The world is watching the development of the crisis between Israel and Iran with bated breath. The Islamic Republic has threatened to launch an attack on the Jewish state in retaliation for the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, which resulted in the death of senior military commanders of the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran). A careful analysis of the data gives it some interesting dimensions.
The Americans are warning in the last few hours, that this attack can be launched at any time, even within the next 48 hours. They describe the threats as real and visible and there are reports that they are talking to Tehran in an attempt to deter the Iranian attack.
Apparently, the American warnings are based on the intelligence gathered by the intelligence services with a multitude of technical and non-technical means. However, this information could be fueled by Iran itself which is setting the stage for mobilization. But all military actions hide a political goal. Hatred is a perennial factor in war, but it does not automatically lead to it. It has also proven to be manipulable by the warlords.
A fundamental observation is that a strike that is announced essentially “burns” the advantage of surprise, which was not there anyway, because it was retaliation. Consequently, the crisis must be analyzed in greater depth in an effort to derive safer estimates. To begin with, if the blow to the consulate and the threat of Iranian reprisals are isolated two separate conclusions are drawn.
Copying the Israeli strategy
1. The first is that the Iranian “punishment” would be disproportionate compared to the Israeli attack. Of course, the characterization of “disproportionate” weakens if the totality of Israeli strikes against Iranian targets in Syria and Iran itself is added to the picture.
2. The second is that the disproportion takes on a different meaning if it is examined in the light of the well-known and historically documented Israeli “strategy of overreaction”! The goal has always been to enhance deterrence and affect the adversary’s calculations, even against relatively small security challenges, through the confidence they cultivate that they will respond with overwhelming blows.
Consequently, the Iranians may be able to copy this strategy, having studied Israel well for many years and having identical targeting. Their goal, therefore, is to nullify the Jewish state’s show-off strategy in practice. If the above is true, it is possible that Iran’s threats of mass retaliation are not necessarily aimed at their implementation, but at creating an effect, which will change the overall context of the confrontation between the two sides.
That is, if they did not respond in some way, the Iranians would lose their credibility and would not achieve the political objective behind any threat to use hard military power. So, once this chapter has opened, some Iranian retaliatory strike should be considered inevitable. What is up for debate is its severity.
Risk assessment
The possibility of carrying out the threat of a massive military strike with missiles and unmanned systems from many sides (Hezbollah and the Houthis, insofar as Hamas’s capabilities are currently neutralized) involves risk. This is a theoretical conclusion and what is important is to prove exactly how Tehran itself evaluates it. But what is the potential risk?
1. It would prove in practice that the organizations that will be involved in an auxiliary way, are “tools” of the Iranian strategy. This could legitimize any future move against them, effectively diminishing their value as strategic tools of the Iranians.
2. In the event that such a massive strike was launched, its effects would be assessed in practice and this would affect the strategic position of the Islamic Republic the next day. Obviously, its bargaining power would be dramatically enhanced in case of an impressive performance. However, experience teaches that the results on the ground are much poorer than the declarations that have preceded, with the aim of prevention. Once the deterrence collapses, however, the weapons have the say. The best use of the military tool is ensured when it remains as a policy tool. “Winning the war without a rifle” is a best-case scenario according to the greatest theorists of strategy and warfare throughout the ages.
3. Tehran would risk the launching of a coordinated strike by the Israeli armed forces, probably with American participation. This would literally do Israel a favor, insofar as the suspicion that has been expressed is valid, that by constantly pointing at Iran, it seeks to legitimize a crushing blow against it at this juncture, where there are developed very strong military – mainly aeronautical – forces in the Mediterranean and the Gulf.
What will Iran finally do?
These strikes could also include the Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Tehran would have every interest in preventing this possibility, without of course showing a face of weakness. This would nullify its great success, which is nothing more than building a wall of extensive deterrence against the Israelis, in their own neighborhood, through the aforementioned armed organizations. In essence, it has achieved significant projection of power, which, apart from its deterrent purpose, could prove to be a tool for expanding influence in other geopolitical regions, beyond the Middle East.
In conclusion, the ongoing strategic game is by definition very dangerous. Regardless of the real intentions of the two sides, the margin for error is both real and large. In this case, a generalized conflagration with geographical expansion of the conflicts could occur. Let’s not leave out of the equation the potential effects such a flare-up would have on the Ukrainian front. It could literally bury any hope Kiev has of reversing the situation.
The Iranians know this and apparently appreciate that the Israelis and Americans wish to avoid it at all costs. The Russians are theoretically interested in focusing Western attention on a front other than Ukraine. However, to the extent that the perspective of each great power is global, as are their interests, it would be frivolous and amateurish from an analytical point of view, to lightly charge the heart in Moscow, desire of a great conflagration in the Middle East.
This setting theoretically accounts for the harshness of Iranian rhetoric. And the Iranians know that their interests are not the same as Russia’s. They have no reason to suffer great destruction to serve anyone. Each country’s strategy aims to maximize security and serve its interests. This will at least guide Iran’s steps as a rational actor, as in Israel there is also Netanyahu’s desperate political situation which puts an additional parameter of uncertainty in determining the motivations of decisions safely.
Despite the large margin of loss of control, logic dictates that Iran has no margin not to respond, but it has every reason to avoid potentially devastating consequences at all levels. This is inconsistent with mass casualty rhetoric for the reasons explained. Iran with its strategy seems to have its eyes on the next day.
Conflict and war are not ends in themselves, but always serve some political goal. The question of his nuclear ambitions will always remain the big thorn. However, the only thing that is certain is that Tehran is in no way in the mood to kill itself and will not overestimate its strength. At least the military ones. His aim is to take advantage of the situation and the next day to find the Islamic Republic with an improved position on the geostrategic grand chessboard.
