After the Gaza war, it has become apparent that American and Israeli officials have increasingly diverged in their assessment of Turkey’s regional role.
At the same time, Egypt and Turkey have begun to deepen their military cooperation after years of estrangement.
US-Israeli disagreement over Turkish “involvement” in the Gaza Strip
In recent days, US envoy Steve Witkoff has been preparing to meet in Miami with senior officials from Egypt, Turkey and Qatar to discuss the next steps in Gaza, giving Ankara a role focused on implementing the ceasefire and post-war arrangements.
The inclusion reflects Washington’s view that Turkey remains an indispensable regional player, even as Israel continues to view Ankara with deep suspicion.
This difference in approach is now at the heart of a growing US-Israeli rift. Specifically:
While Washington has sought to broaden the circle of regional partners involved in managing the post-war phase, Jerusalem has pushed to keep Turkey out of any framework that could shape Gaza’s future security order. This is not a public rupture, but a widening divergence over sequencing and control.
- US officials describe their approach as pragmatic, aimed at maintaining calm and preventing further escalation.
- Israeli officials see the same process as an erosion of the informal boundaries that once limited Ankara’s influence.
For Washington, Turkey remains an ally. Israel, however, sees Turkey as a hostile state and tries to keep it out of Gaza and out of security affairs in general.
Events that have exacerbated the Tel Aviv-Washington divide
In late September, Egypt and Turkey conducted joint naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, their most visible military cooperation in more than a decade. The exercises concluded on September 30 after several days of activity in Turkish territorial waters and were attended by senior commanders from both navies, underscoring the level of institutional commitment behind the renewed cooperation.
Officials from both sides described the exercises as part of an effort to standardize operational coordination and expand practical cooperation at sea. In Washington, the exercises were largely viewed as a step toward bilateral normalization between two regional partners.
In Jerusalem, they were interpreted differently, as evidence that normalization between Egypt and Turkey has moved beyond diplomacy to operational coordination at a time when the post-war architecture of Gaza remains unstable.
These concerns are now being translated into concrete coordination.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has turned (correctly, in The Liberal Globe’s view) to Cyprus and Greece, holding a Summit.
The three countries are considering the creation of a joint military rapid reaction force in the eastern Mediterranean, reflecting growing concern in Athens—and increasingly in Jerusalem—about Turkey’s expanding military presence in the region.
In November, the foreign ministers of Egypt and Turkey met in Ankara to launch a joint planning framework aimed at managing cooperation on political, security, and regional issues. Subsequent discussions later in the month focused on implementation, signaling an effort to institutionalize coordination rather than rely on ad hoc contacts.
Taken together, these steps explain why attention has now intensified. What was once seen as a cautious thaw increasingly resembles an emerging architecture capable of supporting deeper coordination with less political friction, including on sensitive regional issues.
Egypt-Turkey approach not limited to Gaza
The Egypt-Turkey approach is not limited to Gaza, but extends to many regional issues, including the Eastern Mediterranean, despite Cairo’s deep reservations about Turkey’s role.
The Egypt-Turkey approach offers a model for balancing important regional interests through coordination. If it proves successful in Gaza, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, it could eventually be extended to Syria.
He added that Egypt is also looking beyond its immediate neighborhood, including Syria and strategic flashpoints in the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin – areas where Turkey already has a significant presence.
From Ankara’s perspective, Turkey has moved over the past decade from ideological ambition aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood to a more transactional, state-to-state realism.
In the opinion of The Liberal Globe, Greece should further deepen its alliance with Israel, engaging in Gaza by sending military force there, as part of military diplomacy.
Suggestions
In our opinion, Turkey should not be allowed to have a military presence in Gaza as it is known that wherever a Turkish soldier enters, he never leaves peacefully, but only with a military operation, something that the US should take very seriously.
Does anyone believe that Turkish soldiers, if they settle in Gaza, will attempt to disarm Hamas?
It is known that Erdogan is an ally of Hamas, whose leaders and offices operated in Turkey, while the Turkish President has publicly expressed his desire and prayers for the destruction of Israel and the conquest of Jerusalem.
