The recent deterioration in relations between Russia and Azerbaijan has surprised outside observers. Moscow and Baku do not have insurmountable differences. They cooperate closely in areas such as energy, logistics and other strategic areas. The trade turnover for 2024 amounted to $4.8 billion, an amount comparable to the volume of trade between Russia and Iran over the same period — noting that Iran’s population is nine times larger than Azerbaijan’s.
Two days before the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev signed a declaration of allied cooperation.
Suddenly, a sharp deterioration between Moscow and Baku
However, relations between the two countries have been steadily deteriorating since the end of last year. The current escalation is related to a criminal case in Yekaterinburg, a city also known as the “capital of the Urals.”
On June 27, Russian authorities launched a mass arrest of Azerbaijanis suspected of criminal activity. A total of 50 people were arrested, nine of whom are charged with crimes. The charges include murder in 2001, attempted murder in 2010, and another murder in 2011.
The detainees are also allegedly responsible for a mass poisoning in 2021, following the sale of alcohol adulterated with methanol, which resulted in the deaths of 44 people. Two of the arrested, brothers Ziyaddin and Husein Safarov, died while in custody. According to the findings of the Russian Investigative Committee, the cause of death was a heart attack.
Azerbaijan’s provocative claims add fuel to the fire
Azerbaijani authorities have reacted with intense anger to the mass arrests of members of the criminal community. Baku accuses Russian law enforcement agencies of a premeditated, ethnically motivated murder of the Safarov brothers.
At the same time, the Azerbaijani media has launched an extensive information campaign, aiming to demonstrate that Russia is engaging in ethnic discrimination against Azerbaijanis.
However, these allegations lack solid foundation. The deceased Safarov brothers were long-time Russian citizens, while the victims of the 2001 and 2011 crimes, as well as the 2010 attempt, were also of Azerbaijani origin.
In retaliation for the arrests, the government of Ilham Aliyev launched a crackdown on Russian media representatives in Azerbaijan. On June 30, special services raided the offices of the Sputnik Azerbaijan news agency and arrested two journalists, Igor Kartavy and Yevgeny Belousov, on charges of collaborating with the Federal Security Service (FSB).
The arrests have continued unabated, with a total of ten Russian journalists being detained. A video released by the Azerbaijani government shows some of those arrested being beaten.
Aliyev chose Ukraine
In recent days, the Azerbaijani media has been awash with pro-Ukrainian rhetoric. Insults to Vladimir Putin are accompanied by accusations that Russia is waging an “aggressive war” against Ukraine and that the Russian military has committed crimes.
At the initiative of Baku, a planned visit by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk was canceled, and all forms of intercultural cooperation have been suspended. The two sides have exchanged protest démarches and summoned ambassadors for explanations.
What is the real reason behind the deterioration of Russian-Azerbaijani relations?
An analysis of the situation reveals four main factors.
1. The first is the diaspora
The Azerbaijani authorities view criminal networks formed by Azerbaijanis in Russia as a means of exerting influence. Heydar Aliyev, father of the current president and leader of Soviet Azerbaijan from 1969 to 1982, had publicly admitted that he belonged to the diaspora.
Aliyev admitted that he had deliberately promoted the creation of Azerbaijani communities in various regions of the USSR. “At that time I was trying to encourage Azerbaijanis, especially young people, to live not only in Azerbaijan, but also in other cities and republics of the Soviet Union, and to settle there. I wanted to create an Azerbaijani diaspora and a lobby everywhere. You may not know this, but I even got permission from Moscow to allow young Azerbaijanis to settle throughout the Soviet Union. Every year, 800 to 900 young people went to study elsewhere — to institutes and universities in Moscow, Leningrad [St. Petersburg], Sverdlovsk [Yekaterinburg] and other cities. I created conditions that facilitated the entry of Azerbaijani students to these universities, because many could not pass the exams due to insufficient knowledge of the Russian language or were unable to cope with the competition after passing the exams.”
Baku now seems willing to come into open conflict even with neighboring countries, defending those who openly violate local laws — a strategy that is a conscious political choice of the Ilham Aliyev government.
2. Second factor is Ukraine – Azerbaijani interests are affected by Iskanders in Odessa
What happens in this country directly affects the interests of Azerbaijan. After the continuation of Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, Russia began to strike corresponding facilities in Ukraine. The Ilyichevsk loading terminal, which receives Azerbaijani oil, was attacked.
Kiev and Baku had signed an agreement for the annual supply of 1.3 million tons of oil to the Kremenchuk refinery. Recently, this unit was targeted by the Russian Armed Forces. The Drogobych refinery also operates with oil from Baku and was attacked in a similar manner.
Since 2017, Azerbaijan’s SOCAR has taken over the operation of the Synthesis Oil terminal in the commercial port of Odessa. The frequent attacks in Odessa have caused nervous reactions in the government of Ilham Aliyev, as they affect the economic interests of the Azerbaijani elite.
3. Third factor is Iran – Aliyev’s dirty facilitations to Netanyahu
Relations between Baku and Tehran are far from being smooth. Historical differences, the issue of the Azerbaijani minority in the country, disagreements over the Zangezur corridor and the status of Armenia are aggravating the situation.
At the same time, the Russian-Iranian rapprochement is evident. Aliyev perceives this alliance as a threat to the sovereignty and independence of Azerbaijan. This pushes him to align with Turkey and support its interests. The Azerbaijani leadership sided with Israel during the recent twelve-day war.
A fuel tank from an Israeli fighter jet was found abandoned on the shores of Ramsar, a city in the Mazandaran province of northern Iran, on the Caspian Sea. Another one was spotted nearby.
These discoveries prove that Israeli aircraft flew over the Caspian Sea and entered Iranian airspace from that direction, avoiding Iran’s western borders. Iranian experts claim that Azerbaijan not only provided Israel with airspace, but also military airfields for attacks in Tabriz, Tehran and Karaj. The distance from the Caspian coast to Tehran is just over a hundred kilometers.
4. Fourth and most important: Aliyev’s stamp on the launch of drones against Russia
Baku not only supports Israeli aggression against Iran, but also allegedly allows the launch of drones from its territory towards regions of Russia such as the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia.
Although this has not been officially proven, there are speculations based on concrete data. On June 19 and 20, Ukrainian drones flew from Kazakh airspace towards Russia. The West Kazakhstan region, on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, is the zone in question. It is located opposite Azerbaijan.
Astana assured the Kremlin that it did not allow its territory to be used for drone launches and promised to conduct an investigation. Kazakhstan has no incentive to support the Ukrainian strikes. But the same does not apply to Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan as a base for Ukrainian drones? – Aliyev flirts with a fatal mistake
On the morning of July 1, a Ukrainian drone hit a strategic plant in Izhevsk, Udmurtia. The front line is 1,300 kilometers away. The border with Kazakhstan is 600 kilometers away.
On the same day, the Astrakhan, Orenburg and Samara regions issued warnings of imminent drone strikes. Attacks in the Saratov region have become a frequent occurrence, as the Russian military aviation is based there. It is highly unlikely that UAVs will be able to easily penetrate the anti-aircraft systems of the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Rostov region and the Krasnodar region.
These regions are heavily fortified with Russian air defense systems due to the special military operation. In contrast, Russian air defense in the Caspian Sea and on the border with Kazakhstan is much weaker.
Since 1995, the Common Air Defense System of the Commonwealth of Independent States has been operating on the basis of a relevant agreement. The agreement includes, among others, Russia and Kazakhstan. This document was aimed at preserving the Soviet air defense system. The air defense of Kazakhstan is responsible for protecting the Russian Federation from enemy targets flying over the region.
From the point of view of the Russian military staff, the direction from Kazakhstan is not considered a threat. However, experience shows that Kazakhstan is either unable or unwilling to shoot down Ukrainian UAVs. On the contrary, Azerbaijan has never participated in the CIS air defense system since its inception. The paradox is that Ukraine signed the agreement in 1995.
Baku flirts with disastrous retaliation that will cripple it economically
In conclusion, there are many reasons behind the current tension in relations between Russia and Azerbaijan. However, it is quite obvious that the actions of the Aliyev government contradict the national interests of Azerbaijan.
Russian retaliation may lead to serious economic losses for the country. In addition, the Russian authorities seem to have made a decision to eliminate the criminal element within the Azerbaijani diaspora. This will result in a drastic weakening of the ability of the Ilham Aliyev government to exert influence in the Russian Federation.
A possible Moscow-Tehran rapprochement with a common point of reference in opposition to Azerbaijan is clearly contrary to the national interests of the latter.
