The heavy damage suffered by the Russian Morozovsk airbase in the Rostov region, some 300 kilometers away from the front line in Ukraine, from an attack by Ukrainian drones on the night of August 2-3 is not “another event” in the conflict there.
As it is the first time that we have such a large strike against aviation infrastructure, and even with the use of a drone, which results in operational inactivity for a considerable period of time. And it is one of the tactics of war that will now be used systematically, combining great power in attacking drones, with a large imbalance of attack costs (small) to defense costs (large).
What have the Ukrainians achieved now?
Large blast destruction (see video) of the munitions storage complex in the northern part of the base, with debris and ejected materials covering much of it, so it will take days to get it operational again.
The Ukrainians also state that there was also the destruction of one Su-34, as well as damage to 2 others that will need repair. The loss of aircraft is not numerically large, although especially the very modern Su-34 attack aircraft are not “surplus” in Moscow.
Images from the blast site have now been released, showing piles of destroyed FAB and KAB aerial bombs, trainers, etc., as well as R-73 air-to-air missiles. While the initial explosion created secondary explosions and fires at the base, increasing the extent of the damage and the need for repairs.
The lessons from this attack
1. Again, the important thing in this action is that an air base stops working even for a few days. And this at a critical juncture of a war, especially in its first hours, can prove to be a critical blow.
2. Another “lesson” from the Ukrainian attack is the following: The specific base, headquarters of three Su-34 Squadrons of the Russian Air Force, but also a point of action for other types of warplanes, had been hit at least twice more by Ukrainian drones, in April of 2024 but also in June! In the previous attacks, the Ukrainians had claimed that they had destroyed or damaged several Su-34s, but this was not verified. So despite the fact that Morozovsk had been targeted repeatedly, the Russian air defense, even though it was strengthened there, did not manage to intercept the new attack, a few days ago.
3. The obvious thing here is the vulnerability of air bases, which as heavy infrastructure are impossible to move as a whole (although here there is the Scandinavian and also Eastern European example of using motorways as alternative airports). So even when they are targeted and endangered, it is mandatory to continue their operation.
4. The air bases, which are “within firing radius”, and indeed from a weapon much faster than the unmanned and more difficult to stop (missiles). So the image of the swept-inactive Russian base Morozovsk should be impressed, causing radical choices of weapons and tactics (and even more radical “thinking changes”),
