The Ukrainians have fielded between seven (7) and twelve (12) Armored Brigades, with some having only Ukrainian or Russian equipment and others having a combination of Western-supplied equipment. Several International Media are of the opinion that the long-awaited Ukrainian offensive has begun, citing events taking place on the front line and hosting footage from social media showing various tank strikes and explosions in southern and eastern Ukraine.
The Liberal Globe, however, holds serious objections, considering that the actions of the Ukrainians at this stage are part of a broad offensive reconnaissance and not the expected Great Offensive to liberate their country’s territories from the Russian invaders, which has not yet begun but is coming.
The difference between Offensive Reconnaissance and Main Attack
To the true connoisseurs of the applied art of War, such as active and retired officers, the offensive actions carried out by the Ukrainian forces in the current phase, are nothing more than a large-scale offensive reconnaissance and not the expected Ukrainian offensive, in the main phase of her, as we mentioned above.
As is well known, the purpose of offensive reconnaissance is, on the one hand, to attract and engage enemy forces in place and time with the aim of misleading the enemy about our real intentions, on the other hand, to reveal as much information as possible about the enemy (Strength-composition-arrangement- capabilities-fortification etc) in order to determine the weak point of the front, so that the main attack can then be applied to it to achieve a decisive result for the final outcome of the battle.
Finally, many times the offensive reconnaissance can be particularly severe, having similar characteristics to those of a main attack, giving the person who carries it out the possibility, in case of success, to turn it into a main attack in itself by awarding it with additional weapon systems- means and troops.
However, here there is the danger of deliberate entrapment and traction by the enemy, with the aim of trapping and destroying a large amount of the attacker’s forces.
All of the above is facilitated to a very large extent by the multiple means of surveillance of the battlefield that exist, as a result of which it is difficult to mislead-deceive the enemy.
The heavily armed Ukrainian Brigades have not yet been engaged
There is fighting going on all over Ukraine’s front line, says retired Major General Ben Hodges, but the decisive moment will come when we see hundreds of armored vehicles pounding Russian lines.
Social media channels are alive with grainy footage of tanks and explosions in southern and eastern Ukraine. There are statements everywhere that Kiev’s long-awaited counteroffensive is underway, which is causing some excitement and trepidation at the same time, since the attack is incredibly important to the future of Ukraine.
But when assessing what’s actually happening, it’s helpful to understand some key facts. There is a big difference between launching an attack, and the main attack or main effort of the operation. Offensive action has clearly begun, but I don’t think the main attack has begun.
Composition-strength of Ukrainian Armored Brigades
When we see large, armored formations joining the attack, then we will know that the main attack has really begun.
To date, we have not witnessed this concentration of several hundred Ukrainian tanks-APCs in the attack.
A Ukrainian Medium Armoured-Battle Tank Battalion (MATB) typically has 31 tanks, while a Motorized Infantry Battalion (MIB) will have about the same number of Armoured Personnel Carrier (APCs). Now add to these the armored vehicles of the Artillery Squadron, Anti-Aircraft Squadron, Engineer Company, Transport Company, Logistics Battalion and Command vehicles and you see that an Armored Brigade which would probably have three MATBs and one or two MIBs would have a total of 250 plus armored vehicles vehicles of different types.
It is estimated that the Ukrainians have fielded between seven (7) and twelve (12) Armored Brigades, with some having only Ukrainian or Russian equipment and others having a combination of Western-supplied equipment.
When we see two or three of these Brigades, about 500-750 armored vehicles, concentrated on a narrow front, then we will be able to say that the main attack has probably started and where it is happening. But even then, be careful.
The Ukrainian General Staff will want to keep the Russians in the dark about the location of the main attack for as long as possible, and they won’t be bothered and will probably welcome Twitter doing it accidentally.
What do we expect from the main Ukrainian attack when it occurs?
If the West provides everything that the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) needs, especially long-range precision weapons, then it is expected that Ukraine can liberate Crimea, the decisive ground of this war, by the end of this summer, that is, by end of August. That’s one of the goals of the attack, I believe.
At this point, the UAF’s long-range precision weapons could reach Sevastopol, Saki, Dzankoy and other key Crimean targets, and this would allow them to make the peninsula difficult to hold for Russian forces.
This is why the UK delivery of Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles with a range of 155 plus miles was such an important contribution.
We believe the Biden administration will cave in and give short-range (up to 300 km or 186 miles) surface-to-surface ATACMS ballistic missiles to Ukraine. This would mean a decisive contribution to what Ukrainian forces can achieve on the ground, giving the offensive a huge boost.
Some have dated the start of this offensive to June 4, two days before Russia’s sabotage of the Kakhovka Dam on the Dnipro River on June 6.
The four starting conditions of the Main attack
1. There is enough combat power (armored brigades with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, engineering, artillery, air defense and logistics) to be able to penetrate the Russian line defense and achieve their tasks, which probably include cutting the “land bridge” from Russia in Crimea, as well as securing the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant?
2. Have Russian defenses and logistics been sufficiently degraded, and has the Russian DM area and transport network been sufficiently damaged?
3. Is the Russian leadership sufficiently confused about the target and timing of the UAF attack?
4. Is the ground dry enough to support the movement of hundreds of heavy armored vehicles off-road?
