Turkey’s energy needs for the coming decades are important as the country shows both population growth and industrial and social development (despite the economic crisis that has been plaguing it since last year). So it has already made the turn to nuclear energy, building the well-known factory with 4 reactors in Akuyu with Russian funding and know-how and is discussing with Moscow and a second one, with an installation in Sinop, on the Black Sea.
What is interesting, however, is that the relevant dialogue has also matured with China, for another -3rd now – nuclear power plant, with the Minister of Energy Alparslan Bayraktar stating that an agreement may be close. In fact, a Chinese delegation has also visited the proposed location, in Kirklareli (the Forty Churches) in Eastern Thrace, some 90 kilometers from the Greek-Turkish border. And there the unit under discussion will have 4 reactors.
Another element of the search for new “nuclear” energy solutions highlighted by Bayraktar is the intention to add small nuclear plants to Turkey’s network, with a total power of 5 GW, i.e. around 15 to 20 such facilities. SMRs (Small Modular Reactors) as they are called, are the expected development in the field, where the creation of huge factories is no longer preferred, but as an alternative, the installation of compact, automated plants of small power that will autonomously cover a city or a region.
Of course, the discussion with China is not new, it started almost a decade ago but remained pending, which seems to have now been reversed. The interesting thing is that for Turkey, even if such an agreement is concluded, the main volume of electricity production will remain for decades natural gas (for which it makes large mining investments in the Black Sea) and coal, although it invests a lot in renewable sources and also has hydropower. Today, its annual production is estimated at around 330 TWh, while forecasts speak of a requirement of over 400 TWh in 2030, while there is also local concern for the search for greener energy sources, with nuclear being highlighted as such.
For China now, Turkey is a big potential customer both because of energy needs and as a “sample” to serve in the commercial expansion of Chinese nuclear technology to Central Asia, North Africa and why not Europe. China is already doing a rapid development of nuclear plants at home (with an insatiable need for electricity) already having 55 plants and another 21 under construction, with more in the plans. A plan that brings it to the global forefront in the field, but which also needs customers internationally.
Of course, all of the above has a geopolitical impact. As if Turkey proceeds with the order from the Chinese and the Russians it will be the first country in the world to have such a mix of technologies. Also, Russia already dominates internationally in nuclear power plant exports, with the West, i.e. the US and France, trailing far behind. So Ankara appears to align itself energetically with the “Eastern camp” of know-how and related supply of nuclear material (as the construction of a nuclear plant is only the beginning of the relationship), while at the same time remaining a member of NATO and of the Western perspective in general.
The conclusion is obvious, that Turkey, with the creation of nuclear power plants, a crucial tool for its further development, openly declares that it claims – also in this field – its independent course in a multipolar world, in which it seeks and visible if not an enviable position. So he does not hesitate to enter into new alliances and relationships of mutual benefit, which will last for many decades and will not be temporary. Just as the purchase of a nuclear plant obliges, where the technological and above all the political association with the “manufacturer” (Russia and perhaps also China), must be stable and non-negotiable.
To the underlying question, namely whether Turkey with these moves seeks to acquire the know-how and ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, the initial answer is “no”. The specific nuclear reactors, of Russia and China, are for the production of energy and not of nuclear material enriched to such a percentage that it is “weapons grade” (that is, suitable for military use). The reason is easy to understand: both major countries, while they want commercial nuclear proliferation and the geopolitical kinship it brings with other states, are not willing to “sow” internationally the possibility of producing nuclear weapons, which remains a game for a few, who also keep it strictly for their own use. But what is certain is that with Akuyu and with any other nuclear plant it acquires, Turkey will begin to accumulate relevant know-how in the management of nuclear materials, something that “never goes to waste”.
