The entire world is now moving to the rhythm of the Trump-Putin meeting tomorrow, Friday, in Alaska. Not unreasonably, it is considered that it will determine the future of the conflict in Ukraine. In this context, it is interesting to examine Russia’s motives for disengagement from the military conflict.
Of course, for now it is premature to judge in which direction. The most likely, but not a given, is to find an initial formula for stopping the conflicts. The closer we get to Friday, the lower the bar of expectations. Regular or inadequate preparation? Initially, it must be clarified that a possible cessation of the conflicts does not automatically imply an end to the war. Much more so a resolution of the (geo)political problem that led to the armed confrontation.
It is rather unlikely that any catalytic development will occur that will determine the developments in the war. Such as, for example, an internal collapse of the Putin regime in Russia, or some similar development in Ukraine. However, as much as some wish it, if the Putin regime were to collapse, such a development could result in a dramatic escalation. Faced with a great humiliation, the chances of resorting summarily to the nuclear arsenal would increase dangerously. However, Zelensky’s fall is more likely, as the tremors in Kiev are evident.
Whatever the protagonists say, the only thing certain is that the map will not remain the same. It may be rightly declared that borders should not be changed by force, but historical experience proves that this is not determined by moral rules, but by the balance of power. Military and political. The latter was briefly outlined earlier.
In addition, and despite the risk of becoming tedious, it is worth repeating that, unfortunately, the rule is that what is lost on the battlefield is not recovered by diplomatic means, but exclusively by military means.
Another observation is that it is unfair to uncritically charge Trump with responsibility for the course that things have taken in Ukraine, even though he has obviously had a decisive influence on them. Anyone who does not suffer from ideological strategic blindness understands that reversing the fait accompli in Ukraine requires the involvement of military forces from Western countries. However, this was rejected even by what is called in the West as the “war party”.
Something that seems…
The impasse was predictable. The numerical data were against Ukraine from the beginning. In the fourth year of the conflict, with all the destruction that the war has brought to Ukrainian society, not only the destruction of infrastructure, those who advocate for the continuation of the war exclusively through financing the country and providing weapons systems are deeply hypocritical.
The responsibility naturally also falls on Zelensky to the extent that he does not point out this hypocrisy. It is understandable, however, that he has other -politically self-serving- parameters to consider. With the accusations of corruption having -now officially- touched his immediate environment, he has every reason to fear for his personal future.
If he pointed out the hypocrisy and called for the involvement of Western powers, he could use it as an exit strategy, provided that there are no unknown aspects of his personal relations with Western capitals, which are currently helping to “regulate” the margins of movement he has…
The main question of the analysis, however, concerns the motivations of each side to disengage from the conflict. It is a common place in the rhetoric of many in the West that Putin’s Russia has no intention of ending the war. But this is not a question that can be answered with a yes or no.
The negotiating position of each side is determined by what its red lines really are and whether or not they are realistic in today’s conditions. It is perfectly legitimate for Ukrainians to consider the recovery of lost territories as a red line. However, it is not realistic in the given circumstances, while Russian society also considers many of the occupied territories to be purely Russian.
The enthusiastic “audience of spectators” of the sofa, is the one that, between cheese, wine and pears, fantasizes about how to make Putin run away, appropriating the concept of “realism”, which, however, has a very specific content in the global international community, as has been sufficiently analyzed in relation to the war in Ukraine.
The big picture betrays the motivation
The motivation for Russia to disengage from the war is one, although it has its external and internal dimensions: It concerns the new global distribution of power that is being shaped. The war in Ukraine is just one piece. For Moscow, it is also linked to the immediate strategic security environment and how to enter the new era on the best possible terms.
This war is the result of the course – or rather the fluctuations in the management – of East-West relations. In retrospect, many will argue that this management was sometimes erratic, contributing to making the conflict inevitable. This will be recorded by the historian of the future when passions subside and the evidence and archival material are approached again with composure, beyond distorting ideological lenses and foolish divisions between good vs. bad, or right vs. wrong side of history.
As long as a war lasts, there can be no substantial development of the economy and reconstruction of the productive base, and of course of the armed forces. As in the 2008 war in Georgia and despite its positive outcome for Moscow, a multitude of pathologies were revealed in the Russian armed forces. Much was studied and corrective measures were taken. But the war in Ukraine revealed much more.
And if two wrongs make no wise man, it should be considered certain that Putin will attempt sweeping changes tomorrow. To avoid… three wrongs, as this could be fatal. This requires the end of a war that benefits Moscow’s strategic competitors in many ways. Mainly China, but also the EU, which is trying to awaken defensively so that it can stand autonomously against any Russian threat.
Beijing is obviously comfortable as long as the West’s attention and resources are directed to Ukraine, depriving them of the Asia-Pacific front. But this, conversely, logically constitutes an incentive for Washington to disengage! Beyond the reasonable concern about the possible exploitation of the situation by China to clarify the issue with Taiwan. This would break part of its “sea ring” of containment, which is perhaps its most serious strategic nightmare.
However, the -Confucian origin- culture of demonstrating patience, combined with a continuous and consistent effort to shape the most favorable conditions that will allow it to win the war without fighting, constitutes the basic scenario that suits the Chinese modus operandi.
The Russia-China relationship will of course continue to be close. Despite the numerous problems, cooperation is mutually beneficial in addressing the common threat of American hegemony, but also in preventing either side from collaborating more closely with Washington.
The economic factor
The continuation of the war in Ukraine does not favor Russian interests at all. Without meaning that it will end it like that. Although expectations of economic collapse have been solemnly refuted, the situation does not allow complacency in Moscow. The positive economic cycle fueled by the war economy seems to have reached its limits. Annual growth, which reached 4%, seems to be fluctuating in 2025 to 1%, perhaps even less. (“Trouble in Russian economy means Putin really needs Alaska talks too“)
The clouds over the Russian economy are increasingly dense and the risk of recession has been considered real in Moscow since the end of 2024, when the phenomenon of “overheating” of the Russian economy appeared. Although a collapse is not expected, the situation requires careful management, which is reflected in the findings of the head of the Central Bank.
A war by definition consumes resources and in the long run leads to economic disruption. Hippocrates has the wisest advice: “Prevention is cure”… In the West, the voices that see the situation as an opportunity to escalate pressure have lost their credibility, as they are the same voices that heralded the alleged imminent economic collapse of Russia.
Ultimately, the picture that has emerged is far from being considered ideal for either side to be considered able to impose its will on the way to end the conflicts in Ukraine. Only a cooperative approach with a strategic perspective can provide a solution.
The Trump-Putin meeting will chart a new course. Will Moscow secure some gains and acquiesce, or will it consider that completing the capture of key urban centers will pave the way for a rapid advance and capture of most of Ukraine?
If this happens, what will follow? Will Moscow hold on to the territories, proving Kiev’s refusal to capitulate earlier wrong? Or will it consider that it gives it negotiating flexibility, so that by returning part of the territories it can attempt to de-escalate the conflicts at this point in time. Tomorrow… we will know.
