Syria: Analysis of the Crisis and What is Expected to happen in the Future

The collapse of the Syrian Army’s lines in recent days has come as a huge surprise to observers, including the Liberal Globe. Few expected a lightning offensive by the terrorist organization Hayat al-Tahir al-Sham (HTS) to seize Aleppo, Hama and eventually reach Damascus, which has remained undefeated even in the darkest phases of the Syrian guerrilla war.

Meanwhile, the events are relentless. The HTS front, formerly the Al-Nusra Front, may not be pure ISIS, but it appears to have evolved into a Turkish ISIS. Commander Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, the de facto “emir” of the extremely weak rebrand, has thrown all variants of Al Qaeda plus ISIS into the trash can to found HTS. He commands a number of jihadists, mostly from the hinterland, and is a darling of the Turkish MIT. Ergo, he is a darling of Israel and NATO.

After nearly five years of a freeze on lines of territorial control across the country, the developments in Syria are dramatic and groundbreaking. Yet they should not come as a complete surprise, as not only has Assad never really won the guerrilla war, but his grip on power has also been weakened for some time. For years, the conventional view of Syria had been to freeze the crisis, with hostilities a thing of the past. As a result, international attention waned, diplomacy focused on Syria all but ended, and governments gradually withdrew resources from policies targeting Syria, while Arab governments took steps to collectively reengage with Assad, effectively normalizing his regime across the Middle East. All of these developments were supported by the assumption that, although conditions in Syria were bad, the crisis itself was frozen and contained, and that Assad himself was not only strengthening his position, but also consolidating it. This assumption ultimately proved to be misguided. Let’s see why.

Syria’s economy has been in ruins for years. When a ceasefire was agreed in early 2020 by Turkey and Russia, which back opposing sides, the dollar was worth about 1,150 Syrian pounds. When the jihadists’ offensive began a week ago, it was worth 17,500 Syrian pounds. Syria’s humanitarian crisis has escalated since the deal was reached in 2020, with the United Nations reporting that at least 90% of Syrians now live below the poverty line. But Assad had no one to save him from national bankruptcy. Russia’s economy has been dragged down by the war in Ukraine, and Iran’s economy is in dire straits. When Syrians realized that there was no light at the end of the tunnel, they began to take to the streets again and demand Assad’s overthrow.

It didn’t have to be this way. If Assad had reached out constructively to the regional Arab governments that had normalized relations with Syria in 2023, and if he had restored relations with Turkey earlier this year, Syria would be in a significantly different position today.

Meanwhile, Russia’s war in Ukraine and the regional hostilities that Israel has waged against Iran and its network of proxies since October 2023 have distracted Russia and Iran from welding together Syria’s security actors. Both Russia and Iran, as well as Lebanon-based Hezbollah, were busy on their own front lines when the HTS offensive began. Thus, there was little that any of Syria’s supporters could do to hold the Syrian regime forces together while they were in disarray. But no one was justified in being surprised by the attack itself, as the plans of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham jihadists had been in place since mid-October. The last time, in 2015, when Assad faced several coordinated challenges to his country’s territorial control and his regime was pushed to its limits, Russia intervened militarily to save him. Today, there has been no such savior.

Of course, pressing questions and observations arise:

1. Τhe attack by HTS and various jihadist groups was well-organized and clearly planned for a long time, two years according to analyst reports, the starting point of the planning “coincidentally” coincides with Russia’s military operation in Ukraine in early 2022. The jihadists themselves admitted this after the capture of Aleppo and explained in an interview how long they had planned every detail of the attack against the Assad regime. Obviously, we are dealing with a major intelligence failure on the part of Russia, Syria and Iran. However, it must be said that there were several intelligence reports as early as October that HTS and their sponsors were planning an attack of this kind.

2. HTS leader Al-Joulani, while obviously an Islamist terrorist, is a smart and influential leader who has not only consolidated his power but has also built multiple alliances in recent years. Under his leadership, HTS has sought to distance itself from the “jihad” movement and develop a new, broader form of “nationalism” that seeks to achieve with a “carrot” what cannot be achieved with a “stick.” In other words, we are dealing with a coming of age of HTS under Al-Joulani’s leadership.

3. Ιt is clear that Joulani has the support of powerful interest groups to effectively overthrow Assad and become the new “emir” of Syria, but at the same time he is someone who can be accepted and can be repackaged for Western public opinion as a “good” jihadist. This means that his image has had to undergo a major makeover, something that is already happening in the mainstream media. Reports that he is suddenly showing a softer side, flirting with Christians, Alawites and other minorities in Syria (rumor has it that he has appointed a Christian bishop as governor of Aleppo), are true to some extent, but they are clearly a ploy to gain wider international support and present himself as the legitimate leader, while sweeping his radical Salafist past under the carpet.

4. Ιt is interesting that the ideological forces that led the offensive have changed their tactics. In contrast to the widespread brutality and systematic use of knives and massacres that have characterized their actions in recent years, these groups are now using negotiations to achieve quick and strategic successes. Their focus is on controlling territory, allowing the Syrian army to withdraw without prolonged fighting, a pragmatic approach that allows them to expand their influence with minimal resistance. This shift has rapidly reshaped the map of control and raises pressing questions about the future of Syria and the Levant. How might the division of Syria evolve, and what will be the role of various actors, including Israel, in shaping this new geopolitical reality?

5. Τhe attack on Syria is part of a complex networked operation, with chaos as the preferred tool, aimed at turning West Asia upside down and literally setting it on fire. The US “deep state” tactic is to distract Russia by focusing on Syria, luring Moscow to reduce pressure on Ukraine, just before the signing of the very serious Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and Iran. But there are complicating factors for the US. Saudi Arabia, which was a staunch supporter of the jihadists at the beginning of the war against Syria, changed its policy after Russia’s intervention in 2015. And now Riyadh as a BRICS partner remains undecided in the crisis. It is worth noting that until the last moment, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates supported Assad in the fight against the terrorists of the HTS front. Egypt in particular views with particular concern a prevalence of Salafists in Syria, as there is a risk that the Salafist movement will expand to the country, as had happened in the recent past with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi who was elected president of Egypt in 2012 and was overthrown a year later.

6. Syria is absolutely vital to Russia’s overall strategy for West Asia-Africa. Damascus is an important Russian connection to Africa where Moscow uses de facto all its global power. Will Russia correct the incompetence demonstrated by Damascus and the Syrian Army so that it can maintain its access to the Eastern Mediterranean (Tartus port, Hmeimim base), Lebanon, Iraq and beyond. Will Russia be able to maintain a relative influence in Syria?

7. Turkey and Israel have a common interest, namely to dismember Syria. They do not want Syria to gain political weight in the region, as this weakens the influence of both Israel and Turkey in the Middle East. Whoever prepared the HTS operation in Syria, whether Turkey acted alone or the US and Israel participated, this side managed to make an operational, even strategic surprise. The Turks are independent in their actions, it is not serious to consider them someone else’s weapon. Moreover, they are well aware that their interests in backstabbing the Arab world coincide with the plans of Israel and the US. It is possible that they have already received the approval of the new US administration for the supply of Turkey with already purchased F-35 aircraft and the necessary financial injections. There is no reason to doubt Erdogan’s disloyalty. The cooperation of Turkey and Azerbaijan with Israel was clearly felt during the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Under the current circumstances, Israel has once again found common ground with Turkey to open a united front against its enemies. However, one should not necessarily believe that Turkey is an ally of Israel. But Erdogan has made a successful maneuver that will bring him geopolitical gains in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.

8. Τhe experience of recent years shows that Russia and Turkey (primarily the collective West) have repeatedly reached the threshold of conflict in Syria with the help of various manipulations, provocations and aggravation of the situation. And now Washington is rubbing its hands over a possible confrontation between official Ankara and Moscow. For example, the Associated Press reported that “the deterioration of the situation in Syria and the attack of terrorist groups allegedly provoked a conflict between Russia and Turkey, because the two countries had opposing interests in the region.” For Russia, it is better to come to an agreement with Turkey than to fight against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is a proxy war weapon not only for official Ankara, but also for Israel, NATO and the “deep state” of Washington. We note that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was recognized as a terrorist organization by a decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on June 4, 2020, whose activities are prohibited on the territory of Russia.

9. Ηow will the Syrian Kurds (mainly) and other ethnic and religious groups (Armenians, Assyrians, Arameans, Orthodox) react, as they are threatened with the annihilation of their thousand-year history in the region by Islamist terrorists?

Syria is essentially becoming an international battlefield with the US, Turkey, Russia, Iran and other regional players. This is a puzzle and it is too early to dare to make a prediction about how the situation will develop further and which global and regional players will ultimately prevail.

About the author

The Liberal Globe is an independent online magazine that provides carefully selected varieties of stories. Our authoritative insight opinions, analyses, researches are reflected in the sections which are both thematic and geographical. We do not attach ourselves to any political party. Our political agenda is liberal in the classical sense. We continue to advocate bold policies in favour of individual freedoms, even if that means we must oppose the will and the majority view, even if these positions that we express may be unpleasant and unbearable for the majority.

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