For a long time, Turkey’s military industry was largely dependent on Western financing, institutions and technology, the fragmented manifestations and consequences of which still exist to some extent today. However, during the period of Tayyip Erdogan’s rule, the Turkish military-industrial complex has gone through two main stages of development: Elimination of external dependence and development of the country’s internal potential and introduction of a high-tech element of the military-industrial complex and finally expansion into the international market.
The militarization of Turkey’s foreign policy during the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was accompanied by the weakening of the role of the Armed Forces and military institutions in the domestic political system. At the same time, the approach to the use of military force in Turkey’s foreign policy has become more complex, and at the same time its importance and possible options have increased.
From the founding of the Turkish Republic until the mid-2000s, the army was an effective tool in terms of decision-making in both domestic and foreign policy. It determined the ability of a particular political force, the Kemalists, to consolidate power in the country and was one of the main obstacles to gaining political influence for pro-Islamic parties and movements.
Moreover, the army was a guarantor of political stability in the country and directly intervened in political processes more than once (in 1960, 1971 and 1980). During the AKP’s rule in Turkey, the functioning of the army as a political institution changed, enhancing the country’s geopolitical power and diminishing NATO’s influence.
Until the early 2000s, the army was primarily a means of stabilizing and regulating domestic politics. The foreign policy dimension of its activities was limited to participation in multilateral formats (military coalitions, NATO and UN peacekeeping missions).
Since the mid-2000s, the military has primarily played the role of an instrument for shaping an autonomous foreign policy model in accordance with national, rather than NATO, interests – a fact that constitutes the most significant shift in Erdogan’s successful policy. The nature of its activities has changed, with the transition from risk management and preventive measures within Turkey to a strategy of using the military in a preventive manner outside the country’s borders.
Instrument of Foreign Policy
However, the process of dismantling the institutions of military influence within the political system has not weakened the Turkish army in terms of its combat effectiveness. On the contrary, it has been accompanied by a strengthening of the army as an effective instrument of foreign policy, given the already high potential of the Turkish Armed Forces as the second most powerful among NATO members.
Turkey’s defense spending since 2024 has set a record of 1 trillion 133 billion Turkish liras, which at the time of the budget approval was equal to more than 40 billion dollars. This is about 8.8% of the country’s disposable income and indicates an increase of more than 150% compared to the 2023 budget.
The process of reducing the importance of the external component in the formation of the country’s military potential began after the “Cyprus Invasion” in 1974, which led to an arms embargo by the United States.
However, during the AKP period, the Turkish military-industrial complex has gone through two main stages of development:
1) elimination of external dependence and development of the country’s internal potential and
2) introduction of a high-tech component of the military-industrial complex and entry into the international market.
As of 2023, the share of public spending in the Turkish military-industrial complex was 80%, and by 2028 this indicator is expected to increase to 85%, while since 2002 it was only 25%. In any case, one cannot speak of complete autonomy of the Turkish military-industrial complex, since successes affect only some strategically important industries. In other cases, dependence on cooperation with NATO countries and a focus on imports remain.
Defense industry
According to SIPRI, Turkey took 11th place among the world’s 25 largest suppliers of heavy conventional weapons in 2019-2023. Turkey’s defense and aerospace exports reached a record $5.5 billion in 2023, up 27% from 2022. The main destination for Turkish arms exports is the MENA region, along with a growing share of African countries, and the top three recipients are the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Pakistan.
In recent years, Turkey has focused on developing unmanned aerial systems, especially in the medium and tactical fighter drone segment. Turkish UAVs, most notably the ANKA and Bayraktar TB-2, have proven their effectiveness in Syria and Libya, which has attracted the attention of a wide range of countries to their procurement. Local actors such as Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco and Saudi Arabia already possess several dozen Turkish drones.
The involvement in Libya
However, in reality, the goals proclaimed in the context of the development of the military-industrial complex often face a discrepancy between the country’s economic and technological base for their achievement. Military force has been the main instrument of Turkey’s foreign policy and has been used in Libya since 2019.
In the initial stages of the conflict, this was expressed in support of the forces of the international coalition, as well as targeted military-technical cooperation. Today, this seems to be an independent policy of Turkey is to provide military assistance and conduct military operations on the territory of Libya. With Turkish military assistance, Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli was halted in 2019, and Turkey confirmed the effectiveness of the model of military engagement in regional conflicts developed since the beginning of the “Arab Spring”, including the use of various types of military instruments (formal/informal, traditional/non-traditional, etc.).
The characteristic features of this that distance it from the classic use of “hard power” after the “Arab Spring” (as, for example, in the case of Syria) are, first of all, the legal status of military activity.
1) The most active and significant phase of Turkish military involvement in Libya was implemented after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Security and Military Cooperation between Libya and Turkey in 2019. The Turkish military contingent (initially about 1,000 Turkish military personnel and specialists) was sent to Libya in response to an official request from the Government of National Unity. The conclusion of further agreements contributed to the extraordinary expansion of the Turkish presence in Libya (presence of Turkish troops only within the jurisdiction of Turkish law, the possibility of free entry into Libyan air and sea space, carrying weapons and inspecting civilians and vehicles outside the deployment area, etc.).
2) An important feature of Turkey’s military activity in Libya is the hybrid nature of the use of military force. Despite the presence of elements of traditional military operations abroad (such as the deployment of military personnel and military supplies), the main emphasis in Libya was on the provision of know-how and training, logistical support, as well as the use of high-tech defense equipment (mainly UAVs) and the involvement of foreign mercenaries. The combination of direct and indirect use of military force through the demonstration and sale of defense equipment gave Turkey the opportunity to effectively exchange its military potential for privileges in the use of resources in the Mediterranean.
Thus, the involvement of Turkish military force in Libya can be considered an important element in the use of “smart power”.
The Libyan experience has reinforced the success of Turkey’s latest military developments, as Libya has used Turkish-made weapons (including Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles, Kirpi armored vehicles, etc.).
This has significantly increased the prestige of the Turkish military-industrial complex on the international stage. In addition, Turkey has de facto acquired another physical foothold in the region in the form of the Al-Watiya air base, the trilateral military coordination center in the port of Misrata, and the naval base in Homs.
Turkey’s “on the ground” position in Libya provides Ankara with a channel to expand its de facto involvement in the region, for example, the air force could potentially conduct operations in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Chad.
