Turkey had been a major arms importer for many decades. Its economic integration with the West since 1945 and its subsequent accession to NATO had damaged even the beginnings of a domestic arms industry, the most modern Western weapons systems were now freely available and relatively cheap due to US-NATO military aid. The invasion of Cyprus in 1974 brought a first turning point, as it led to a first temporary embargo, which worried Ankara and forced it to draw up a new policy regarding armaments programs.
As a result, the Turkish state wanted to become less dependent on arms imports. Thus, from the 1980s onwards, it carried out a coordinated program of import substitution. The internal war with the Kurds, which caused negative headlines internationally, led the Federal Republic of Germany to an informal embargo on weapons systems on which the Turkish military machine depended significantly, making the Turkish leadership realize that arms imports were ultimately a risky policy that was contrary to the country’s interests.
Today, the TB2 Bayraktar drones manufactured in Turkey are no longer unknown flying objects in the Middle East, Africa and Europe, but significant arms exports. Their operational missions only cause a stir when they are particularly spectacular, such as, for example, in April 2022, when they participated in the sinking of the Moskva, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. And the next generation, the TB3, has been in testing for some time and is reportedly about to be presented.
Other armament projects such as the development of the Atak helicopter, the Altay main battle tank, the Anka-3 stealth drone, the Gökberk anti-drone laser system and the KAAN stealth fighter aircraft all demonstrate that decision-makers in Ankara are pursuing three strategic defense and security priorities. The first such priority is complete independence from international suppliers, with over 100 domestic companies already producing military hardware. The second is the systematic promotion and financial support of technological innovation through the acquisition of European defense companies, through cooperation with domestic and foreign start-ups and universities. And the third priority is to steadily increase Turkey’s ability to export weapons systems.
In 2024, Turkey’s military budget was $25 billion, ranking 17th in the world. 1.9% of the gross domestic product was thus spent on armaments. Compared to 2015, this represented a marginal increase in the share by 0.1%, which is explained by the worsening economic crisis in the late 2010s that had a limiting effect on military spending, despite high foreign policy ambitions.
Today, the Turkish arms industry has been in the spotlight of military experts due to its exports. By the end of 2023, drones from the manufacturer Baykar had been exported to more than 30 countries, including European countries and countries in the Middle East and Africa. They are particularly attractive for so-called asymmetric wars. Armored vehicles are also exported to Pakistan, while Portugal has chosen Turkish corvettes.
This is also reflected in the data: Between 2015 and 2019, Turkey accounted for 1.7% of global arms imports and in the period from 2020 to 2024 it accounted for 1.1%. Arms exports developed in the opposite direction, i.e. while Turkish arms still accounted for 0.8% of global exports from 2015 to 2019, this doubled to 1.7% for 2020 to 2024, i.e. 11th place in the global ranking.
These figures also show that more arms are now being exported than imported. However, although there have been increasing reports of an increase in arms exports since the 2010s, this has not translated into a sustained export surplus for a long time. Slight export surpluses in the years 2014 to 2017 were followed by significant import surpluses in 2018 and 2019. Since 2020, the trade balance has been consistently and significantly positive, due both to a short-term crisis-related drop in imports in 2020/21 and to a rapid increase in exports that accelerated again with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. In 2024, Turkey exported arms worth $7.12 billion.
The quantitative developments also reflect a qualitative change. Starting from individual projects for the substitution of imported weapons and systems, Turkey now produces more or less the entire range of conventional weapons. As early as the 1980s, the first systems for imported aircraft were manufactured domestically, and as early as the 1990s, contracts, for example with German naval equipment companies, provided not only for the acquisition of ships, but also for their construction in domestic shipyards. After decades of targeted import substitution and increasing export promotion, Turkish industry boasts that it will soon produce its own fighter aircraft. The stealth Kaan already made its maiden flight last year and is planned to be exported even to Indonesia later.
The creation of domestic production increased the military-political room for maneuver of the Turkish government with reference to geopolitical trends and the balance of power, both at a regional level in the Eastern Mediterranean, see revisionist policy at the expense of Greece, and at a global level with alliances that Ankara is forging in Africa, Central Asia and Europe.
Today, the weak point of Turkish armaments is no longer the import of entire weapons systems, but international patents and joint ventures with international manufacturers. Politically, this means that direct embargo measures against armaments can hardly have a direct effective effect on upcoming or ongoing Turkish military operations.
