The current wars in the Middle East and Ukraine are part of the crisis of US-led globalization, a crisis of colonialism that manifested itself in three stages: In the First World War with the transfer of colonies to dependent nation states. In the Second World War with the ethnic “wars of cleansing” during the post-colonial reorganization and with Israel becoming the West’s imperialist wedge in Palestinian territory. Finally, in the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the unhindered emergence of the USA as the “unique world power”, as most clearly described by Zbigniew Brzezinski.
The veil of globalization under which the US intended to permanently inherit the post-Cold War legacy of the collapsing Soviet Union is now opening in the wake of a fourth, possibly final, wave of decolonization. This development is creating new powers, bolstered by the growing self-confidence of former colonies in the prospect of a future multipolar order of independent nation-states. Deep down, this is a positive historical dynamic that aims not only beyond past colonial history, but also beyond the veneer of US “monopolar” dominance that emerged from it, and could usher in a new era, an era of global regionalism. and local cooperation of independent nation states.
This is where romantic political thinking oriented toward the cooperative preservation of our world with mutual respect for the diverse interests and cultural values of peoples and their societies can come in. Such thinking could set social limits to the dynamics of capital’s self-exploitation in the form of national competition. This would be a development in which the civilizations of the old and newly developing worlds could complement and cooperate in the peaceful exchange of their abilities and potentials and in the interest of a common concern for the further development of our world, rather than competing. among themselves or lead to world war.
But, romance in international relations is one thing and geopolitical escalations are another…
The process of the current, perhaps final, stage of decolonization, i.e. the tendency towards the formation of national, regional and local autonomy in a pluralistic, jointly shaped world, does not automatically take place in cooperative forms, nor does it automatically produce a multinational new order of equals social units and a new understanding of the common world economy, but at the same time it fuels explosive, perhaps extreme or aggressive forms of nationalism that come from the remnants of an unresolved history.
The most extreme expression of this today is the events in Ukraine and Israel, which today erupt as nationalist ulcers from the problematic reality of the “one world”. In Ukraine, this is happening as a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire, in the Middle East as a result of Israel’s colonization of Palestine as the spearhead of the West in the Arab world. We must expect further nationalist eruptions, where groups, countries and societies want to free themselves from post-colonial shackles but are not yet ready or, to put it more carefully, not yet capable of open economic and intercultural cooperation during of the emerging new pluralist order.
The conflicts in Ukraine and Israel fueled by the past can distort the formation of the possible multipolar order that is imminent today, dragging it into defection, into confrontation, into new “cleansing wars”, tending to a general disaster. This trend will exist as long as the governments of the current US-led unipolar order still manage to use local or regional conflicts, Western interest-driven state-building on the principle of “divide and rule” to maintain their sovereignty ( to use Brzezinski’s words again) and to prevent the emergence of global rivals.
To be clear, these wars are not about defending “democracy” in either Ukraine or Israel. In any case, to put it another way, conflicts are only the lever for the still (?) world power of the USA to overthrow its global rivals. Through Ukraine, they aim at Russia, China and also Europe, which is exhausted in the undeclared war with Russia. Through Israel, they target the oil states of the Middle and South East, which, following Russia and China, are poised to disengage from Western hegemony and must be prevented at all costs from doing so.
In Israel, to be clear, it is not about fighting anti-Semitism, and in Ukraine it is certainly not about general enforcement of “human rights” and “freedom.” To recognize this, it is enough to look at the current battlefields in Ukraine and Israel, namely the continuous shelling of Donbas by Kiev since 2014, as well as the relentless shelling of the Gaza Strip by Israel, which goes far beyond the provocation by Hamas. We must not forget the terrorism of the settlers in the West Bank against the Palestinian residents. Justifications such as that these wars are being used to defend “democracy” against “Russian aggression,” as Zelensky states, against “terrorism,” as Netanyahu puts it, shrink in the context of these real events in Ukraine as well as in Israel in simple movements of the lips, in ideological veils that hide the real facts.
The actual events must be described quite differently. In Ukraine, the historical advantage of the post-colonial impulse, which could lead to a self-defined society in cooperative diversity as a mediator between Russia and Europe, has turned into an aggressive racist latent nationalism, according to which Russians are “subhuman ». The gain for the US is a divided Eurasia in which Europe and Russia waste their energies in half-declared war with each other. Israel has shifted its role from victim of history to perpetrator with its merciless response to the Palestinians, whom Jewish military leaders say must be fought like “animals”. However, here, the gain of the “one world power” could turn into a strategic boomerang due to the anger of the Arab, Muslim and, by extension, the southern world.
Thus, with the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, the relations between Moscow and the West have entered a phase of direct and blatant competition, in a real and acute Cold War. The military operation in Ukraine marked a new stage for Russia. The internal, external, defense and economic policy of the country at this stage served one and only one goal. Other areas of interest were mainly examined through this lens. This does not mean that they have ceased to exist, but there has been a change in the Russian priority system and its readiness to allocate resources. Focusing on Ukraine, there was one particular change that proved particularly important for Russia in the context of the Middle East.
The undisputed strength of Moscow’s Middle East policy rested on its ability to engage in objective, pragmatic dialogues with almost all political forces there, including those that are staunchly opposed to one another. These included Iran and Israel, various Palestinian and Lebanese factions, parties to the conflict in Libya and Yemen, the Turks and Kurds, the Saudis and Iranians, and to some extent those involved in the Syrian civil war.
As a result of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia has lost this unique capability, or at least it has been significantly weakened. Moreover, Russia’s relations with various nations and groups depended on its position and ties with the US. This change had the greatest impact on Russia’s relations with Israel. After the end of the confrontation in the late 1980s, relations between the two countries developed actively, not only at the political level, but mainly at the human level.
After the start of the Ukrainian conflict, Israeli authorities criticized Moscow, but tried to maintain a balance and did not directly join the sanctions coalition against Russia led by Washington. However, the growing cooperation between Moscow and Iran, which Moscow needed to achieve its goals in Ukraine, put Israel in an increasingly difficult position. The attack by Hamas and the outbreak of the war in Palestine, in which the US and the EU unconditionally supported Israel, have established the Jewish state as an integral part of the “collective West”, which Russia strongly opposes. This simplified the previously complex scheme (of relations) and created less room for political maneuvering.
On the other hand, the ongoing military campaign in Gaza and the increasing humanitarian and financial costs could have an impact on the situation in the West itself. Both in the US and in Western Europe, there are already some differences of opinion on the issue of support for Israel. However, there will be no major changes.
In relation to the efforts of the Western coalition to impose the political and economic blockade of Russia, Moscow needs the support of that world (that is, the majority) which now condemns Israel and treats the Palestinians with understanding. The US position is not popular in the countries of the “Global South” and this opens up additional opportunities for Russia.
Of course, this does not mean that Moscow supports Hamas unconditionally, as this Islamist group brings back many unpleasant memories for Russia. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Russia fought in the North Caucasus against Islamist militants who wanted to undermine the Russian Federation. In fact, they were partly funded and equipped by Middle Eastern interests, including those countries with which Russia now has business and good relations within the framework of BRICS.
The West also sympathized with the “rebels” and saw them as representatives of their people who wanted to secede. Leftists and liberals of the time justified the Islamists’ openly terrorist, bloody methods by arguing that they had no other way to achieve their goals. That is, while the West purged the “insurgent” Islamists in the Caucasus with its policy, it now condemns the insurgent Hamas as a terrorist organization to the fire at the very least.
In parentheses, it should be mentioned that the Western policy followed so far to solve the other problems of the region, while avoiding the Palestinian issue, suited almost all the participants, except of course, the Palestinians themselves. Hamas wanted to crush those plans and force everyone to turn their attention back to Palestine, and whatever the outcome of the war, it likely succeeded in that goal, seriously wounding the West’s “political correctness” narrative.
Since Russia currently views all international events through Ukrainian glasses, the excessive pressure the US is now experiencing is favorable to Moscow. Washington is forced to provide rapid and effective support to two military partners at the same time, which is problematic even for such a powerful world power. For its part, Russia does not expect the conflict to escalate into a region-wide war, although it stresses the potential dangers.
In general, Moscow’s stance in the Middle East will be very moderate, showing some support for the Palestinians and calling on the parties to end violence and resume the political process of resolving the Palestinian issue. Although Israel has ruled out any peace processes, it may ultimately conclude that there is no other solution. Subsequently, Russia’s relations with the various sides could prove useful again, especially if its plans succeed in the Ukraine war, which objectively appears to be the case.
In conclusion, the war in Ukraine and the war in Israel are two different theaters of war that seemingly have nothing to do with each other. But however different the events in Ukraine and Israel may seem, their dynamics are comparable to the nationalist extremes of nation-building, which must be understood primarily as an expression of the crisis of US globalization and its history as an imperialist power.
