For several years, Saudi Arabia and Syria represented polar opposites within the Arab world. Let us not forget that the Gulf monarchies have never taken kindly to Arab nationalism, as historically represented not only by Nasser’s Egypt but also by Syria. This became much more pronounced when the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011-12, when there was perceived to be an opportunity to topple the Assad government and forge a different treaty. In fact, at that time Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia were almost immediately involved, strengthening armed opposition groups.
But as the years passed, it became apparent that the Damascus government was more resilient than first appreciated. Having the support of Russia, Iran and also pro-Iranian forces such as Hezbollah, the Assad government managed to achieve victories at the expense of the opposition and regain under its control a significant part of the territory of Syria. Essentially, at the moment, with the exception of isolated pockets where Islamic State militants operate, the government of Damascus is in control of most of Syria with the exception of the Idlib region, the areas that are under Kurdish control – where the presence of American forces – and the zone controlled by Turkey.
But it is clear that at this time the Assad government does not appear to be under threat of “regime change” and is politically strengthened, although financially it is suffering the costs of the sanctions. This implies that all the countries of the wider region are called upon to make assessments and plans based on this data.
The change in the attitude of the Arab world towards Syria
When major fighting broke out in Syria, the Arab League initially tried to broker an end to the fighting and a commitment by the Syrian government to end military operations against protesters, engage in dialogue with the opposition and hold multi-party elections in 2014. these efforts failed, and in November 2011 Syria’s Arab League membership was officially suspended. At the same time, the member countries of the association, such as Saudi Arabia, which in fact in an early phase also strengthened armed opposition groups, gradually severed diplomatic relations with Syria.
In fact, in that phase the effort to influence the opposition in Syria also had to do with the effort to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from being the main current that would emerge strengthened by the dynamics of the Arab Spring.
However, it appeared that it was not possible to form a winning dynamic for the opposition against the Damascus government, while within the landscape of armed organizations, forces such as the Islamic State emerged. The successful countering of the Islamic State in Syria, combined with the gradual withdrawal of other armed Islamic tendencies towards the Idlib enclave, formed a new landscape where regime change no longer seemed possible.
The first Gulf country to recognize that a new relationship had been formed was the United Arab Emirates, which already reopened its embassy in Damascus in 2018, while Bahrain reopened its embassy almost at the same time. Oman’s ambassador returned in 2020, while in 2021 Jordan reopened its border with Syria. In 2021 the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates visited Damascus. More recently, on April 1 the Syrian Foreign Minister visited Egypt and met with his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry.
All this trend of rapprochement has to do both with the recognition that de facto the government of Damascus remains in power and of course with the fact that the horizon of peace in Syria also opens the way for the reconstruction process and thus for the big construction projects contracts it entails.
The catastrophic earthquakes that hit Turkey and Syria in February also seem to have played a role as a catalyst, which also led to a wave of support from Arab countries and towards Damascus. In fact, at that time Saudi Arabia sent aid both to the government and to the areas controlled by the armed Islamist organizations.
For its part, the government in Damascus has engaged in a diplomatic marathon with numerous visits to countries in the Middle East and North Africa to ensure that it is accepted again in the wider Muslim and Arab world. Syria is already preparing to reopen its embassy in Tunis, while Tunisia will again send an ambassador to Damascus.
The time of rapprochement with Saudi Arabia as well
Now it seems that Saudi Arabia’s time has come. This explains the much-publicized April 18 visit to Damascus by Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan. Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry itself said the visit demonstrates the kingdom’s desire for a political solution to the conflict in Syria that preserves “Arab identity and returns it to its Arab environment.”
Especially the last report has to do with the question of whether and when Syria will be re-admitted to the Arab League, which would signal a broader change in the attitude of the Arab world towards the Damascus government.
The fact that Riyadh seems to be taking the initiative now has to do with the overall role it seems to be taking, but also the overall reorientation of Saudi Arabia’s policy, which seems to want to limit the open fronts, through a re-approach with the Iran and in fact after the mediation of China, the looming effort for some peace in relation to Yemen, but also the ongoing coordination with Russia regarding the formation of the price of oil.
In fact, especially the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran has a direct impact on Syria itself, as the confrontation in Syria was largely fueled by the more general geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
To be sure, other countries are not yet in a hurry to see Syria return to the Arab League. Let’s not forget that a part of Arab public opinion would also like to see real steps in terms of dialogue in Syria and internal reconciliation.
The US is faced with the limits of its influence in the region
Above all, however, the fact that at this stage the US would not like to see a full recognition of Syria should not be underestimated. The US has abandoned the objective of “regime change” in Syria for years in real terms, but does not want to recognize the Assad government, given the support it has from Russia and Iran. After all, in their eyes, breaking Syria’s isolation would also mean strengthening an axis of states that still treat it as hostile. In this sense at this stage the US does not want to see a quick return of Syria to the Arab League and it is rather clear that they have communicated this desire to countries they can influence. But as has been pointed out from various quarters, the US is currently facing a decline in its real influence in the wider region.
Pressure on Turkey
All of this puts pressure on Turkey, which can cooperate with Russia and Iran in the “Astana process”, mainly because all three countries do not support an independent Kurdish state on the border with Syria, but at the same time support a part of the armed opposition, the so-called Syrian National Army and maintains a military presence on the territory of Syria. Turkey has shown that it too would like a normalization process with Damascus, but it needs to see what it will also do with the forces in Syria that depend on it. However, beyond the moves that Erdogan has made, the opposition also seems to see a horizon of normalization. Let’s not forget that a pacification in Syria would also mean that the return of Syrian refugees in Turkey could be accelerated.
