The discussion taking place in various European countries regarding the intention to create an anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic “dome” contains many distortions and is dominated by simplistic narratives, which give the impression that these countries will create something like the Israeli equivalent.
Everyone forgets, of course, that the operational conditions are completely different in these countries, as well as the geography where, combined with the nature of the threat they face (Russia, Turkey) is extremely problematic. With these as data, and with the help of experts, we will analyze some basic principles that govern the design of a functional and effective air defense in a country, gaining great interest.
- No army on the planet can carry out its mission if it is not supported by an adequate air defense network.
- Air defense is neither domes nor circles on a map. These may look nice in presentations, but they have no operational significance or application.
- The term AIR DEFENSE refers to the set of active and passive measures taken by a force and aimed at nullifying or reducing the effectiveness of enemy air power.
- The purpose of air defense IS NOT the destruction of aircraft (this is the “icing on the cake”). The main purpose is to prevent the use of air power or the involvement of a disproportionately high number of personnel and air assets, which will ultimately lead to increased losses and/or weakening of the presence of air power on other fronts.
- The most basic element of air defense is its personnel. To acquire sufficient skills, sterile training is not enough, but continuous field training is required, supported by high-capacity simulators in sufficient quantities and of course live fire firing. Also, personnel should not become a vagabond between units equipped with different systems with the excuse of acquiring “integrated knowledge”. Air defense requires specialization and here the saying that many of us say in our village… “jack of all trades, master of none” finds full application.
- The next element is the development of a serious and comprehensive air defense doctrine, which will incorporate organizational, technical and operational elements. Basic information that should be obtained concerns the threat formation, organizational issues, and finally the technical requirements. We are not going to buy the weapon systems first and then see how we will use them operationally.
- Design, implementation and continuous upgrading of an integrated and multidimensional command and control system. This system should be able to be expanded without restrictions, it should be flexible, and resistant to electronic warfare and cyberwarfare. The weapon systems that will be purchased must be compatible with the command and control system.
- It should also be understood that no air defense weapon system that is designed outside the user country will be fully compatible or will completely satisfy the operational requirements, as each country faces a different – qualitative and quantitative – threat. Also, the fact that a system has been used in real businesses means absolutely nothing if the characteristics of these businesses are not analyzed.
- Air defense systems that are not truly mobile are doomed to destruction.
- Air defense systems that are not protected against all relevant threats are doomed to destruction.
- Air defense systems that are not dispersed, do not implement a plan of cover, deception and concealment are doomed to destruction.
- For each air target, at least two guided missiles are required, and perhaps a third to be sure. This means that the adequacy of guided missiles is critical to the successful completion of the air defense mission.
- Air defense cannot protect everything forever. No matter how extensive the air defense is, some offensive weapons will always get through and cause damage. Also, if there is no provision for a robust supply chain, everyone will soon find in the middle of operations that the available missiles and weapon systems will run out very quickly.
- In the event of a military conflict, air defense, or rather the suppression and destruction of air defense, is a top priority.
- The real application of artificial intelligence in air defense is not yet feasible. So it should not be used… as a pacifier, especially by people who have no idea either about the field they are referring to or about the challenges it presents. On the other hand, the application of automation is feasible and immediately implementable.
- If homology is of critical importance for other sectors, in air defense it is a matter of life and death!
- Those who talk about anti-drone domes are asked to explain how they will allow the simultaneous use of friendly systems with enemy counterparts.
- Domination over the electromagnetic spectrum means dominance over the battlefield.
- Information dominance means business dominance.
- The “out of the box” approach is extremely vital to achieving air defense operational goals.
- When “borrowing” ideas from others, it is good to ask them so that we can extract as much data and information as possible!
