Infantry can breach enemy defenses only in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces, including tanks, artillery, and aviation. This is the opinion of a well-known military expert, editor-in-chief of Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, Viktor Murakovsky.
Splitting of the forehead. Interaction is not just an infantry task. All other weapons work in the interest of the infantry,” Murakovsky wrote on his Telegram channel, listing the missions performed by other branches of the military. Reconnaissance “must reveal all enemy objectives and means and anticipate further enemy actions.”
At the same time, artillery reconnaissance has its own tasks. It must engage all enemy targets at a given depth in preparation for launching a mass of fire and firing at individual targets. In turn, the air force must be aware of all targets.
The main task of tank units when breaking through the front, according to Murakhovsky, is not to get away from the infantry. Tanks operate in battle formation with infantry and destroy targets that are dangerous to infantry.
Conclusions
The above mentioned by the Russian military expert are very basic-fundamental components of conducting military operations and are widely known.
However, all this refers to outdated military doctrines of other times, far behind even the “Air-land Battle” doctrine used by the US in the first Gulf War against Iraq 30 years ago, since in what the Russian Special Military Expert reports the action of attack and transport helicopters as well as airborne operations on the flanks and rear of the enemy, in the context of his vertical hypercorner, is missing, with the aim of isolating and encircling the enemy’s forward fighting forces.
Also, there is no mention of making a deep hyperkerotic maneuver from the line of contact with the enemy, with the aim of defeating or destroying a vital ANSK (Objective objective) of the enemy, while the doctrine of “Multi Domain Operations” seems to be completely unknown to the author.
The existence of drones and their multiple roles on the battlefield are also not even mentioned, as if they don’t exist.
For example, surveillance drones, in combination with real-time satellite photos, reveal the enemy’s layout in depth, with C4ISR being the mainstay of conducting military operations.
The concept of end-to-end interoperability of means is crucial to achieving victory on a modern battlefield, since the observation drone “gives” the coordinates of the enemy target in real time to C4ISR, and through it directly to one of the following means of destruction of, as in friendly artillery, UCAVs, kamikazi drones, attack helicopters and aviation.
With the artificial intelligence that is finally being applied to the modern battlefield, the process of finding and destroying the target will be immediate (sensor to shooter).
Finally, the impression is given that the Russian Armed Forces are facing basic problems of coordination and cooperation of their weapons and bodies, while the doctrine of conducting their operations is many decades behind, since it does not include the optimal combined use of modern weapon systems in the context of their interoperability.
Perhaps this is the main reason that despite their overwhelming superiority in manpower and means, the Russian Forces have not been able to impose themselves completely against the Ukrainians, even knowing the defeat in battles between them.
