The serious disagreement between Israel and the US regarding the revival of the 2015 nuclear deal, which as explained in the analysis entitled “Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Pretext for the New War“, also threatens European interests, appears to be escalating rapidly. rhythms. This is an issue that will also worsen the energy security equation. However, it also creates a potential opportunity for Europe.
Among the motivations of the US and the EU for completing the agreement with the Iranians is the effort to find alternative energy suppliers, in the context of the attempt to minimize dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. Iran is known to “sit” on rich reserves of natural gas and oil.
China and Iran
Iran’s confrontation with the West created a huge opportunity, which China was quick to seize, signing a 25-year strategic agreement in March 2021. The agreement provided for investments of $400 billion in Iranian infrastructure, including in the energy sector. This is completely understandable given the huge energy needs of the Chinese economy. China meets 75% of its needs from Iran.
But the war in Ukraine created a new scenario. China has been quick to absorb at preferential prices the Russian hydrocarbons lost to the West. At the same time, however, it is still developing its relations with Iran and carrying out what is foreseen by the bilateral agreement.
The impending nuclear agreement with the West has the positive consequence, since the lifting of sanctions will allow the channeling of Iranian hydrocarbons to the international market, compressing the very high prices of natural gas and oil. The quantities of hydrocarbons that Beijing supplies from Tehran will not be affected, as the prices are “locked”. The Chinese certainly have reasons to be generally interested in the existence of cheap alternative sources of energy supply.
Although the deal on Iran’s nuclear program does not threaten Chinese interests immediately, in the long run it could cause complications if it sets in motion a process of diplomatic reconciliation between the West and Tehran. This perspective, however, traditionally stumbles in the attitude of the Israelis who react to the reduction of Western pressure towards Iran, which they consider a central threat to Israeli national security.
Israel against USA over Iran
The alleged impending deal is already creating backlash. It was the same drive to cut energy costs that led the US president to tone down human rights criticism of the Saudi regime and visit Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh, asking him to increase hydrocarbon production to squeeze oil prices.
On the other hand, Shiite Iran is considered by the Saudis as a central national security threat. This threat was also the main motivation that led to the post-Cold War spectacular restoration of relations with Israel. The situation, therefore, once again leads to an identification of the interests of the two sides. Riyadh does not seem willing to do Washington any favors, while it must be considered certain that the response to initiatives to revive the nuclear deal will be given by Riyadh in conjunction with the Jewish state.
It is no coincidence that Israel’s planning for a possible military attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would likely also use Saudi Arabia’s territory. The other possibility is through the special relations that the Israelis maintain with Azerbaijan. The Azeris, although they are Shiite in the majority, on the one hand have border conflicts with Iran, on the other hand much of their military power that led to victory in the recent Nagorno Karabakh war with Armenia, owes it to Israeli military technology.
Israel and Saudi Arabia do not want Tehran’s rapprochement with the West. At the same time, the dynamics that the exploitation of the hydrocarbon deposits in the Mediterranean has assumed, will soon reserve the region a key role in the energy security of Europe, through the EEZs of Greece and Cyprus respectively.
Although Iran is a competing country with Russia in the field of energy, it has the possibility of directly supplying the West, while the flow from the Mediterranean still needs some years to cover European needs. Given the conflict in Ukraine, Russian strategy appears to be focused on bending Western resistance, maximizing the energy impact on European societies this coming winter. So, Moscow’s interest is to prevent an agreement that would allow the flow of Iranian hydrocarbons to the European market. So, on a tactical level it seems that Moscow, Jerusalem and Riyadh are converging.
The rare public appearance of the head of Israel’s Mossad firmly opposing the revival of the 2015 deal on Iran’s nuclear program highlights the importance of the issue to Israel’s national security. As it was deliberately leaked, David Barnea, informing the country’s leadership last Thursday, spoke of a “strategic disaster”, which Israel cannot stand by passively, seeing the danger unfolding and will have to respond.
Mossad’s assessment is that the deal, which appears to have already been concluded, amounts to a “license” for Iran to build nuclear weapons. Sanctions with the deal will be lifted, allowing hundreds of billions of dollars to flow into the Iranian economy, facilitating Tehran’s goal.
The Mossad estimates that the deal is essentially a copy of the 2015 deal, while circumstances have changed, from the geopolitical environment to technology. At the same time, the Iranians have developed their own centrifuge devices, with which uranium enrichment is achieved, a prerequisite for developing a nuclear arsenal.
The new economic capabilities of the Iranians will lead to the rearmament of their “affiliates”, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Gaza, as well as the Houthis in Yemen. This report also proves the alignment of the policy with Saudi Arabia. All these developments will affect American security interests in addition to Israeli ones.
