Sir Julian Stafford Corbett was a prominent British naval historian and geostrategist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
According to Julian Corbett: “The object of naval warfare must always be, directly or indirectly, to secure control of the sea, or to prevent the enemy from securing it.” However, naval warfare favors stronger naval powers in their quest to control the sea. This position may lead weaker navies to act in less traditional ways, but at the risk of a potential and dangerous destabilization in their security environment. Likewise, weaker naval powers may become increasingly receptive to establishing innovative options to achieve the relative parity required to contest sea control.
1. Weaker navies can use asymmetric naval warfare, in the form of disruptive technologies and sudden changes in their strategy.
2. Weaker navies can leverage alliances to increase their relative strength and threaten secondary theaters of operations and divide adversary power.
3. Weaker naval forces can cause cumulative friction along sea lines of communication.
These options, individually or together, can allow a weak navy to counter a stronger navy.
Asymmetric Warfare at Sea
A weak navy can use asymmetric naval warfare to challenge sea control through the incorporation of lethal technologies. For example:
Strategy 1 – Use a combination of technology (mines and torpedo-equipped destroyers)
During the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese used two unique warfare capabilities to undermine relative Russian naval superiority.
1. Τhe Japanese Navy used mines to destroy Russian ships trying to leave the port of Port Arthur, which allowed Japan to control the seas around the Korean peninsula without major naval engagements.
2. Τhe Japanese Navy used torpedo-armed destroyers in close-in attacks against Russian battleships.
This asymmetric use of small naval assets, with lethal firepower, proved a devastating surprise to the Russians who had expected a major ship-to-ship naval battle. This combination of technology (mines and torpedo-equipped destroyers) is an example of how a relatively weaker naval force can challenge sea control, especially in coastal waters.
Strategy 2 – The strategy of unconditional submarine warfare that focuses on commercial targets (a sudden change in strategy)
Another means of asymmetric warfare that a less powerful navy can use to control the sea is a sudden change in strategy.
This tactic was used by the German navy in World War II. Early on, Germany identified sea lines of communication across the Atlantic Ocean from the US to the European and North African theaters as critical. Germany concentrated its well-trained and disciplined submarine force into “packs”. The primary objective of these submarine groups was to destroy as many Allied merchant ships as possible, with the desired effect exceeding the rate at which the Allies could replace losses. Germany could and did have significant successes during the early stages of the war, particularly focusing off the east coast of the US. This tactic instilled fear in the American population and directly challenged control of the sea.
At the beginning of the war, the German strategy was effective. Thus, a strategy such as unconditional submarine warfare can be particularly useful in contesting sea control when the adversary is unfamiliar with this type of warfare and remains reluctant to implement the tactics or technology necessary to counter it.
Conclusion
Asymmetric naval warfare, whether through the use of lethal technologies or the application of surprise strategies, has the potential to be a force multiplier for weaker naval forces in contesting sea control.
Alliances
Stratgey 1 – A less powerful navy can contest control of the sea by leveraging alliances, primarily to increase the balance of power
During the Peloponnesian War, Sparta represented a land-centric power compared to naval-centric Athens, in a conflict dominated by the maritime domain. Accurately assessing her position as the weakest naval power, Sparta sought allies with naval power to increase the combined strength of the Peloponnesian League and challenge Athens’ claim to control of the sea.
In addition, Sparta took advantage of the Persian willingness to export naval capabilities in exchange for financial and diplomatic deals to further increase the naval power of the Peloponnesian Alliance. The growth of Spartan naval power, through a combination of direct and indirect alliances, had the effect of instilling strategic paranoia in the Athenian leadership.
The fear of Sparta, and more specifically the fear of the Sicilian states joining the Peloponnesian League, caused Athens to overextend her naval power and exhaust her resources in a great campaign, the failure of which changed the course of Peloponnesian War in favor of Sparta.
Stratgey 2 – A less powerful naval power can also leverage alliances to increase combined naval power and thus threaten the stronger adversary in secondary theaters of operations. Thus forcing him to divide his combat power into more manageable levels.
The American Revolution is an example of this tactic, where the Colonies gained crucial naval support from France. This alliance outnumbered the British Navy throughout the American Revolutionary War.
The decline in the British Navy’s ability to muster its combat power was exacerbated by France’s entry into the conflict. The threat of France prompted Great Britain to devote significant naval power to the defense of the British Isles against possible invasion, changing the primary strategic objective of the entire war. The combined effort of France and the Colonies demonstrated the importance of alliances and the strategic dilemma an adversary might face. In addition, France’s colonial powers and sea lines of communication close to British commercial interests divided British naval power.
Cumulative friction along sea lines of communication
Strategy – A weaker naval force can challenge control of the sea by causing cumulative attrition along distant sea lines of communication
During World War II, the Japanese Navy pinpointed the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean as a critical factor, which presented many advantages in achieving the goal of sea control. The “tyranny of distance” associated with sea lines of communication, essential to the US Navy, would be vulnerable to Japanese operations.
Specifically, Japan targeted merchant shipping as a measure to reduce American naval power to more manageable levels.
Furthermore, the extreme distances of the Pacific Ocean would, at least in the early stages of the conflict, prevent the US Pacific Fleet from amassing its maximum strength.
In other words, the Japanese aimed to cause attrition with a defined strategy.
The Japanese Navy implemented a wait-and-react strategy, which was designed and involved a series of naval engagements away from the Japanese centers of gravity, in order to strike the US Pacific Fleet. In addition to these minor naval engagements, Japan’s strategy also relied on the garrisoning of its island fortresses. These forts would allow the concentration of air and naval power with the goal of striking any American naval force moving westward.
The projection of Japanese war power would directly threaten the concentration of American naval power, both naval and merchant. Through this erosion of sea lines of communication, American naval power would be reduced, according to Japanese strategy. This reduction would allow for a decisive fleet-to-fleet engagement, allowing Japan to gain control of the sea. Despite the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean, the Japanese Navy chose a strategy aimed at causing attrition and decisive results.
The Fallacy of Joint Force Integration
Some might argue that a better option for contesting sea control, for a weak navy, would be the integration of a joint force against threats posed by a stronger naval power. Julian Corbett proclaimed the value of a joint force to achieve a range of benefits, such as contesting sea control. Joint firepower coordination is critical in countering a superior naval force and is especially important in light of modern technology.
Moreover, the influence of devastating offensive firepower, including over-the-horizon targeting capabilities, validates the inadequacy of naval action in a single domain. The combination of firepower, on many levels, is almost a necessity for a weaker navy if it wants to challenge control of the sea.
Conclusions
Joint operations, while important in a general sense, and critical to front-line navies, are not the best option for weaker navies as a means of contesting sea control. Joint operations are resource intensive and could prove more useless than useful to a weaker navy.
Furthermore, interoperability, to be effective, depends on the factors of asymmetric naval warfare, alliances and the deterioration of sea lines of communication. Interoperability is not a prerequisite for these different factors.
Asymmetric naval warfare can be conducted independently of a joint force, especially when the country possesses highly lethal means and uses sudden changes in strategy, which undermine the adversary’s understanding of the maritime environment.
Alliances can be leveraged to increase relative combat power and threaten an adversary’s secondary theaters of operations without the need for a joint force.
Distant sea lines of communication can be harassed and targeted to inflict cumulative wear on the enemy. Even a small, unique advantage has the potential to be beneficial.
Ultimately, a weaker navy has many options when it comes to contesting sea control against a stronger naval power without having to rely on joint operations.
