Before the first outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013, Berlin-Moscow relations were a primary concern of German diplomacy, for geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons. After all, Eastern Europe is the area, with the course of which Germany has connected its historical existence for ten centuries. In this area, all the geopolitical theories about living space elaborated by the German strategists were tested. For Berlin, the geopolitical and geostrategic necessities, as well as the study of History, testified that its vital national interests dictated that it maintain a good level of Russo-German relations.
Following this compass, Frederick the Great of Prussia, the first Chancellor of the unified Germany Othon von Bismarck, the Chancellors Willy Brand and Helmut Schmidt, but also the first Chancellor of the reunified Germany Helmut Kohl achieved important results. When this course was abandoned, Germany in the middle of Europe experienced temporary Roman triumphs, but ultimately suffered great suffering. After the end of World War II, a deep rift occurred between Federal Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe. During the Cold War we distinguish the following periods of German foreign policy:
A. The first concerns the period 1945-1955. The foreign policy of the new state was thus completely hetero-determined until 1955, the year it acquired its independence with Western agreements (Westvertrage).
B. The second was identified with the foreign policy of Chancellor Adenauer (1949-1963), and covers the period 1955-1969. We could call it attachment to the West. Adenauer’s strategy (Westintegration) for the country’s integration into the various Western organizations and European integration processes, which was followed after World War II, had an ethnocentric character.
C. The third is identified with the Ostpolitik period of chancellors Brand and Schmidt (1969-1980 approximately). Brandt’s foreign policy from 1969 onwards was in stark contrast to the notions of Westintegration, as it was based on the belief that a new reality had taken shape both in Germany and in Europe and could not be ignored. In relation to East Germany, this reality referred to the existence of two states on German territory. The short-term benefit of this policy was the economic penetration of Germany in this area (the perennial interest of the Germans was concentrated in Russia’s large deposits of raw materials).
D. The fourth can be traced back to the 1980s, up to the fall of the Eastern Coalition regimes and the unification of Germany. This is a period of establishing close political and economic contacts with these countries and cooperation within the framework of international organizations to consolidate the policy of recession. The fact that today Germany is the most important trading partner of the countries of Eastern Europe is attributed to the penetration of German capital there during the Cold War period. About 1/3 of the imports carried out by these states, before the change, came from Germany.
E. The fifth period begins with the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013, with the events of Maidan Square that led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian Yanukovych.
F. In the sixth, which began with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we have the rupture in Berlin-Moscow relations, with the latest episode being the scandal with the interception of German military conversations about strikes on the Kerch bridge in Crimea. The German government attributed the interception to an attempt by Russia to “divide the country”.
The first thorn in Russian-German relations
But long before the Russian invasion, the Ukrainian crisis seemed to have turned into the first serious thorn in Russo-German relations. It was the period when Angela Merkel made it clear to German businesses (and other EU member states) that they must accept sanctions against Russia for the annexation of Crimea. Her argument was that the annexation of Crimea and the asymmetric war in Eastern Ukraine undermine European peace.
Interest groups such as the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations (Ostausschuss) accepted (initially) this shift. It was the period when political interests, instead of economic interests, gained the upper hand in German-Russian relations.
The fact that Germany had actively supported the opposition groups in Ukraine, without compelling strategic imperatives to do so, was a sign that something was beginning to change in Berlin’s perceptions of Russia. Of course, Germany later did not choose the path of conflict with Moscow, as shown by the course of implementation of the Nord Stream and the more general economic and energy relations it still maintains with Russia. The absolute alignment of Berlin under Washington put an end to them, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
German-Russian relations have always been based on a win-win relationship, with a continuous development of trust and mutual interest, which changed with the Ukrainian crisis (as early as 2013) where the German leaderships had to get used to situations dominated by politicians purposes, i.e. purposes of dominance. Yes, with a player who is used to such games and determined to push them to their limits, whatever that means for the interests of German industrial and energy companies, as well as all those companies in general that have chosen to invest in Russia (as was painfully discovered after the Russian invasion).
We cite as examples: In 2014, German exports to Russia were worth 29.3 billion euros and imports from Russia 38.5 billion euros. It is an important partner both quantitatively but mainly qualitatively, given that a large part of German imports from Russia concerns energy. At the same time, a large amount of German capital was invested in Russia and conversely Russian capital in Germany, promoting the interdependence of the two countries. In 2016, respectively, German exports fell to 21.5 billion euros and imports to 26.5 billion euros.
The future of Russian-German relations is uncertain
German policy towards Russia promoted political change through deepening economic relations. This policy, however, had long since failed. After all, these developments are something to be expected for those who have solid knowledge of history and are not seduced by ahistorical rumors. The hard core of politics looms large and drags away any financial commitments.
At the same time, since the economic crisis, the perennial German question, which is connected to the traditional geopolitical issues of Machtpolitik and living space (overshadowed, of course, by the economic spread), has started to come back to the fore. These issues were supposed to have found a solution with Germany’s accession to NATO and the political and economic framework of the United Europe.
The course of things has proven that states, in determining national interests, can ignore or underestimate unborn geopolitical necessities for years, decades, if not forever. Especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, where combined with intense American pressure, Germany is now prioritizing the geopolitical context, with the German economy dependent on cheap Russian energy for years paying, of course, a heavy price and having turned into “big patient” of Europe. At the same time, the German government and media maintain war scenarios, with 35% of Germans even fearing a Russian invasion of Germany!
The strategic shift
As we have already mentioned from the end of World War II onwards, Germany pursued a relatively calm foreign policy. Since the emergence of the crisis in Ukraine in 2013 (perhaps even earlier) Berlin seems to have begun to recognize the need for a change. Berlin, already from the period when it had openly drawn up with the Ukrainian opposition at the time, had tried to put a new framework, contrary to the restraint it had traditionally displayed, attempting to assume a greater international role and to become more politically and militarily active.
It should be noted that Germany consistently avoided promoting a strong foreign policy and the open promotion of its national interests, so as not to revive fears of German nationalism. The Germans have decided that this position is now outdated and that advancing their national interests does not carry the risks it once did, with the Russian invasion acting as a catalyst for pre-existing trends.
