The Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ Corps (IRGC) rocket attack on Erbil in Iraqi Kazakhstan was a message to many. It was an admittedly impressive attack. In the early hours of Sunday, March 13, the The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the elite Islamic Republic militia, fired 12 ballistic missiles at Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. Although the rockets landed near the building of the new US consulate under construction, it appears that the target was not specifically American, while at the same time the offices of a Kurdish organization and the residence of a Kurdish businessman were hit.
Officially, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed that their target was facilities operated by Israeli agents, as Iran has for years claimed that Mossad has a presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. That would make the attack a retaliatory act for the Israeli airstrikes on Damascus on March 7 that killed two IRGC members.
In any case, Iran and Israel are in an almost open confrontation in Syria, as the Israeli government is particularly concerned about the presence of Iranian forces (mainly Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) but also Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian forces fighting on the side of the Assad government. In fact, he has asked Russia for assurances that the Iranian presence, as well as the action of pro-Iranian forces in Syria on the side of the Assad government, will not become a large-scale threat to him.
On the other hand, for Iran itself, the presence in Syria is one of the key aspects of building the so-called “axis of resistance”, ie the alliance of movements that embrace the views of the Islamic Republic and share with it the rivalry with the US and the Israel.
The message to Iraq
At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that Iran has a significant presence in Iraq and is particularly interested in developments in that country.
In recent years, pro-Iranian forces have strengthened their presence in Iraq, with a large Shiite presence. In addition, the pro-Iranian militias, the People’s Mobilization Forces, largely affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Iran’s main foreign policy body), had gained significant prestige due to their contribution to the fight against Islamic State and were integrated into official Iraqi armed forces.
At the same time, however, pro-Iranian organizations were dissatisfied with the social policies of previous governments and with the fact that they were accused of representing the interests of another country.
The recent elections in October 2021 created a new landscape, as there was a relative decline of the pro-Iranian parties and a rise of the coalition led by the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The result was a protracted negotiation to form a new government, which has not been completed, with Iran pushing for a new government with parties representing its own positions, but Sadr himself opposes the idea of a former prime minister. Nouri al-Maliki to play a role in the new government.
In addition, Iran has not taken a good look at the way the Kurdish Democratic Party has moved (which emerged stronger in the recent elections, remains the largest party in Iraqi Kurdistan and the main force of the local government). This is because the Kurdish Party seems to be converging with Sadr and Iran sees this as an attempt to split the Shiite forces and reduce the political weight of the pro-Iranian parties. Hence the fact that pro-Iranian parties use every means, including procedural issues, to pressure Sadr to share power with them.
It is no coincidence that Iran supports Barham Salih, from the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, for the post of president (who according to the Constitution must be a Kurd). In this sense, the message was also directed at the Kurds in relation to their stance on the internal political affairs of Iraq.
Iran remains a strong player in the region
However, apart from various specific purposes, it was clear that with such an impressive military operation, Iran wanted to emphasize that it is a strong power in the region and that its effort to get rid of the burden of sanctions in relation to its nuclear program should not be to be considered a weakness.
On the contrary, it insists on securing its position in the wider region, not to see concessions in areas that it considers critical to its overall presence, such as political developments in Iraq, to keep the “axis of resistance” active, and of course on this basis. take advantage of the lifting of sanctions in order to take advantage of the high demand for oil and gas and in this way be able to deal with the internal climate of dissatisfaction, but this does not mean that it accepts concessions in relation to the securing its position in the region.
At the same time, it does not fail to maintain a range of alliances, as evidenced by the way it moves in relation to Russia in the nuclear negotiations, where it avoided accusing Russia of involvement when it raised the issue of not being influenced by the sanctions, with Moscow finally stating that it has received guarantees and is not blocking the agreement.
