Unfortunately, Europe has been experiencing a new war for 3.5 years, cruel and merciless and with no end in sight for the time being. However, in a world where geopolitical balances are changing rapidly and alliances are being tested, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not an event that concerns “only” Eastern Europe and is far from us. On the contrary, it constitutes a critical crossroads of international legitimacy within Europe (in the hard core of developed countries), with consequences for countries such as Greece and Cyprus that belong to the same formation.
Thus, Turkey, cooperating with Russia and maintaining special and good relations with it, during this period of war, is carefully monitoring these developments, seeing in them opportunities to strengthen its own claims at the expense of Greece and Cyprus. So the essence of this particular war, as far as Greek interests are concerned, lies in the fact that accepting the Russian occupation of territories in Ukraine, as well as other Russian demands, will create a fait accompli, which could be used by any country with revisionist tendencies.
So Turkey, which has illegally occupied the northern part of Cyprus since 1974, where it consistently presents its invasion there as a “peacekeeping operation” (with Moscow speaking since 2022 about a “special military operation”), would have every reason to demand similar negotiations and a resolution of the occupation, citing arguments similar to those of Russia.
Furthermore, Moscow’s claims of “oppression of the Russian-speaking population” in Ukraine, to such an extent that they justify an invasion, find a direct counterpart in Ankara’s claims of “oppression and danger” of the Turkish Cypriot community in 1974. Something that is repeated today with references to “our oppressed compatriots in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese”.
Furthermore, the Russian demand for “Ukrainian neutrality” but also for control of the political scene in Kiev (presented as “denazification”), in practice means that Moscow will impose a trusteeship on the sovereignty of Ukraine. This is also partly equivalent to the Turkish demand for Cyprus and Greece to abandon-cede their sovereign rights to land and sea “if they want peace”.
In Greece, however, a significant part of public opinion has been influenced by Russian propaganda, which presents the invasion as a “liberating” act, while many see the whole issue as a “just punishment of the hypocritical West, which did nothing to help in Cyprus”. Such views, however, are deeply problematic as they ignore the above, namely how the same narrative could be turned against us, today, in a possible conflict with Turkey.
Greece has had a consistent foreign policy for many decades, and it invokes international law, legitimacy and international stability as the central axes of its action. Right here, the historian will recognize that this tactic did not help us in resolving the Cyprus problem – so clearly here we also have Western inertia and hypocrisy – nor did it manage to limit Turkish claims in the Aegean.
But if the Cyprus problem remains an “open” international issue, if all the countries of the world continue to refuse to recognize the pseudo-state (even those friendly to Ankara), if Turkey, even diplomatically, is on the defensive on this particular point, this is precisely because there is still international legitimacy and the functioning of the institutions. With shortcomings, with failures, with problems. But it exists. The same goes for the tensions in the Aegean, where, albeit with a heavy heart, Greece finds support, mainly within the EU, for its rights, while no one there applauds Turkish lawlessness, nor justifies it.
Thus, Greece cannot risk seeing a new cycle of “revisionism” and collapse of institutional existence and rules, especially when its own position is not that of a country with regional power ambitions. Simply put, such scenarios of “superpower lawlessness” are well-known – the US has a heavy history here – but each new appearance of them, geographically closer to Greece and from countries with “special relations” with Turkey and with such warlike tension, does not serve our own interests.
Greece and Russia
Another issue that enters into this complex relationship is the historical contact between Greece and Russia. In Greece, some pro-Russian perceptions present Moscow as an “alternative” to the West, which would supposedly save Greece if it left the euro, if it collapsed economically during the era of the Memoranda and other similar things. These statements, in retrospect, on the safe side and without any proof, have one purpose: To distract Greece from its disagreement with Russia on the Ukrainian issue, and for us to become a follower of Moscow, with vague promises, such as for “cheap energy” or “cheap Russian weapons” (another favorite topic of Greek followers of the “blonde race”). In 2015, of course, Russia (which was supposed to save Greece), was going through an economic crisis and its main interest was for Greece to serve the sale of Russian natural gas to Europe. But through the Turkstream pipeline… which ended in Turkey!
To the same arguments are added references to “homodox” with Russia, forgetting of course that for many years the latter has been openly undermining the Greek-minded Ecumenical Patriarchate, and is trying to make it a prisoner of that of Moscow, which wants the ecclesiastical primacy as the “Third Rome”. It should not escape our thought that the discord between East and West that has been cultivated in Greece since the date of its establishment as a state (1826 to the present) was cultivated by Russia through the Greek Orthodox Church.
The pro-Russian perceptions within Greece still forget that Russia sold the S-400 anti-aircraft missiles to the Islamizing Turkey in 2019, without any hesitation. A weapons system that is directly aimed at the Greek Air Force. As there is no other air force in the Turkish region, worth mentioning. While it has proposed other weapons systems from time to time.
They also forget that Russia systematically invests in Turkey, in nuclear plants, in oil and gas pipelines, in its financial market, in tourist infrastructure and so much more. Because it finds great opportunities for development there and therefore “does well”, without of course being bothered by the Turkish threat against Greece.
Clearly, Russia and Greece have nothing to share and have serious historical ties. And the Greek statement that “we are at war with Russia” was wrong! But Greece has every right to remind Moscow of the serious mistake it is making with the invasion of Ukraine, in turn pursuing an imperialist policy, and with arguments about “racial heritage”. A false argument that we will also hear at some point from Turkey about our own territories, while nationalist circles there are already formulating it for “Thessaloniki, Kemal’s birthplace” and for “western Thrace, where we lived in large numbers”. While Russia being “angry” with Greece because we sent some military equipment to Kiev, it is good to equate it with the continuous support we described, which Moscow provides to Ankara, and much earlier than 2022.
In conclusion, a defeat of Ukraine and its retreat to Russian demands is not only a sad development. But it will be recorded as a victory of revisionist forces within post-war Europe, a prevalence of the “strong”, a dominance of weapons over international law, but this time very close to Greece, and by a country which by its choice has much more developed relations with Turkey than Greece. Giving the latter the right and the prospect to “do something similar”, hoping for exactly a similar outcome. That is, justification in the long run.
