The STOVL version of the JSF is a giant leap forward for Naval Aviation and especially the US Marine Corps (USMC), giving it operational flexibility with a vertical/short takeoff from advanced land bases or defloating from sea platforms, which is impressively superior of its predecessor AV-8B Harrier II in all areas. The supersonic F-35B, however, in addition to launching the USMC’s capabilities, brings back to the fore the doctrine of the “light aircraft carrier” (Light Carrier Concept): an old ambition to combine STOVL fighters with the “Gator Navy”, i.e. the large ships landing strike, yielding aircraft carriers with Lightning II.
The original doctrine of “STOVL (attack) Carriers” had a first application with the USS Nassau (LHA-4), a 39,000-ton Tarawa-class amphibious warfare ship capable of carrying 1,900 Marines with their equipment, including transport and assault helicopters, such as the Harrier. The LHA-4 (commissioned in 1979 and decommissioned in 2011), when deployed to the Mediterranean in April 1981, became the US Navy’s first amphibious assault ship to operate as a Harrier carrier.
With the inclusion of STOVL Lightning IIs in USMC Squadrons, the issue of LHA/LHD as hybrid aircraft carriers not only returned, but was (since the middle of the previous decade) also included in the Corps’ mid- to long-term planning, along with the transition of Units F/A-18 in JSF and the retirement of the AV-8B towards the end of the current decade.
But as the USMC is not an “autonomous” branch of the US armed forces, but is sponsored in all aspects of its activities by the US Navy, this plan was an extension of the latter’s main plans, as prepared and eventually expressed as the Battle Force plan 2045. In this doctrine, presented by Mark Esper, US Secretary of Defense under the Trump presidency, in 2019-2020 (and which is still formally in effect, as the Biden presidency’s amendments have not been finalized), nuclear attack submarines (SSN) and large aircraft carriers (CVN) remain the backbone of the US Navy fleet. [With the prospect of this consisting of 500 ships -manned and unmanned- by 2045, but already having 335 “traditional” (manned) units by 2035!
The LHAs of this class have a length of 257 meters, a draft of 32 and a displacement of 45,000 tons, with the ability to simultaneously transport 12 MV-22B Osprey, 6 F-35B Lightning II, 4 CH-53K, 7 AH-1Z/UH-1Y and 2 MH -60S (US Navy). In a “Harrier carrier” role they can carry at least 20 AV-8Bs and 2 MH-60S for SAR, while the Harrier IIs can be replaced by F-35Bs. While the CVN-Ls with a displacement of up to 60,000 tons will have “conventional” fighter operations support infrastructure, namely catapults and interception/recovery cables.
Under the USMC’s parallel design, the ARG/MEU (Amphibius Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit), without changing their missions and the tasks derived from them, could exploit the full potential of amphibious operations ships as floating bases offering partner forces significant air power application capabilities.
The “tool” that will turn the LHA/LHD into a “Lightning carrier” will of course be the F-35B and the enormous capabilities it offers, both absolute and relative to the AV-8B, in air-to-air and air-to-ground combat /surface.
New era of air warfare
A “cornerstone” of the transition from theoretical doctrine to operational practice was the launch of the newly built USS Tripoli (LHA-7) in a large test that took place in late March and early April 2022, as we will see below. So, for many, when on 3/30/2022 the F-35Bs of two Corps Squadrons took off from MCAS Yuma, Arizona, to land on the deck of the USS Tripoli, homeported in San Diego Harbor, it began to write a new page of aeronautical warfare.
Thus, the LHA-6 and LHA-7 are aircraft-carryingly optimized for air operations, without losing the basic ability to support amphibious operations, albeit reduced. The US Navy and USMC have not fully finalized the configuration of the remaining America-class ships, but it is likely that about half of them will eventually also be intended as “Lightning carriers” and not exclusively as “traditional” LHAs, i.e. they will have the features of USS Tripoli and USS America.
The Lightning carriers, which will be able to carry 16-20 F-35Bs (or up to 24 if tests, such as the one conducted in April, show this), are referred to by some sources as CV–Ls. Scenarios that may become operational practices in the future refer to the formation of ESGs (Expeditionary Strike Groups) that will be composed of two LHAs, one in its “traditional” role of transporting marines and the means (air and amphibious) of their transport ashore and the other in CV-L role with F-35B.
The rate of landings that can be sustained in F-35B operations is completely different from the same parameters for an aircraft carrier. Recall that the F-35B operations from LHA/LHD are done with conventional short-haul, since these ships, unlike the two Queen Elizabeth II-class aircraft carriers of the Royal Navy or the Italian ITS Cavour, which also operate with STOVL JSF , they do not have a ski-jump ramp.
According to US Navy officials, the America-class LHAs from their design in the classic amphibious operations support role were intended with two F-35B recovery/launch points during the day and one of them at night. As part of the evaluation, the VMX-1 pilots also demonstrated the possibility of consecutive nocturnal observations at Spot 7 and 9 with a time separation of two minutes. This certification can directly support the “Lightning carrier” doctrine, when the ships will be loaded only with F-35B.
USS Tripoli’s short-day deployment with STOVL JSFs as a demonstration of Lightning Carrier doctrine was a major challenge for both the ship’s personnel and the 500 Marines accompanying the F-35Bs of the three Squadrons, who were temporarily housed aboard the ship. Although the US Navy already has experience with JSF – which is constantly growing – the sailors were tasked with conducting operations with the largest number of stealth fighters they have ever received on a flattop, even if it was in a temporary format.
The airmen, some of whom had never operated from an aircraft carrier, let alone a small one like the LHAs, flew a variety of missions, both defensive and offensive, with an emphasis on managing them in terms of the fuel factor and range available to execute them.
