Negotiations to end 41 years of conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have taken on a concrete dimension. On May 12, two months after the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called on his comrades to lay down their arms in a letter, the leadership of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane announced that it was abandoning the armed struggle and handing over its weapons. In fact, a few days ago, a “ceremonial” surrender and destruction of small arms by the organization’s fighters took place symbolically and in front of the cameras of Turkish television media. The PKK, which is fighting for greater Kurdish rights and autonomy, has outlined several conditions that it considers necessary for its dissolution. He insists that Ocalan must lead and direct the peace process, that his right to democratic politics in Turkey be recognized, and that strong legal guarantees be provided to the organization.
Why is the breakup coming now?
1. On the one hand, there seems to be a great desire for peace between Turkey and the PKK. This is evidenced by the positive reactions to the PKK’s statement both domestically and internationally. Erdogan said that the PKK’s disengagement from the armed struggle (terrorism according to Ankara) opened “the doors of a new era in every field, namely the strengthening of political and democratic capacity.” However, there is skepticism. Turkey sees the peace process very differently from the Kurds, referring to it as part of the government’s initiative for a “Turkey without terrorism,” while the Kurdish movement adopted the title of Öcalan’s letter in February, “A Call for Peace and a Democratic Society.”
2. Many see Erdogan’s willingness to resolve the Kurdish issue as a political maneuver by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Positioning himself as the party that ended decades of “terror” by the PKK would allow the AKP to consolidate its power over the opposition. But, despite this, there are clear reasons for both the Turkish state and the PKK to negotiate now. One of the main reasons is the changing geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East.
What are these reasons?
1. In late 2024, the regime of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown in Syria, and the country was subsequently taken over by al-Qaeda Islamists. Iran’s influence has weakened after the collapse of parts of its regional network of proxies, most notably Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to some extent the Houthis in Yemen. Israel, meanwhile, continues its war in Gaza. And it has stepped up military operations in Syria, particularly near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, while openly expressing support for Syria’s Druze religious communities. The politics of the region are being reshaped, and leaders across the Middle East are being repositioned accordingly.
2. For the PKK and its broader political base, a peace process with Turkey, if it succeeds, offers a path to equal democratic participation and long-term legitimacy for Kurds in the Middle East after almost a century of struggle. This was signaled by the Kurdish National Conference in April 2025. The conference, which was attended by various Kurdish parties and organizations, underlined the importance of strategic coordination among Kurds in the region. For Turkey, peace with the PKK now would further reduce Iran’s weakened ability to project power to the West. It is worth recalling that some PKK-linked groups, such as the Sinjar resistance units in northern Iraq, have been indirectly supported by Iran.
3. The Kurdish issue has also created friction in Turkey’s diplomatic approach to the US and Europe. By addressing the long-standing Kurdish issue, Ankara could lay the groundwork for more stable relations with the West. These relations are particularly important now, as Turkey seeks to assume an increasingly central role in European security.
Dismantling the PKK will not guarantee peace in Turkey. The Kurdish people are demanding equal citizenship, recognition of Kurdish as the national language, an amendment to the constitutional article that states that every Turkish citizen is a Turk, and an end to the government’s practice of removing elected mayors and replacing them with state-appointed administrators. They are also demanding the release of political prisoners and reforms to Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws, which are used to suppress the Kurdish movement. These issues will be debated in Turkey’s parliament in the coming days, while talks on a new constitution are expected to take place in the fall. The negotiations will not be simple. Kurds have been persistently branded as rebels, traitors, and terrorists since the beginning of Turkish democracy in 1923. It will not be easy to change entrenched views overnight.
It is also completely unclear whether all PKK branches will follow the call for disbandment. It is unknown how the Kurdish YPG militia, which controls large areas of northern Syria, will behave. Another question is how the disarmament of the PKK, which has thousands of fighters both inside Turkey and in Iraq, should proceed.
However, historical precedents do not prescribe a positive approach to the peaceful resolution of the conflict between the PKK and Ankara. What do we mean?
Geopolitical developments have at times paved the way for peace between Turkey and the Kurds. After each episode of geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11/2001, and the “Arab Spring” in 2011, Turkey has held negotiations with the Kurds. In 1991, Turkish President Turgut Ozal contacted the Kurdish political leaders in Iraq, Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani. The development of relations between Iraqi Kurdish leaders and Turkey soon evolved into informal peace negotiations with the PKK in 1993, in which Jalal Talabani played a decisive role as a mediator between Turkey and the PKK. Özal believed that Turkey would gain an advantage by working with the Kurds in the Middle East against the United States. Talabani felt that satisfying his sponsor (Özal) “could contribute to strengthening the overall position of the Kurds throughout the Middle East.” However, this process ended abruptly when Özal died on April 17, 1993, as the Turkish deep state did not share his approach.
Another revival of peace talks with the Kurds occurred when the US invaded Iraq in 2003. Peace with the PKK, in particular, had been on the cards even before 9/11, as PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan had been imprisoned on İmralı Island in Turkey since 1999. Furthermore, the PKK had declared a ceasefire in 1999 and even “self-dissolved” in 2002, reforming as the Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK) to negotiate a peace settlement.
In fact, informal negotiations with the PKK did not begin until 2008, when Turkey began an “opening process” with the newly formed Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. This time, unlike in 1993 under Özal, the rapprochement with the Kurds was supported by both the Turkish deep state and the international community, as both agreed on the necessity of Turkish-Kurdish peace to pave the way for Turkey to assume a leading role, both economically and politically, in the Middle East. Although this second round of negotiations between Turkey and the PKK was suspended for a few years during the “Arab Spring” after 2011, it was resumed after 2013 with the full and explicit commitment of all parties, Turkey, the KRG, the PKK and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), in the context of a negotiation process (the İmralı process) where Turkey and the Kurds were positioned as strategic partners in the Middle East “under the banner of Islam”.
Therefore, it can be argued that, firstly, the driving force behind the post-1993 negotiations between Turkey and the PKK was regional and not an internal dynamic. Second, although the negotiations were conducted between Turkey and the PKK, Kurdish political actors in Iraq and Syria were also involved at least occasionally at different levels. Third, the goal of the negotiations was ultimately a cooperation between Turkey and the Kurds as a whole in the Middle East, and not simply a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict within Turkey. However, the main factor that led to the termination of the negotiations was related to the internal dynamics in Turkey, rather than the regional situation.
From this perspective, one can argue that the fate of the negotiation processes was determined by Ankara from the following developments:
- In 1993, the power struggle between the political and military establishment, where the military factor prevailed.
- In 2008-2010, the internal political struggle as Islamist cadres entered the security bureaucracy and the power of the army was reduced under the government of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP).
- And finally, the political repercussions of the general elections of June 7, 2015, where the AKP failed to meet expectations, while the Kurdish HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) achieved unexpected success. The military and political successes of the Kurds in Syria and Iraq and their visible strengthening during the fight against ISIS/DAESH had further accelerated this process. In this context, the growing authoritarian tendencies in Turkey affected the Kurdish conflict not only in Turkey, but also in Iraq and Syria.
- Furthermore, Turkey’s military interventions in the neighboring Kurdish entities undermined any peace efforts with the Kurds of these regions.
- Nevertheless, even if the current peace process is sincere on both sides, a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict is unlikely in the immediate future, given the new global geopolitical considerations, where security interests will dominate the course of developments in the Middle East. In fact, the international community’s indifference (at best) to decades of Turkish aggression against the Kurds, both domestically and regionally, demonstrates that such interests dominate the game.
It is always difficult, if not impossible, to make predictions about the future when it comes to Middle Eastern politics. However, a new balance is emerging in the Middle East, and in this new balance very different players will sit at the same table. The Kurds do not have the military and political power required to achieve their ambitions on their own. But so does any actor seeking to project power on the territory of Kurdistan without the cooperation of Kurdish actors.
In summary, both the failed attempts to obtain Kurdish statehood, independence, or autonomy, as well as the processes through peace processes, show how global and regional upheavals and, in particular, geopolitical constellations open up opportunities for the Kurds, influence intra-Kurdish dynamics, and impact the chances of success or defeat.
