The record exports of the Turkish defense industry in 2024 are proof of the success of Ankara’s 25-year effort to make Turkey a global player in the manufacture of weapons systems of the 21st century. Turkey’s emergence as a major arms supplier was helped by the decisive interventions on the battlefields of the weapons systems deployed in the Syrian and Libyan wars, as well as in the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) war in 2020. The program to build the manufacturing capabilities of Turkey’s defense industry was developed as a pillar of Turkey’s strategic imperative to operate geopolitically as an independent actor. With enhanced strategic autonomy, Turkey is currently expanding its geopolitical footprint in the Middle East and North Africa, becoming the primary actor in Syria and Libya, as well as countries in Africa.
Turkey’s arms exports increased by 106% in the period 2019-2023 compared to the period 2014-2018, according to a March 11 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Turkey became the world’s 11th largest arms exporter, after the United States, France, Russia, Italy, South Korea, China, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain and Israel.
Increasing its global market share through the sale of armored vehicles, drones, warships and electronic warfare systems, the Turkish defense industry serves some 180 countries. While Turkish arms sales provide Ankara with geopolitical leverage within the NATO alliance and in various geographic theaters, Turkey’s growing sales in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region deserve special attention, as recent exports to Arab monarchies have the potential to expand Turkey’s strategic partnerships and broaden its role as a regional security provider.
“Turkey exported the largest volume of arms to the United Arab Emirates with 15%, followed by Qatar (13%) and Pakistan (11%). It was the fourth largest supplier to sub-Saharan Africa with a share of 6.3%, driven by deliveries of combat helicopters to Nigeria and trainer/fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to various states,” the SIPRI report notes. “At the same time, its imports shrank by 29% from 2014-2018. It is the 17th largest importer of arms. It imported most of its weapons from Spain, Italy and Russia.”
Turkey’s defense and security policy is increasingly characterized by the goal of achieving autonomy. Ankara is trying to reduce its dependence on foreign partners in conceptual, technological and logistical terms, as well as in the manufacture of military equipment. In other words, it is focusing on local production capacity, while limiting supplies from abroad. In order to achieve this policy goal, companies operating in the defense sector are institutionally interconnected, local supply chain networks are expanded, and relevant research capabilities are subject to central coordination by the state-owned Defense Industry Agency (SSB), which reports directly to the Turkish president.
Equipment projects such as the development of the TB2 unmanned drone system, the Atak helicopter, the Altay main battle tank, the Anka-3 stealth drone, the Gökberk anti-drone laser system, and the KAAN stealth fighter aircraft all demonstrate that decision-makers in Ankara are pursuing three strategic defense and security priorities. The first such priority is increasing independence from international providers. The second is the systematic promotion and financial support of technological innovation through cooperation with domestic and foreign startups and universities. And the third priority is to steadily increase Turkey’s ability to export various weapons systems.
Over the past decade, military power and the reach of the defense industry have become a key pillar of Turkish foreign policy. Interventions in the conflicts in Syria, northern Iraq, and Libya, and engagement with African countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, underscore the depth of this policy. All of this demonstrates the relationship between flexible multi-alignment with various countries, on the one hand, and a foreign policy approach that includes military intervention and increasing arms exports, on the other. Moreover, Turkey does not hesitate to sell its weapons to countries on opposite sides of a military conflict. Nor are these arms purchases negatively affected by regime changes in individual states.
Turkey’s drive to establish itself as an internationally recognized arms manufacturer and global exporter of advanced weapons systems poses challenges to its NATO partners and demonstrates its determination to enhance its strategic autonomy.
This approach extends to the development and production of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems. Turkish companies are currently developing the first stealth fighter aircraft, the KAAN, which is planned to be built entirely from domestic components. Serial production is planned to begin by 2028. If this happens, the Turkish Air Force will be able to gradually replace the aging stock of American F-16s. In this context, Ankara’s request to acquire the Eurofighter Typhoon can be seen as a search for alternatives during the transition period. There is speculation that in case the German or Italian government does not approve the sale of the Eurofighter, Ankara is considering acquiring the Chinese JF-17 Thunder fighter jet.
The potential sale of Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft to Turkey is more than a commercial transaction. It must be seen in the broader context of NATO interoperability, that is, keeping Turkey in military-industrial systems under the leadership of the Alliance. This entails both costs and risks. Turkey’s continued participation in NATO is central to the Alliance’s security interests. The transformation of the Turkish defense industry over the past two decades has gone hand in hand with the redefinition of Ankara’s geostrategic interests. And this gives Ankara such political influence that it goes beyond military power and institutional alignments with NATO.
Thus, the successes of the Turkish defense industry do not only concern advanced weapons systems and increased exports. They concern geopolitical currents in the balance of power, both at a regional level in the Eastern Mediterranean, see revisionist policy to the detriment of Greece, and at a global level with alliances that Ankara is forging in Africa, Central Asia and Europe.
