The debate over the potential for a “power vacuum” in Australia’s submarine capabilities is intensifying, with analysts, defence industry executives and politicians now openly calling for a “Plan B” for the AUKUS programme to be considered.
The current plan calls for the acquisition of at least three second-hand US Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines from the US in the 2030s, followed by the first Australian-built nuclear-powered SSN-AUKUS (as a new class in collaboration with Britain) sometime after 2040. Until then, the current fleet of six conventional Collins-class submarines must remain active through the A$11 billion Life of Type Extension (LOTE) programme.
However, the Collins’ situation raises serious concerns. The government has already scaled back some of the planned upgrades, abandoning the replacement of diesel engines, while the true state of each submarine will only be determined once it enters the dock for work. The fact that only one submarine was recently considered fully operational heightens concerns about a possible reduction in the fleet’s availability over the next decade.
At the same time, uncertainty also prevails in the US regarding the ability of American shipyards to increase production of the Virginia class from around 1.2 to more than two units per year. Delays, supply chain problems and the priority given to the Columbia-class strategic ballistic missile submarines raise doubts about whether there will be any vessels available for lease to Australia by 2032.
In this environment, the proposal for a temporary lease of conventional submarines from Japan is gaining ground. Analysts at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute have suggested that Soryu-class submarines or other Japanese platforms could serve as a stopgap solution in the event of AUKUS delays. The Australian government has so far dismissed such a possibility, arguing that any discussion of an alternative solution undermines the AUKUS program itself.
Despite official assurances, the scope of the project — extending the life of the Collins, rebuilding American industry, and developing a new class of nuclear-powered submarines — makes it clear that Australia is entering a period of high strategic risk, with discussions of a “contingency plan” likely to intensify in the coming years.
