The downing of a Ukrainian missile in Poland came to highlight the dangers of escalating involvement in the conflict. It is clear that the reflexes worked in the end and indeed deterred the possibility that a NATO member country would be considered under attack by Russia, an admission which if made would immediately raise the question of whether article five of the treaty should be invoked which expressly states that if a member country of the alliance is attacked, then there may be an all-out response from the entire alliance, which would obviously in this case amount to a world war.
This explains why very early on from the American side the tone was set that there were no indications of a Russian missile attack on Poland. Instead, the much more obvious explanation was given that it was debris from a Ukrainian air defense missile that had been fired to intercept a Russian missile attack on Ukrainian soil. Soon this explanation was accepted by the Polish side itself through the mouth of the country’s president Andrzej Duda.
But at the same time, this incident showed the real danger of the conflict in Ukraine escaping from the limits of a bilateral conflict where NATO participates mainly through the shipment of arms to Ukraine and taking on the characteristics of a generalized conflict, with unpredictable developments.
The cost of continuing the war increases geometrically
The conflict in Ukraine is a war with great cost in both lives and material infrastructure which, on the Ukrainian side, has largely been funded by the West. It is estimated that by October 3, 2022 the total aid to Ukraine reached 93.8, billion dollars of which 52.3 dollars came from the USA, 29.2 from the European Union and 12.3 from other countries and mainly Great Britain (please also read the article entitled “Ukraine: The White House is asking Congress for an additional $38 billion“).
Military aid has played an important role in shaping the relationship on the ground itself, especially since the US in particular provided HIMARS arrays and heavy artillery, but also drones and anti-tank aircraft, which allowed Ukrainian forces to strike at Russian forces.
In addition, in addition to the equipment, an important role has been played by the provision of information to the Ukrainian armed forces that allowed better identification of targets, information that came from both American satellites and spying drones.
And of course there is always the help in the level of training of the Ukrainian armed forces, but also the participation of Western officers, mainly American and British in the planning of the Ukrainian operations, but also the possibility of several of the Ukrainian sabotage operations.
All this partly refers to a “proxy” war, as without Western support it is not at all certain that the Ukrainian forces would have endured.
But at the same time the very size of the aid shows that there are some limits to how this situation can continue. Because this aid may have contributed to Ukraine’s ability to have a more effective defense and from one point onward and the possibility of successful counterattacks, including the recapture of areas under Russian control, but this does not mean that it is so simple to have what appeared to be the Western pursuit, namely a decisive defeat of Russia.
Moreover, trying to achieve a decisive defeat of Russia (eg by a large retreat from the bulk of the areas it occupied and formally integrated with the operations so far) would mean an even greater Western military involvement.
But a longer and more prolonged involvement would mean other problems. There is, in other words, the risk of dissatisfaction with the size of the costs, but also of the possibility of a more direct conflict between NATO and Russia.
It even seems that especially the last possibility remains a real limit, especially for the USA, although the Ukrainian leadership practically pushes in this direction.
The endless negotiations
This also provides the background for the negotiations that informally appear to have begun.
It is clear that the US, or at least a section of the US political and diplomatic establishment seems to be seeking some sort of ceasefire and negotiated peace process. The same applies to European countries such as Germany. Other voices still insist on trying to inflict a major defeat on Russia.
Of course, there are difficulties in this attempt to negotiate. First of all, the Ukrainian side itself sets conditions and makes proposals that practically allude to the Russian side turning out to be a wreck. A partly analogous desire for peace to reflect an admission of defeat by Russia also exists in the West. But, at the same time, it is not at all certain that Russia will accept to lose in the field of negotiations what it has secured on the battlefield itself.
On the other hand, Russia would also like to negotiate. Let’s not forget that the “Special Military Operation” was so named because it was largely also a kind of armed pressure to negotiate, with the goal of an agreement that would address Moscow’s security concerns. It was no coincidence that in response to the Ukrainian terms for peace, the Russian side considered unacceptable the fact that Kyiv does not discuss a logical “Minsk 3” agreement and an indication that in fact it cannot really negotiate. After all, for the Russian side, the conflict has already lasted a long time and despite the completion of partial mobilization and the gradual arrival of reinforcements on the Ukrainian fronts, there is an awareness of difficulties and problems.
This awareness, together with the symbolism that there can indeed be retreats if necessary, also explains moves such as the withdrawal from the city of Kherson, which of course also has to do with the effort to minimize losses.
And of course, as we move towards the winter, where the conditions will de facto lead to a relative “freezing” of the conflicts, more favorable conditions will be formed for this negotiation.
The strategic dilemmas
However, dilemmas remain. While the US and other NATO countries have shown that they do not at this stage want a generalized and uncontrolled conflict with Russia, this does not necessarily mean that they also want a negotiation that leaves Russia with more benefits than it had before the war. because that would mean that the goal of a Russian defeat and a corresponding deterrence “message” to China would not have been achieved.
Neither, however, can they exert more pressure on Russia except with an eventual even greater involvement, which, however, would dangerously cross the “red line” to avoid a direct NATO confrontation with Russia.
At the same time, it is quite possible that the current maneuvers of Russian forces will once again bring a balance to the front, while Russia constantly reminds that without a peace negotiation it will gradually destroy much of Ukraine’s infrastructure in an attempt to force so the Zelenskyi government to accept what has been done. Which means it’s not that simple for Western governments to just let things play out, because that could once again lead to a particularly unfavorable association for the Ukrainian side.
And that explains why the US in particular keeps some channels of communication with Russia open and continues this effort to explore the possibility of a more comprehensive negotiation with the Russian side, the terms of a possible peace process.
