Under normal circumstances, Donald Trump, a man who in 2021 practically drove a mob to storm the Capitol building in Washington, challenging the outcome of the election, should have no place in the political life of the most powerful – for now at least – country. of the planet.
Especially when, in the years that followed, he neither distanced himself from his simplistic and almost conspiratorial perception, nor stopped the racist and far-right references.
Except we haven’t been in a normal condition for a long time. Or, to put it another way, what we once considered an “extraordinary event” is now the “new normal.” And alongside the “extreme weather events” that are becoming more and more frequent, we also have more “extreme political events”.
And so even though supposedly even the Republican establishment didn’t want him, Trump managed to establish himself as the main candidate and now claim the presidency, helped of course by an archaic electoral system that has ended up being played by a small number of States, which whichever candidate wins has also won a majority in the Electoral College.
But how did we get to this state?
Here we should avoid the mistake they often make in Europe when they look at the American elections and think that everything is judged in communication. Clearly, it plays an important role, but mainly they are judged on how each candidate communicates specific positions that directly concern the electoral audience or important sections of it.
That is, citizens weigh whether
- will pay less or more taxes,
- whether they will have access to the health system or not;
- whether new well-paid industrial jobs will be created (or whether jobs will be lost in the energy sector due to the ‘Green Transition’);
- what will happen to imports from China and other countries,
- whether they will be able to proceed with an abortion,
- what policy will be followed on immigration,
- if the still endemic racism is to be tackled,
- whether to strengthen the role of religion in social life or not.
And on that basis they choose what to vote for.
This may explain why polarizations are largely articulated around these issues, so that Democrats win the votes of blacks, women, the more educated, more unionized workers, and Republicans see themselves as having the part of them is a significant part of white workers, especially those who have not gone to College or the conservative and highly religious areas.
This also explains why in some cases the crucial thing is not for a candidate to take an entire social category, but to strengthen his presence within it. For example, for Trump the important thing is not to get a majority of Blacks or Hispanics, but to get more Blacks or Hispanics than last time, investing e.g. in his proposals for the economy. Accordingly, Trump knows that in the youth vote he is second, but he is interested in getting more young people than last time.
It is on this basis that communication plays a role. For example, when Trump goes and serves fries at a McDonald’s restaurant in Pennsylvania, he knows that he is touching a critical segment of workers without a college education in this State – which is the most critical right now for his election. When he’s shown driving a garbage truck he plays on the rallying reflex that Biden’s disparaging statement about Trump’s voters evoked.
And of course, the events of 2021 may have caused a big shock, but it seems that for a significant part of the American economic establishment, Trump is the best solution, either because he supports fossil fuels and mining, or because he supports a more decisive US position in the ongoing trade war with China anyway. That is why it also has significant support from high-tech tycoons.
And of course, as happens in these cases, the opponent also plays a role. And the problem with Kamala Harris is not that she entered the race late, after all she initially appeared to change the data and the correlations. The problem is that he can’t convince that swath of the electorate that remains sceptical, weighing more on the effects of soaring living costs or job insecurity in his industry than on more general positions about a more democratic or inclusive society. governance.
And things may be very different in the US than in Europe, from the electoral system to the actual scope of the powers of the President and the federal government, but one can draw some important conclusions: One can see, for example, that the simple risk assessment for populism or the extreme right, in itself does not prevent their strengthening. That issues of income, jobs, purchasing power, may count more than issues of “identity.” That how one responds to a deepening sense of insecurity that pervades significant sections of societies remains the great challenge. That when the politicians themselves have made the political spectacle, then even the “shitholes” acquire political weight. That “anyone but the current ‘political demon'” (in this case Trump) is a recipe for guaranteed political failure. That when the dilemma is between the populist Far Right and an increasingly “Extreme Center”, it is far from certain that the latter will win.
And all this shows that on our side, with the obviously very different conditions and the different institutional and electoral traditions, it is good to realize that the simple condemnation of populism (especially when it is accompanied by “two-edged” logics) and the extreme right at all they do not diminish their influence when the opposing awe is a harsh – and often authoritarian – neoliberalism, even if it invokes “political correctness”. On the contrary, such dynamics will be strengthened, as long as no strong political proposals appear that can respond to the real anxieties of people who increasingly feel “outside the castle”, wronged and marginalized.
