares in front of Netanyahu, who is joking – with veiled irony – that he is thinking of giving the F-35 to Erdogan’s Turkish friend, he may be saying what the real recipient of the message wants to hear. If it doesn’t happen, Netanyahu will be the “bad guy”. Only if it doesn’t suit him politically, at least he doesn’t care if he upsets the Turks!

About the author

The Liberal Globe is an independent online magazine that provides carefully selected varieties of stories. Our authoritative insight opinions, analyses, researches are reflected in the sections which are both thematic and geographical. We do not attach ourselves to any political party. Our political agenda is liberal in the classical sense. We continue to advocate bold policies in favour of individual freedoms, even if that means we must oppose the will and the majority view, even if these positions that we express may be unpleasant and unbearable for the majority.

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