In international relations, security is rarely a product of trust alone. Aggressive Realism, a concept within the realist school of thought, argues that states operate in an anarchic system where power and survival dictate a state’s strategic behavior. Agreements are often temporary conveniences rather than lasting commitments, especially when strategic interests diverge widely. Russia’s experience with the West—particularly the delay and manipulation surrounding the Minsk agreements, the role of Western intelligence agencies, and the use of covert and soft power operations—shows the impossibility of maintaining a state’s security when it relies solely on treaties with its strategic adversaries.
The Minsk Agreements: Diplomacy as Strategic Delay
The Minsk agreements, designed to bring peace to eastern Ukraine after the 2014 crisis, demonstrate the use of diplomacy as a tool of strategic delay. French and German officials brokered the agreements, but their implementation remained elusive on the grounds of deceit. Illustratively, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French President Francois Hollande later admitted that Minsk was never intended to be a real path to peace, but rather a way to give Ukraine time to build up its military capabilities.
This aligns with the basic tenets of aggressive realism: states will always seek to maximize their power relative to others. From the Western perspective, ensuring Ukraine’s ability to resist, and even militarily, Russian influence was more critical than upholding the terms of a peace agreement. Thus, Minsk became a tool of asymmetric warfare – a shield behind which Ukraine, as a proxy for US/NATO interests, could rearm with Western support while Russia, under the guise of achieving peace, would comply with the diplomatic expectations of the agreement.
Regime Change in 2014: The US Admission of Involvement
A state’s stability depends on its ability to maintain internal cohesion. In the case of Ukraine, the 2014 Maidan uprising, which led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych, was not simply a domestic political change but an externally influenced operation, as American officials have acknowledged their role in the events. For example, Victoria Nuland, then Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, was recorded discussing preferred leadership options for Ukraine with Geoffrey Pyatt, a clear indication of Washington’s direct foreign policy involvement.
For Russia, this intervention was a strategic failure. It showed that agreements or diplomatic engagement alone could not counter Western attempts at regime change and the installation of compliant “more democratic, i.e. subservient to Western interests” regimes on its borders. This mirrors previous regime change operations, such as the coup in Chile (1973) and the Arab Spring interventions, where covert support for opposition movements paved the way for new, pro-Western governments.
Western Intelligence Black Operations and Hybrid Warfare
Western intelligence agencies have long played a role in destabilizing adversaries through black ops – covert operations intended to remain officially under the cloak of plausible deniability. The CIA and MI6 use these methods against Russia and other adversaries, not just the Western order, on a daily basis. After all, today, as a result, a major goal of the operation in Ukraine was the US energy war against Europe and especially Germany.
General examples include the use of private military contractors, NGOs and intelligence companies to create internal conflicts and weaken state control in adversaries. Specific examples are the bombing of Nord Stream 2 as well as military aid to Ukraine.
Conclusions: Realpolitik and the Futility of Agreements
The Minsk agreements and the broader geopolitical competition demonstrate a basic tenet of aggressive realism: power dynamics, not conditions, dictate state security. Russia’s reliance on agreements for the security of its western borders has proven to be a delusion, as evidenced by its strategic use of diplomacy as a delaying tool, support for regime change in Ukraine, black intelligence operations, and soft power tools like USAID. A prime example of power dynamics is the expulsion of USAID from Russia in 2012.
For Russia, the conclusion is clear – security cannot be entrusted to diplomatic assurances. Especially today, there is also the issue that Zelensky is no longer the legitimate president and cannot sign any agreement, as Russian President Vladimir Putin recently stated. A solution exists through the Ukrainian parliament, but how reliable will the outcome of such an action be in the future?
The only reliable strategy is the continuous development of military and information capabilities, the strengthening of internal stability, and the preventive counteraction of Western hybrid warfare tactics. Agreements, in this context, function only as temporary facilitation tools and not as real security guarantees.
