The United States, during the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June, had deployed two THAAD anti-aircraft systems in Israel, which, built to intercept ballistic missiles at high altitude, proved effective, but “spent” more than 150 missiles to intercept waves of Iranian missiles. That is, a quarter of the American stockpile!
The demand for missiles was so great that the Pentagon considered a plan to send Israel urgently, missiles purchased from Saudi Arabia. The cost of each THAAD missile is about 13 million dollars, with the Pentagon having purchased about 650 since 2010 and planning to buy 37 more next year. So replacing the ones fired during the 12-day war would likely take more than a year (manufacturer Lockheed Martin says it can produce about 100 per year), and cost between $1.5 billion and $2 billion.
As the war progressed and the Iranian barrages continued, the US rushed to deploy Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to help with interception, also using SM-3 anti-ballistic missiles. So here, about 80 SM-3s were launched against Iranian threats, each costing between $8 million and $25 million, depending on the variant. There were also concerns in the Pentagon that the SM-3s, first used in combat last year against an Iranian attack, were not destroying as many targets as expected.
Adding to the challenges of the sheer volume of missiles being fired, US ships had to head to ports in the Mediterranean or Red Sea after their missiles were depleted, as the US Navy does not yet have a reliable way to reload them at sea.
Another issue that emerged, and was cited by US Navy officers, was the high intensity of the Iranian missile interception operations, as the US and Israel rely heavily on voice communications to determine which systems will engage which missiles. It is therefore not unlikely that two ships or anti-aircraft guns could have engaged the same target simultaneously, leading to wasted missiles. Also, the detection radars detected not only the incoming missiles, but also debris, decoys, drones, rocket engines of the missiles, creating saturation and possible confusion.
To the above, we should add that Israel also apparently spent a very large part of its own reserves of Arrow 2/3 missiles, that is, the most capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. Here too, a rapid and costly replenishment is needed.
The above, largely expected and within the reality of modern warfare, demonstrated, in practice, the main problem. How a strong air defense based on expensive interceptor missiles (THAAD, Arrow-2/3, SM-3 type in this specific case of conflict) can achieve a high percentage of interception and downing of the threat, but ultimately prove numerically insufficient. That is, when the enemy manages to launch cheaper ballistic missiles en masse.
And that is why, in the Israel-Iran war, the Israeli Air Force never stopped, throughout the days of the conflict, to search for and destroy as many Iranian ballistic and cruise missile launchers as it could locate. With the systematic use of its fighters, in large patrols that identified the characteristic trace of the launch from the ground, to rush there. As it is not only understood support in defense, but also the active search for the enemy’s weapons is required.
For the American Armed Forces and their general defense policy, the issue is critical, as such investments and doctrines are already being implemented by Russia, and China and North Korea are also turning towards that. In other words, choosing to saturate the air defense with too many missiles, many of them perhaps of low quality, but capable of creating a barrage that lasts for many days. That is, what is happening in Ukraine, and with the participation of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Thus, in the US, the need to initially replenish stocks and then create larger ones is now great, and there is an effort, both to increase the production of anti-aircraft missiles, but also to mobilize funds for their purchase.
