Putin: “not afraid of deterioration” in the face of increasing Western aggression – How much longer?

Will Putin’s declaration that he “does not fear escalation” hold up in the face of increasing Western aggression?

As the war in Ukraine enters its third year, the prospect of further escalation seems to be in the spotlight. Recent discussions about Germany’s potential approval of Ukraine’s use of Taurus missiles, long-range weapons that can strike deep into Russian territory, including Moscow, have raised concerns among analysts and politicians. This development raises a crucial question: how much longer can Russia maintain a defensive posture toward its real enemies outside Ukraine, and what might happen if Russia itself decides to move toward a more aggressive strategy?

  • The framework for the discussion

This analysis is based on aggressive realism, a theory of international relations that argues that great powers will act aggressively when their survival is threatened, even if doing so involves high risks (Mearsheimer 2001). While this approach does not predict Russia’s actions with certainty, it does provide a framework for understanding how Moscow might respond under increasing pressure.

The paper does not predict inevitable war or nuclear catastrophe. Instead, it examines possible strategic paths based on current trends, highlighting the dangers of miscalculation in an increasingly fragile environment.

The Strategic Importance of the Taurus Missile

The Taurus KEPD 350 missile, with a range of up to 500 kilometers and stealth capabilities, would allow Ukraine to strike targets far beyond the front lines — including targets near Moscow and other critical Russian infrastructure (Schulte 2023). Unlike previous weapons provided by the West — which were primarily defensive or of limited range — the Taurus represents a qualitative strategic shift.

From the perspective of aggressive realism, such a move could be interpreted by Russia as a clear and immediate threat to its national security. According to Mearsheimer (2001), no great power can chronically tolerate the possibility of an attack within its borders. If approved for use, the missile could force Moscow to reconsider its current strategy, which is currently based on gradual reflexive responses and only towards Ukrainian territory.

Putin’s rhetoric versus strategic realities

President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that Russia “is not afraid of escalation” (Putin 2024), projecting strength and determination. However, history shows that nuclear states rarely ignore insidious threats (Waltz 1979). It is a fact that Russia has so far maintained a fairly restrained attitude towards all states that supply the Ukrainian proxy state with weapons, troops, and network centric warfare capabilities. But a direct attack on Moscow or other major cities in the Russian Federation with weapons that Ukraine could not launch, such as the Taurus missile, could push the Kremlin from reflexive to more drastic measures.

This does not mean that Putin will automatically react with military means. But from a strategic perspective, continued reflexive inaction could strengthen NATO’s self-confidence and undermine Russia’s deterrent power, possibly causing further deterioration.

NATO’s credibility under pressure

A potential Russian attack on NATO logistical hubs in countries like Poland or Romania would certainly test NATO’s famous commitment to mutual defense (Article 5). However, recent political developments cast a shadow over the alliance’s unity.

Former United States President Donald Trump, who has publicly questioned NATO’s value, has suggested that he would not defend members that do not meet defense spending targets (Trump 2024). Surely Trump would not want to risk nuclear war with Russia for the sake of elites who want a war of attrition with Russia through the proxy punching bag of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, European countries remain militarily unprepared for a large-scale conflict. The German Bundeswehr reports chronic shortages of basic equipment (Bundeswehr Report 2023), while public opposition to war against Russia exceeds 60% in most EU countries (Eurobarometer 2024).

All this together undermines NATO’s ability to threaten Russia with credible retaliation. In addition, the rhetoric of creating a “European NATO” is straining its financial resources. This is why NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte complains about high pensions in Europe.

China’s role

China may also have an interest in preventing a definitive Western victory in Ukraine. A weak Russia could leave China more alone in its dispute with the United States over Taiwan. Some analysts suggest that China may increase its support for Russia—not necessarily through direct military intervention, but through economic or diplomatic assistance (Chen 2024).

North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia (Kim 2024) demonstrates how there are allies that openly offer military assistance.

However, the expansion of the war into a broader Russia-China-West conflict opens up the possibility of nuclear escalation.

The Myth of “Tactical Nuclear Weapons”

One of the most dangerous assumptions in modern strategic thinking is the belief that nuclear weapons can be used in a controlled and limited manner, what some call “tactical nuclear weapons.” However, researchers such as Herman Kahn, as early as the 1960s, have argued that once nuclear weapons are used, control of the fallout becomes extremely difficult.

Even a single explosion can cause widespread radiation, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects, and global climate disruption, resulting in millions of deaths and humanitarian catastrophe (Schell 2023). As Jonathan Schell wrote in The Fate of the Earth , the consequences of nuclear war extend far beyond the battlefield and cannot be easily controlled.

Thus, the use of any nuclear weapon — even in a seemingly limited context — carries the risk of the situation getting completely out of control.

Nuclear weapons are either strategic with a destructive potential of 100 kilotons and more in megatons (Tsar Bomba), or substrategic like the bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (15-20kilotons), they are never tactical. That is, in no case can they limit their destructive potential to a limited and controlled area and for a certain period of time.

The dangers of a wrong assessment

Russia’s current strategy — reflexive and measured — cannot be maintained indefinitely. If the West continues to expand the reach of Ukraine, especially with weapons like Taurus, Moscow may feel compelled to worsen the situation in order to maintain its strategic position.

However, any significant escalation carries with it the risk of unforeseen consequences. Neither NATO nor Russia can afford to lose in a direct conflict, making miscalculation particularly dangerous. The idea that nuclear weapons provide a controlled escalation option is dangerously misleading.

Ultimately, this analysis serves as a warning — not a prediction. It is a reminder that in matters of great power politics and nuclear deterrence, the line between strategy and survival is very thin.

References

  • Bundeswehr Report. (2023). Defense Readiness Assessment . German Ministry of Defense.
  • Chen, D. (2024). Sino-Russian Axis: The New Geopolitical Order . Oxford University Press.
  • Eurobarometer. (2024). Public Opinion on NATO and Russia . European Commission.
  • Freedman, L. (2019). The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy . Palgrave.
  • Galeotti, M. (2023). Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine . Osprey.
  • Kahn, H. (1960). On Thermonuclear War . Princeton University Press.
  • Kim, J. (2024). “North Korea’s Role in the Ukraine War.” 38 North .
  • Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics . Norton.
  • Mearsheimer, J. (2014). “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” Foreign Affairs .
  • Putin, V. (2024). Speech to the Federal Assembly . Kremlin.ru.
  • Schell, J. (2023). The Fate of the Earth Revisited . Stanford University Press.
  • Schulte, P. (2023). “Taurus Missiles and the Escalation Dynamic.” RUSI Journal .
  • Trump, D. (2024). Remarks at Rally, New Hampshire . CNN.
  • Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics . McGraw-Hill.

About the author

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