Some of the information coming from the War in Ukraine between the Ukrainian and Russian Armed Forces is consistent with what we previously knew about the Russian army or with the historical trends and military culture of these forces. Therefore, and with all possible reservations, it is possible to draw some conclusions, always on a temporary basis and warning the reader that this analysis has logical gaps stemming from the lack of reliable and complete information.
The Russian Military Doctrine
All armies are formed around a doctrine, understood as the right way (for each army) to conduct battle. This doctrine is codified, for better or worse, in a series of textbooks that are often difficult to read and understand and are not always widely distributed.
However, the soldiers who join the units soon learn to do things as usual, and this as always is nothing more than the application of the current doctrine, in a kind of oral and almost customary transmission.
The doctrine determines the organization, the way of development, the characteristics of its materials, even its number and composition, even regulating the educational system.
Soviet-Russian dogma maintains a remarkable continuity, where the current Russian dogma is an evolution of the Soviet. Thus, the current dogma of the Russian army continues to be the heir of the “Deep Battle” of Tujaschevski, Triandafilov, Svechin, Issersson …, which developed in the 1930s (for more analysis about the Deep Battle dogma please read the analysis entitled “The Doctrine of “Deep Battle”) and was used successfully in the Great Patriotic War (World War II) event which is still valid today. The Soviets then updated and improved it, but without changing the fundamental ideas that make it up.
In its original idea, the “deep battle” is explained in the PU-36 manual, a fundamental document in Soviet-Russian dogmatic history. The whole dogmatic conception of the PU-36 was born out of the thought that the armies created after the Industrial Revolution were too large to be destroyed in a single decisive battle (a modern Austerlitz or Borodino), so the destruction of the enemy Army could be achieved, only through a series of simultaneous or successive battles, aimed at a single goal and, therefore, to be carried out under a single command. This is the origin of the concept of “military operation art”.
The development of these huge armies meant that the forces on the line of contact (the front) are only the surface of a larger and more complex system, in which in addition the vital elements of artillery, command, logistics, etc. are far from the line of contact.
However, in order to achieve the collapse of the enemy, the destruction of these vital elements is imperative if they are acted only by the forces in contact with the enemy, where the result will be a “war of attrition”, very long and indecisive, as happened on the Western Front of World War II
For this reason, it is necessary to destroy those elements that are in the depths of hostile development, at the same time that the aggressive action of the elements that come in contact is canceled.
If the enemy side is based on the coast, it is also possible to use naval means for action in the background of the development with fire amphibious and airborne actions.
To carry out this doctrine, a series of operations with large-scale artillery and aviation fire and airborne forces are required to neutralize/destroy critical elements in depth, while infantry and artillery are used to keep the front line stable, more artillery to break the front line enemy and the cavalry/battle armour tanks to penetrate deep into the enemy’s development and destroy these critical elements or occupy key points on the ground.
The need to use aircraft (for reconnaissance, deep-range firefighting and the use of airborne forces) made it necessary for companies to have a unified Command of the land and air forces and, as the case may be, the naval forces, which makes the operational level necessarily common.
The main difference now is the fact that modern armies are so small that a decisive battle can not be ruled out.
The main continuation is the perception of the enemy as a complex system consisting of many more parts of the armed forces that exist and as then, depends on a series of critical systems that are naturally far from the developing forces, such as today in the case of satellite or Internet communications. , but also a public opinion that is very vulnerable to information manipulation.
Consequently, the current Russian dogma remains universal and seeks to attack the enemy “at the full depth of its development,” whether that depth is natural or linked to other areas, such as intelligence. This doctrine, strikingly similar to the German blitzkrieg, has a serious disadvantage for Russians.
It requires leaders of all levels to take great initiative, for which they need high preparation and the necessary power to take advantage of the opportunities presented the battlefield.
The culture of the Russian Army remains Soviet, where taking the initiative and moving away from strict compliance with the orders is a road that leads, sooner or later, to Siberia.
It is important to remember that the Soviet system was based on centralized plans designed at the highest level and carried out without a doubt by subordinates at all levels. Any change in the execution of the plan could be perceived as critical or a lack of trust in the hierarchy that had drawn up the plan, something deadly dangerous.
The Soviet solution to carry out the doctrine of “deep battle” with a fully centralized Army and without initiative was the abundance of means
The Soviets created it, through artillery battle, Stalin had already said that artillery was the god of war, taking advantage of the rift they caused in enemy defense, with massive groups of tanks and infantry in vehicles, following a rigid plan, but with sufficient means to overcome any resistance ..
The Soviet air force acted in a similar way to the Luftwaffe, as it was a kind of “flying artillery” devoted solely to supporting ground forces. However, like the ground forces, it strictly adheres to the approved plan.
As a result, many of the Luftwaffe missions were beyond the capabilities of the Red Air Force: as the time and place of possible enemy counterattacks were difficult to predict, the Red Air Force was rarely able to intervene. Because this action involved modifying the plan.
For the same reasons, it also could not react quickly in the event of unforeseen situations greater than the expected resistance or the emergence of forces not provided for in the original plan.
The PU-36 publication stressed the need to prevent the enemy from reorganizing and creating a new defensive front after the outbreak of the front. For this reason, the Red Army never stops its advance, unless absolutely necessary.
This means that, in general, the Red Army units do not relieve their forces in the attack, where the front line units attack until they are destroyed, so the second line units “run” them and continue the attack.
As a result, logistics are relatively poor and there are no plans to supply forces that are considered damaged after the first attack. NATO’s old notion of a subsequent force attack (FOFA) is born of this characteristic
If the second-line units were destroyed, the Soviet advance would be very short, due to the wear and tear of the first-line units and the limited logistical scope.
This Soviet mentality also implies that units are considered expendable, hence the Soviet willingness to suffer far more serious losses than we are accustomed to in the West.
In my opinion, in Ukraine, the Russians had launched a plan in line with the doctrine of “deep battle”, a simultaneous attack on the entire enemy mechanism, geographically and functionally, trying to encircle the Ukrainian army in the east with “forceps” one end of which came from the north from Kharkiv-Poltava and the other from the Crimea and at the same time to overthrow the political leadership by occupying Kyiv.
Likewise, they did not expect to achieve air superiority in order to attack, since the doctrine requires a “simultaneous attack” and Tukhachevsky himself would have approved the plan.
Why the execution of the military operation plan in Ukraine did not perform the expected
In addition to the unexpected Ukrainian resistance, carrying out the “deep battle” without initiative on the lower echelons requires a huge mass of forces from the Red Army.
However, it seems that in Ukraine, the Russians created a plan on a Soviet scale, which they have studied outside in their academies, having forgotten that they now have a small and poor Russian army. Indeed, the Russian army is not the red army.
The Soviet success in World War II, where, after the catastrophe of 1941, they successfully implemented the ideas incorporated into the PU-36, was based on the enormous size of the forces.
With the peace of the Cold War, the Soviet system became more and more entrenched, with the Red Army operating with increasingly rigid procedures, with complete centralized control and no room for initiative.
The fall of the Soviet Union exacerbated this crisis, which is difficult to reverse, after fifty years of creating a culture of blind obedience to the plan and avoiding initiative, which is almost impossible to change in a few years. The Chechen war soon showed the serious shortcomings of the Russian army.
In fact, the Russian military has not faced an enemy large enough to analyze its true military capabilities in a high-intensity conflict, as Georgia was more than a skirmish against a very weak enemy. The Russian army has other limitations, where it mixes professional troops with replacement troops, with one year of military service, but it does so in a very specific way.
The first maneuver battalion of each brigade / regiment is professional troops, as is the first squadron of each brigade’s artillery teams (anti-aircraft, field or anti-tank) and the first battalion of support units. The rest consist of replacement troops, with some critical positions (tank snipers, artillery indicators …) occupied by professionals.
In addition to the unexpected Ukrainian resistance, carrying out the “deep battle” without initiative on the lower echelons requires a huge mass of forces from the Red Army.
However, it seems that in Ukraine, the Russians created a plan on a Soviet scale, which they have studied outside in their academies, having forgotten that they now have a small and poor Russian army. Indeed, the Russian army is not the red army.
The Soviet success in World War II, where, after the catastrophe of 1941, they successfully implemented the ideas incorporated into the PU-36, was based on the enormous size of the forces.
With the peace of the Cold War, the Soviet system became more and more entrenched, with the Red Army operating with increasingly rigid procedures, with complete centralized control and no room for initiative.
The fall of the Soviet Union exacerbated this crisis, which is difficult to reverse, after fifty years of creating a culture of blind obedience to the plan and avoiding initiative, which is almost impossible to change in a few years. The Chechen war soon showed the serious shortcomings of the Russian army.
In fact, the Russian military has not faced an enemy large enough to analyze its true military capabilities in a high-intensity conflict, as Georgia was more than a skirmish against a very weak enemy.
The Russian army has other limitations, where it mixes professional troops with replacement troops, with one year of military service, but it does so in a very specific way.
The first maneuver battalion of each brigade / regiment is professional troops, as is the first squadron of each brigade’s artillery teams (anti-aircraft, field or anti-tank) and the first battalion of support units. The rest consist of replacement troops, with some critical positions (tank snipers, artillery indicators …) occupied by professionals. Budget constraints mean that training is focused on vocational units and much less on replacement units.
Thus, each brigade is, in fact, a tactical group based on an infantry/armored battalion, an artillery battalion, an anti-aircraft cell, an anti-tank unit, a transfer unit. That is, a Battalion Tactical Group (BTG), which is what they use in Ukraine.
However, this organization implies that the Brigade or Artillery Commands are also equipped with replacement troops, which means that if it is decided not to use replacement troops in the operation, there is no brigade level and, consequently, the BTGs lack basic elements. In the same way, logistics units receive substantial replacement troops.
Thus, the positions of command of the large units of the Russian army (these armies would in fact be almost equivalent to our divisions or a small army corps, as they consist, in most cases, of two small divisions of about 10,000 soldiers, plus some support ) end up directly controlling a variable BTG number
Budget constraints mean that, in addition to the annual Zapad exercise, the Russian military rarely conducts exercises larger than the BTG, so the use of brigade and division support is rarely applied. Something similar happens with air-to-ground coordination, which usually takes place at Army level.
The Russian battalions have only a logistics department, with very limited capabilities in maintenance and supply. The first logistical step worthy of the name appears at the brigade level, which has a maintenance battalion and a supply battalion. This means that BTGs, if not reinforced by their brigade, have very little capacity to recover damaged vehicles or refuel.
The Russian brigades theoretically have a UAV unit, with three groups of three devices, generally Orlan-10. These UAVs operate in groups of two or three, with one flying at an altitude of 1,000 or 1,500 m, on an ISTAR mission (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Surveillance), while another acts as an electronic escort carrying electronic warfare equipment. and if necessary, another flies back to a higher altitude, acting as a relay to extend the range of the team. Theoretically, UAVs should precede the advance of their brigade units by providing information.
Weaknesses in the structure of the Russian army based on its doctrine
Non-Commissioned Offeicers (NCOs) are generally selected professional soldiers, following a short course to become a sergeant. Its preparation is very limited. Units based on replacement troops do not have non-commissioned officers in command, but professional non-commissioned officers occupy those positions that require some technical knowledge, which does not mean that they occupy command positions.
Consequently, the duties performed by non-commissioned officers in our Army are performed in the Russian Army by Lieutenants. This means that they can spend very little time on the instructions of their unit. As a result, the cohesion of small units of replacement troops is very low and their training very low.
For its part, the Russian air force has real combat experience, gained in Syria. However, in this theater there are no real threats to Russian aircraft from enemy aircraft and anti-aircraft).
In Syria, on the other hand, the Russians have used mainly unarmed weapons (only 5% of the attacks have used directed weapons). This minimal use of smart weapons (less than that used by the Coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991, a conflict in which the Allies used 10% of their guided weapons) implies limited experience in their use, but may also be a symptom of limited availability. these types of weapons, which on the other hand are very expensive.
Many of the difficulties encountered by Russian troops in Ukraine stem directly from the aforementioned characteristics of the Russian military.
President Putin apparently assumed that there would be no real opposition to the Russian advance, so the initial phases of the campaign were aimed at destroying the Ukrainian air force, while ground troops would make a rapid advance to occupy Kyiv and encircle its forces. army in the east of the country.
However, the Ukrainian air force, most likely with information from the United States, avoided its complete destruction.
On the other hand, Russian attacks targeted aircraft car parks and some key facilities, such as fuel depots, but spared infrastructure that was slow to be rebuilt, such as runways.
This seems to indicate a certain desire to keep the Ukrainian bases in a state where they can be used by Russian planes after their occupation. The Ukrainians’ precautionary measures reduced the effectiveness of the Russian attacks, which on the other hand did not repeat their attacks, perhaps because the original plan did not provide for such a repetition. Thus, the Ukrainian air force continues to fly, although very limited by the dominance of Russian air.
Videos posted on the Internet – with all the reservations of the “information war” surrounding the conflict – often show high-tech aircraft (Su-30 or Su-34) dropping gravity bombs, forcing them to land. scope of the Ukrainian air defense.
By comparison, in the 78 days of the Kosovo bombing (38,000 air strikes), there is no indication that NATO aircraft entered the range of the Serbian anti-aircraft artillery (perhaps they did it exceptionally).
However, dropping gravity bombs involves flying very low, to have a minimum of accuracy. In addition, these images show Russian planes that do not fire flares, a normal process when, for some reason, they have to enter the range of infrared guided anti-aircraft missiles, such as the Stinger or Igla.
Both circumstances could indicate a very early lack of guided weapons and basic items such as flares. As expected, the ground advance revealed the organization’s limitations in BTG.
The brigade support was hardly used at all, so the Russian battalions had serious logistics problems (both supply and maintenance and recovery of vehicles). The Orlan-10 UAVs have obviously been used sparingly, so the Russians have advanced without air reconnaissance.
Before the images of the Russian tanks destroyed by the light anti-tank weapons of the Ukrainian infantry, there are already some voices declaring that “the tank is dead”
In fact, Russian tanks are no more vulnerable to anti-tank missiles today than they were in World War II when they encountered Wehrmacht anti-tank barracks.
What the Russian military lacks is precisely the cooperation between weapons, as in World War II, the correct identification of enemy threats on the front line against armored phalanxes (easier today thanks to UAVs) and the use of artillery when available. Enemy anti-tank weapons, today as then, are a problem.
On the other hand, the powerful Russian anti-aircraft artillery has been used in individual arrays, without means of coordination and integration into the air defense system. Russian anti-aircraft batteries are not designed or trained to operate individually, but always integrated and under the command of their Group PC.
If these computers were not turned on, the anti-aircraft batteries simply would not have been developed (no one has instructed them how and where to do so), which would explain the images of phalanxes of Russian vehicles moving along roads without anti-aircraft protection.
The limited amount of power available also means that the second line of units, critical to maintaining the original momentum, simply does not exist. Therefore, once the initial logistical resources are exhausted, there is no unit at the back that allows the operations to continue. The Russian army does not have the means to maintain the steady pace of operations that was one of its key features.
The composition of the Russian BTG and their available number simply make them unable to take a city of a particular city. For example, in the second battle of Fallujah (Iraq), the Americans used about 18,000 troops to occupy a city of 321,000, which was defended by about 5,000 militants, using it for a month and a half. Kyiv has a population of 3,000,000 and its guard is much larger than that of Fallujah. Kharkiv has one and a half million. It is easy to conclude that the Russian forces, the total number of Russian troops in Ukraine seems to be about 180,000 men, is insufficient to occupy any city of a certain size.
This does not mean, however, that the Russian army has failed
In fact, no, although it is true that it is very difficult for him to win. But that was the case from the beginning, as the Russian army is only too small to invade Ukraine. It is important to remember that “small armies mean small businesses”. However, as our old friend Clausewitz used to say, victory is achieved when the enemy assumes that he has been defeated.
In other words, the victory of the Russians could come if the Ukrainians decide to surrender. Today, this does not seem likely, although it is possible that the collapse of the Ukrainian army or military pressure could lead to a peace deal favorable to the Russians (for more information about the unfailed of the Russian army in Ukraine, please read the analysis entitled “Russian Campaign in Ukraine: Why It Will Be Included in War Maneuvers Manuscripts“)
In fact, there is very little information about the Ukrainian losses, but they must be important. In any case, if Ukraine resists, the Russian army will have to change its plans. In this case, most likely, the Russians will implement the measures commonly used by armies when they lack troops, fire support.
Thus, it is predictable that the abundant Russian artillery will begin to be much more present than so far on the battlefield. On the other hand, the proven lack of guided weapons implies the need for a large amount of conventional ammunition and also a very high degree of “collateral damage”.
What is expected now in the war with Ukraine?
1. Another notable result of the actions taken so far was the restraint with which the Russian troops dealt with the Ukrainian civilian population, at least in the first days of the attack.
2. The massive use of artillery against cities means that the suffering of the civilian population will be greater.
3. In addition, the behavior of Russian troops in relation to the civilian population could change radically as Putin’s frustration grows and, with it, pressure on his troops. This pressure will add to the natural erosion of morale as the losses increase.
It is important to remember that many small armies in the past have turned to another power multiplier, terror. Let us hope that the realization that the Russian troops are under constant surveillance by the world public opinion will prevent them from resorting to this process.
4. Finally, the use of nuclear weapons remains the biggest unknown. The Soviet nuclear doctrine involves resorting to launching a tactical nuclear weapon (limited in power, similar to those used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki) against a secondary target, as a “final warning” before proceeding with the widespread use of nuclear weapons.
This is what the Russians call “escalation to de-escalation” (and it is the final stage of the annual Zapad exercises). If this happens, at that very moment, we will find ourselves in a new world, in an unprecedented situation.
Conclusions
The Russian army is a victim of its own dogmatic and organizational restrictions. An attempt to implement a doctrine of motion warfare that requires well-trained personnel with a large initiative or mass of troops much higher than what is available has failed. In the absence of both characteristics, the “deep battle” is impractical.
On the other hand, organizational decisions stemming from a lack of budget have proven to be very damaging. The Russian brigade is an integrated system, designed to function in a very specific way, codified in its doctrine.
Given the budget constraints, instead of training entire brigades, the Russian commanders decided to prioritize certain elements of their system, such as maneuvering units and one among the Support Units.
The postponement of the administration and control systems and the logistics has led to the inefficiency of the developing forces. Indeed, the obsession with deploying as many forces as possible to the detriment of the “logistics queue” or other key elements (such as artillery or UAVs) has destroyed the systemic character of the brigade – and the BTG – which, in the end, ends up being more than a sum of uncoordinated means and with very little autonomy.
Indeed, large units are complex systems, the operation of which requires the coordinated action of their components. If you lose any of these elements or any of the links that allow them to be integrated, the result is a multitude of media without the ability to function harmoniously.
On the other hand, we should not be surprised that Russian Generals have planned a Soviet operation with Russian means. In all modern armies there is a tendency to design as we have been taught (with a doctrine derived from that of World War I, with armies of millions of men), but with far fewer troops.
And many times we delude ourselves into believing that what forty years ago needed a division, today a battalion can do. But, in fact, the means of a division forty years ago are not so different from what we have today: The first version of the Leopard 2 chariot is from the 1970s, the M-109 is from 1963.… Therefore, it is misleading to suppose that with a unit twenty times smaller we can do the same.
But even though the Russian army is much bigger and more powerful than the Ukrainian one, its capabilities remain objectively insufficient to occupy Ukraine, even to take the big cities.
Faced with the political devaluation that would result in a defeat, it is predictable that Putin will try to maintain military pressure with a much more traditional operation, with infantry and artillery, without guided weapons and little air support, with replacement troops, trying to occupy a large Ukrainian city like bargaining chip.
If Ukraine does not collapse, it would lead to a long war, which would increase the pressure on the affected Russian economy and a large number of victims (Russian and Ukrainian), which would have a significant impact on public opinion in both countries.
