For mainly geopolitical reasons, Stalin wanted in 1944-45 to place all sacrifices under his control in neighboring Poland, a country from which it was geographically reasonable to pass a possible attack on the Soviet Union.
He had secured the rest of the Eastern European countries during his meeting with Churchill in Moscow in October 1944, with the infamous “percentage agreement” on a rough piece of paper, the same agreement that created the post-war British sphere of influence. At that time, and not in Yalta, as some write, a substantial Eastern and Southeastern Europe was divided between the British and the Soviets. However, there was no reference to the future of Poland on the surname, perhaps because the landscape was still quite confusing at the time.
Even in Yalta, in February 1945, it was not possible to clarify the future of Poland, which was in fact the main cause of friction between Stalin and Churchill during the Conference.
Let us not forget that the British also had good reasons to be interested in the Polish question: they had declared war on Hitler when he invaded their ally Poland, there was an exiled Polish government in London, Polish pilots had helped the RAF significantly during Battle of England in the autumn of 1940, three Polish mathematicians had played a key role in the breaking of the German Enigma cryptographic code by the British.
As early as 1939, however, Stalin had “stretched out his hand” in Poland, with the shameful Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the secret protocol of which provided for the cold division (common division) of Poland between the Germans and the Soviets. It was the fourth partition of Poland after those of 1772, 1793 and 1795. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the Poles had seen their uprisings of 1831 and 1863 violently suppressed by the tsarist troops (hence the timeless hatred of Marx for the Russians), as they had also seen the Red Army reach the outskirts of Warsaw in the summer of 1920.
These brief references to the history may, among other things, be useful to some who are wondering if they are wondering – or pretending to be wondering – where the Poles’ stance against Putin, but also against the Russians in general, comes from. However, apart from what the Poles suffered from the Russians in the 18th and 19th centuries, there are other events closer to our times. The predatory occupation of all the eastern provinces of Poland in 1939 by the Soviets, in good cooperation with their then ally Hitler, was followed by two more major events that have indelibly marked the collective memory and conscience of the Poles.
1. The Soviets cold-bloodedly executed the Polish army officers, 14,000 (estimated) permanent and reserve officers, in the Katyn forest with a bullet to the neck, in order to keep the country militarily headless so that Stalin could more easily capture it.
2. Now that the Red Army was on the outskirts of Warsaw, the Soviets, with broadcasts on the Moscow radio station, urged in August 1944 the mighty Polish Home Army or Homeland Army (Armia Kraxova, AK) to revolt.
Then, however, they waited patiently for two whole months without firing a single cannon, until the Germans exterminated the last fighters of that particular AK, who had taken refuge in the sewers of Warsaw. The AK leadership may not have seemed very prudent in its decision or proceeded prematurely in the uprising, but this does not negate in the slightest the fact that Stalin did not order the Red Army not to move during the uprising. He knew very well what he was seeking since the AK could obviously, if not prevent, at least thwart his plans for the establishment of a Communist regime in Poland.
Which of his plans did he implement, of course, even if it had to do with a country where the communist party was almost non-existent. Indicative of how completely “communist” the communist regime was “planted” in Poland was that the first post-war leaders of the country were some almost unknown, residents of Moscow until 1943, who were imposed by the Red Army. In fact, in an unbelievable display of audacity and cynicism on the part of Stalin, the Russian Minister of Defense from 1949 to 1956 was Russian Marshal Rokosowski.
We are reminded of these facts and situations that fully explain why Poland is so suspicious of the Russians and Putin. And not only suspicious but in fact, from what things show, and determined this time to give the ultimate fight if necessary.
