The development of advanced conventional weapons by the Nordic countries, such as the planned procurement of hypersonic missiles, reflects trends in Europe to strengthen conventional capabilities for deterrence and strategic stability, under the pretext of the war in Ukraine.
However, these developments threaten to disrupt the strategic stability of nuclear control agreements, as they expand conventional and nuclear capabilities. The Nordic countries should review their security strategies and carefully consider the implications of developing advanced conventional capabilities in combination with nuclear ones, in order to avoid potential escalation, if that is what they ultimately want…
Recently, Norway completed the new hypersonic missile, Tyrfing, in cooperation with Germany, to strengthen European conventional capabilities.
Finland plans to acquire JASSM-ER missiles from the United States, strengthening its air power.
Sweden provides military support to Ukraine through modernized early warning aircraft.
The Nordic developments emphasize the expansion of strategic interaction with the United States and the strengthening of NATO. They are occurring in a European region traditionally more neutral than involved, changing, as I predicted, the stable. Advanced conventional capabilities may accelerate the arms race and affect the strategies of nuclear powers, and the risks of escalation are increasing.
Analysis of Conventional Weapons Development in Scandinavia
Historical and Strategic Context
After the end of the Cold War, the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, and Finland) had adopted security strategies that focused more on defense planning and constructive cooperation with Russia. Today, the NATO narrative says that the Russian military operations in Ukraine have highlighted the need to strengthen conventional military capabilities.
Hypersonic Missile Development
Norway: The development of the Tyrfing hypersonic missile is considered important because it incorporates modern technology with the aim of increasing strategic deterrence. It is designed to penetrate air defense systems, increasing the possibility of attacks on strategic targets.
Finland: The planned procurement of JASSM-ER missiles is expected to ensure extensive attacks against enemy forces, strengthening Finland’s overall air power.
Strategic Implications
The development of advanced conventional weapons has not only a military dimension, but is also part of a broader strategic adjustment for the Nordic countries:
Interaction with NATO and the US: These countries either participate as allies in NATO or seek strategic partnerships with the US, considering this to strengthen their deterrent power.
Creation of a Defense Network: By increasing advanced defense systems, the Nordic countries aim to create a network of coverage against potential attacks.
Risks and Challenges
Risk of Escalation: The development of new armaments programs by Nordic countries may lead to mutual concern and alarm in neighboring countries, possibly accelerating the arms race. This increases the speed towards an upcoming massive conflict and of course deprives these countries of significant development resources.
Nuclear Strategy: The nuclear deterrence strategies that have been in place may be affected as naval and air forces are strengthened, resulting in new needs for a review of strategic nuclear policies.
Conclusion
NATO, according to its favorite tactic, presents itself as a defensive force against the “Russian danger” but does nothing less than provoke the Russian Federation, concentrating regular military dangers on its borders, demanding (hypocritically) that it accept it.
Something that it would not accept in any case. The US, of course, did not tolerate Soviet missiles in Cuba, when in the past the US-Cuban crisis was triggered, which led to the cancellation of the installation of missiles in Cuba and to approximately 90 murderous attacks against Castro by the CIA.
Similarly, the US, trumpets that it will not tolerate Chinese expansion in Greenland (which, it should be noted, is purely commercial and not military) due to the short distance from the US and the possible transformation into a military danger. Of course, the United Kingdom would not tolerate Russian or Chinese military installations in, say, Ireland, and Germany would not tolerate, say, Hungary. However, all of them consider Russia’s refusal to do so as unacceptable, provocative and dangerous.
The planned deployment of conventional weapons in Scandinavia is therefore a critical factor in regional and international security. As countries, it is important to consider the implications of their decisions on deterrence and international relations. The Nordic countries need to find a balance between strengthening their security and maintaining strategic stability in the region.
In short, they must decide independently and not be tied to the NATO tank.
