This analysis is based on an Aggressive Realist Interpretation of Nuclear Sovereignty and the Global Dynamics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Iran’s recent legislative measures to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mark a defining shift in global nuclear governance. While not a formal withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran’s deactivation of IAEA monitoring systems and curtailment of inspections fundamentally challenge the agency’s operational mandate.
Drawing on the theory of Aggressive Realism, this analysis argues that Iran’s actions reflect a calculated assertion of national sovereignty in an anarchic international system where survival and self-help trump institutional norms. At the same time, the security asymmetries revealed by the Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian nuclear-capable bombers and Israel’s historic exemption from comprehensive IAEA inspections highlight the systemic erosion of nuclear governance mechanisms. The analysis concludes that the IAEA’s regulatory authority is under existential strain, with implications for the future of nuclear order and deterrence.
Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran, a party to the NPT and subject to extensive international scrutiny, has recently taken concrete steps to suspend cooperation with the IAEA. On 23 June 2025, Iran’s Parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy approved legislation to ban the IAEA’s monitoring and inspection activities, citing national security concerns following Israeli and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities earlier that month.
This development reignites long-standing tensions around nuclear transparency, allegations of espionage, and the selective application of the IAEA’s monitoring mechanisms. This article assesses these dynamics in the light of aggressive realism, emphasizing the role of power, security imperatives, and self-interest in shaping state behavior within the global nuclear regime.
Iran and the IAEA: A De Facto Divorce
Although Iran has not formally withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its Parliament voted by a large majority (221–2) to prevent the installation or maintenance of IAEA surveillance cameras and to deny inspectors access to key nuclear facilities. These moves follow Tehran’s accusation that IAEA surveillance data was used by foreign intelligence agencies, notably Israel’s Mossad, to orchestrate targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists—a claim the IAEA vehemently denies.
From an aggressively realist perspective, Iran’s actions represent a rational response to perceived threats in an anarchic international system. Given the asymmetric exposure of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, inspections are increasingly seen not as transparency mechanisms but as avenues of espionage that allow adversaries the advantage of selectively targeting scientists and facilities.
The Israeli Exception
Israel, which has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), remains outside the scope of comprehensive IAEA inspections. It maintains a policy of nuclear non-transparency, refusing to confirm or deny its arsenal, while allegedly conducting numerous covert operations, including cyberattacks (e.g., Stuxnet) and high-profile assassinations against Iranian nuclear-related scientists and infrastructure (Time 2025).
Iranian policymakers argue that this asymmetry delegitimizes the IAEA’s impartiality, making the agency complicit, knowingly or unknowingly, in hostile intelligence gathering. While there is no definitive evidence linking the IAEA to leaks, the perception of bias seriously undermines its credibility in Tehran’s security calculations.
Russia: “Operation Spider Web” and the Illusion of Symmetrical Nuclear Deterrence
On June 1, 2025, Ukraine launched a coordinated series of drone attacks—reportedly codenamed “Operation Spider Web”—targeting five major Russian air bases. The drones, hidden inside modified civilian cargo trucks, were deployed within close proximity of military airfields across central Russia, including Engels-2, Irkutsk, and Belaya (Ukrainska Pravda 2025). The operation resulted in the destruction or serious damage to several high-value military assets, including Tu-95 and Tu-22M strategic bombers, as well as A-50 aircraft warning and control systems.
While these aircraft are not directly subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, they are critical components of Russia’s nuclear triad. Under the terms of the New START Treaty, Russia is required to declare the number and location of its strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles (bombers) and to allow their visibility through satellite surveillance and on-site inspections under mutual verification protocols (US Department of State 2010).
From an aggressively realist perspective, this transparency—intended as a confidence-building measure—paradoxically exposes vulnerabilities. The fact that such high-value, treaty-declared nuclear assets could be degraded through asymmetric drone warfare demonstrates a larger truth: compliance with international norms and treaties does not provide strategic immunity. In a system where law is subordinate to power, deterrence must be enforced through the projection of power, not through trust in verification regimes.
Strategic Implications for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The juxtaposition of Iran’s de facto withdrawal, Israel’s historical exceptionalism, and Russia’s vulnerability suggests a systematic weakening of the nuclear governance regime since the Cold War. The IAEA, once a symbol of regulatory consensus, now appears as a selectively applied instrument tolerated by powerful states when convenient and bypassed at will.
Iran’s shift should not be understood as an irrational acrobatic policy but as a strategic realignment. The state is reacting to its structural insecurity by rejecting international norms that no longer serve its survival interests. In turn, this weakens the integrity of the NPT as a mutual framework for nuclear containment and the prevention of nuclear war.
Is the world heading towards a post-institutional nuclear order?
Iran’s partial withdrawal from the IAEA, Israel’s self-interested anarchy, and the proven vulnerabilities of a START-compliant Russia point to the limits of international institutional power in an era of geopolitical confrontation and asymmetric warfare. As aggressive realism predicts, states revert to self-help and unilateral action when their survival is threatened.
For Tehran, the IAEA no longer guarantees security; for Moscow, compliance with legal provisions has not prevented strategic loss; and, for Israel, illegal covert operations and military strikes have always been the cornerstone of its strategy.
If current trends continue, the international community may find itself navigating a nuclear landscape in which espionage, opacity, and asymmetric first strikes replace diplomacy and verification of non-aggressive intentions.
The IAEA, stripped of inspection access and haunted by suspicions of facilitating espionage, risks becoming a rudimentary, symbolic, and strategically powerless organization.
Sources
- https://www.idnfinancials.com/news/55459/iran-halts-cooperation-with-un-nuclear-agency
- Financial Times. 2025. Iran’s parliament votes to halt co-operation with nuclear watchdog. June 23, 2025.
- The Guardian. 2025. Israel-Iran war live: Iranian nuclear program could restart in months, Pentagon finds. June 25, 2025.
- Time Magazine. 2025. How Bombing Iran May Have Made Nuclear Diplomacy Much Harder. June 24, 2025.
- Ukrainian Pravda. 2025. Ukrainian drones strike Russian Tu‑95 bombers deep in Irkutsk and Saratov. June 2, 2025.
- International Atomic Energy Agency. 2025. Safeguards Statement for 2024. Vienna: IAEA Publications.
- U.S. Department of State. 2010. New START Treaty Text and Protocols. Arms Control Association. 2022. New START at a Glance
