A few days ago, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared that “we are now in a world of very great powers in different parts of the world” and that “the post-war world order is not just outdated, it is now a weapon used against us”. What the US is essentially admitting in a few words is: Our attempt to rule the world is over, we are now just another great power and not the “exceptional nation”.
Hegemony was going to end sooner or later, now the US is essentially choosing to end it on its own terms. It is the post-American world order that the new US administration is trying to bring to the fore. From this perspective, even tariffs imposed on friendly or allied countries make sense, as they redefine the concept of “allies”. The US can no longer afford vassals, but relationships that evolve based on current interests. We can see this development either as decline or as the avoidance of further decline. That is, a controlled withdrawal from imperial commitments in order to focus resources on core national interests, rather than being forced into an even worst retreat at a later stage.
In any case, it is the end of an era. And while Trump’s pronouncements may seem like chaos to some, they are much more in tune with the changing realities of the world and the difficult position of the United States than the actions of the previous Biden administration. Recognizing the existence of a multipolar world and choosing to operate within it, rather than trying to maintain an increasingly costly global hegemony, could not be much longer delayed. The whole scene seems messy (Greenland, Panama, Ukraine, the Middle East, tariffs, etc.), but it is probably better than maintaining the fiction of American primacy until the collapse finally occurs.
This does not mean that the United States will not continue to wreak havoc on the world and in fact may become much more aggressive than before. Because where previously they were trying, poorly and hypocritically, to maintain some semblance of a self-proclaimed “rules-based order,” now they don’t even need to pretend to be under any constraints, not even the constraint of being “nice” to allies. It is the end of the US empire, but certainly not the end of the US as a major disruptive force in world affairs.
Overall, this transformation may mark one of the most significant changes in international relations since the fall of the Soviet Union. And those most unprepared for it, as is painfully obvious, are US vassals like Greece, who have been caught asleep, not realizing that the protector they relied on for decades will now treat them as a set of countries with which to negotiate on different terms.
The question is: Can Trump and Putin, together with Xi Jinping, become the co-architects of a new multipolar world order? Can they forge a world order more in tune with the realities of the 21st century?
We recall that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the current decline of the US have remarkable similarities. The Soviet Union failed because it marginalized the business class. The US is floundering because the ruling class has marginalized the working class, leading to extreme economic inequality and political polarization.
The US and Russia have more in common than they would like to admit. As the American futurist Lawrence Taub pointed out in the 1980s, both countries were born out of revolutions against European empires and were based on humanist political ideals (freedom and social equality, respectively). Both expanded by occupying the lands of indigenous peoples during the 18th and 19th centuries. Furthermore, both the US and Russia have federal political structures and predominantly European cultural roots. Both are multicultural, have multi-ethnic populations, but are culturally, economically, and politically dominated by a major group (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants in the US, Russians in Russia).
Alexis de Tocqueville and, more recently, Paul Dukes in his book The Emergence of the Super-Powers (1970), also drew parallels between Russia and the United States. Dukes wrote that until recently each believed it had a manifest destiny, a global mission, and that the other was the main obstacle to its success. Furthermore, they had a relative tendency to view all political issues in simplistic, black-and-white terms. Both countries are superpowers with superpower mindsets. They are vast in size, comparable in population, and similar in climate and topography. Both nations have large arsenals, and both have decades of experience in space exploration.
As for China, Deng Xiaoping successfully integrated capitalist principles into China’s socialist system in the 1980s, while promoting good relations with the United States. Deng is considered the architect of modern China, as his major economic reforms essentially transformed China’s economy from a state-controlled one to a capitalist one. During his rule in the 1980s, public property was transferred to private ownership, farmers and businessmen were allowed to keep their profits, and China’s economy was opened to foreign investors. The country’s vast labor force became available on the world market, resulting in rapid economic growth.
The last leader of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev, aimed for a similar transformation through perestroika (economic restructuring) and glasnost (political openness). However, he lacked the political support and institutional stability to realize his vision. Instead of controlled reforms, his policies accelerated economic collapse and political fragmentation, leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The failure of Gorbachev’s reforms paved the way for Yeltsin, a populist who capitalized on widespread dissatisfaction with communist rule. Instead of refining socialism, Yeltsin dismantled it. By removing the Communist Party’s control, Yeltsin aimed to transition Russia to a Western-style democracy and market economy. However, the result was widespread corruption, the impoverishment of millions, and the unchecked rise of oligarchs who consolidated their wealth at the expense of the Russian people. Yeltsin’s failed policies paved the way for a leader who restored order and restored Russia’s sovereignty.
Yeltsin allowed the oligarchs to dominate Russian politics, but Putin reined them in and consolidated power within the state. His strategy combined nationalism, economic control, and, especially, national sovereignty, which had been under threat during the Yeltsin years. Under Putin, Russia has reasserted itself on the world stage, using its energy resources and military capabilities to challenge Western dominance. While his authoritarian methods have been controversial, he has transformed Russia from a chaotic post-Soviet state into a formidable power once again.
Unlike the Soviet Union and China, the United States lacked a Gorbachev or Deng figurehead, a leader with enough influence and courage to push for systemic reform. Obama had the opportunity to implement reforms, especially after the 2008 financial crisis. However, instead of promoting structural change, he bailed out Wall Street and the deep state. This decision deepened economic inequality and fueled the popular backlash that led to Trump’s rise to power.
Trump’s first presidency bore similarities to Yeltsin’s. Both leaders disrupted the political establishment and challenged entrenched elites. Trump’s first term was marked by institutional weakening and a focus on dismantling the old order. His policies, such as trade wars, deregulation, and a focus on nationalism, reflected a broader rejection of the post-Cold War globalist consensus.
In his second term, Trump is already trying to exert greater control over the state apparatus, as Putin did in Russia. Despite their similarities, however, Trump and Putin are distinct in their relationships with the super-rich. Putin, as he consolidated power, limited the influence of Russia’s oligarchs, ensuring that the state remained dominant. Instead, Trump aligns himself with the wealthiest elites in the US, securing support from the ultra-rich who have benefited from his tax policies and deregulation agenda. The structure of the US political system, where corporate influence is deeply entrenched, makes fundamental change difficult. Putin has been able to amass power in a way that Trump, constrained by US institutions and legal frameworks, may struggle to replicate.
Nevertheless, a move beyond superpower rivalry and towards a multipolar world has become almost inevitable for the reasons initially mentioned, including the war in Ukraine, the formation of the BRICS, the unsustainable debt of the US government, and the growing economic, technological, and geopolitical influence of China and Russia. When Trump and Putin resolve the Ukraine crisis, they will have the opportunity, in concert with China, to go down in history as co-architects of a multipolar world. The three powers could shape a world order fit for the 21st century.
China is uniquely positioned to have integrated the two major political ideologies of the 20th century, capitalism and socialism. By developing 10-, 20-, and even 50-year plans, the country has arguably lifted a billion people out of poverty, taken the lead in most of the technologies that will shape the 21st century, and become the world’s largest industrial and commercial nation.
With the Deng reforms of the 1980s, the Chinese rediscovered their 2,500-year tradition of reconciling (yin-yang) opposites, based on the Confucian Middle Way. Chinese Prime Minister Xi Jinping will be able to mediate between Trump and Putin by offering the words of wisdom of the philosopher Chuang Tzu, who pointed out the pitfalls of rigidly adhering to a fixed belief or worldview.
