In the last twenty years or so the special forces, mainly of the Americans, have been at the center of international interest because of their role in the war against terrorism.
The first special forces in the history of modern warfare were created during World War II, after Churchill’s exhortation in 1940 to “set fire to Europe”, i.e. Europe occupied by the Germans. So the British pioneered the field with the founders of special forces either belonging to the aristocracy, such as David Stirling, or to the eccentric category, such as Ord Wingate who wore an alarm clock on his arm and hung garlic and onions around his neck. .
Recognizing the importance of sabotage and reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines by small specialized forces, all major participants in the war created special units of some kind. Although they carried out some very spectacular missions, their successes were ultimately tactical in nature.
Field Marshal William Slim, arguably the most successful British commander of the Second World War, gave the most comprehensive assessment of the contribution of special forces to the war: “I finally came to the conclusion that these units, trained, equipped and intellectually adapted for a single type of operation , were wasteful. They did not produce militarily appreciable results, commensurate with the resources in personnel, material and time they absorbed.”
In addition, Slim pointed out how detrimental the formation of special forces was to the rest of the army, which is still true today: “The effect of these recruiting methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the army, especially the infantry, not only by removing the cream of the crop of, but also encouraging the idea that some of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped elite corps could undertake them. Armies do not win wars by a few corps of supersoldiers but by the average quality of their regular units.’
British and Israeli special forces
After the Second World War the special forces of Western countries were mainly used to suppress insurgencies in the wars of decolonization. When General William Westmoreland, the commander of US forces in Vietnam, was asked about the role of special forces in the war, he replied: “It was a minor show as far as the military was concerned. . . their contribution was like the prick of a needle.” Then, in the First Gulf War in 1991 special forces did not undertake primary missions during air and ground operations. Ultimately their biggest involvement was in the hunt for Iraq’s Scud launchers, with limited results.
For British special forces, considered the best in the world, with many successes in individual operations, their action in a conventional conflict, the Falklands War, is of interest. In a rare example of official military censure, Lt. Gen. Jeremy Moore, a hard-nosed Marine officer and commander of ground forces during the conflict, was highly critical of the special forces. The report he submitted after the operations, which was recently declassified, is revealing.
Moore said he was frustrated by the inability of special forces, after the amphibious operations, to “integrate with the operations of the ground forces as a whole and provide the accurate and timely reports that I requested.” Another vexing issue for Moore was the fact that “more special forces were deployed than were needed or could be supported in the field.” In his view, the special forces unit was “expensive in terms of support and planning requirements to sustain its operations” and was “less effective, relative to the results it achieved.”
Despite the widespread view that Israeli special forces are a paragon of strategic success, the reality is that they have had limited strategic utility in the wars, largely derived from discrete operations between the wars. Their contribution to the primary military effort in all wars has ranged from small to insignificant. Although the utility of special forces had increased somewhat in 1967, they did not contribute significantly during the Six Day War.
Also in the 1973 War, the special forces did not provide any significant result and the same was repeated in the First Lebanon War in 1982, as well as the Second in 2006. In between the wars, they distinguished themselves in counter-terrorism and intelligence-gathering operations, with some spectacular actions such as the 1976 raid on Entebbe airport and the release of hostages.
The golden age for the USA
The golden age of US special forces came after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. They then took the leading role in the war against terrorism, doubling in size to 70,000 while their annual budget tripled and is almost three times the total Portuguese defense budget. General Stanley McChrystal gained worldwide fame as the commander of special forces in Iraq from 2003 to 2008 and after his retirement founded a consulting company that delivers leadership courses around the world, and published four books, making him millionaire.
The general in his books boasts as much for his inspired leadership as for his successful methods of action, 300 raids a month being his best achievement. However, since he is a general and not a captain, he does not explain where these raids ultimately led to and whether they contributed to the success of the war in capturing or exterminating rebel leaders. Raids against insurgent leaders constituted the majority of special forces missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and today we know that they did not lead to any strategic outcome.
The increase in the number of American special forces and their involvement in various missions created many legends. US Army Chief of Staff General Mark Millay, himself a former special forces officer, joined a large number of his colleagues who have exaggerated the role of special forces.
In a speech in 2017, he stated that “special forces have the best warriors in the world with the best training, but they are not designed to engage in a conflict and deliver decisive victory. The only thing they’re not designed to do is win a war,” he said. “They can raid, they can train other countries – there are many other things they can do. To win a war by themselves is not in their duties.’
Special Forces
Making an assessment of special operations and special forces, after this brief overview, we distinguish the following characteristics:
1. First and foremost it has to do with strategic utility, which strategist Colin Gray defines as “the contribution of a particular type of military activity to the course and outcome of an entire conflict.” Special operations almost never achieve decisive strategic success by themselves, they can often only achieve decisive tactical success.
2. Βecause the special roles for which special forces were created less and elite forces (paratroopers, airborne, marines) more are limited, they have often been used in ordinary infantry roles. This happened with German paratroopers after 1941, with American and British paratroopers after Arnhem, with Israeli paratroopers in 1973, and with Russian paratroopers and marines in the war against Ukraine.
3. Αn entire industry of mythology has developed and is sustained around special forces, supported by literature to film. Hollywood films from 60-year-old John Wayne as the green-capped Colonel Kirby to those with Sylvester Stallone as John Rambo single-handedly winning wars have contributed the most to the mythology of special forces capabilities.
4. Special forces appeal to many politicians, either because they can offer them solutions to complex situations, or because of their romantic side. The cases of Churchill, Roosevelt, Kennedy and Rumsfeld are the most indicative.
