The NATO Summit in Vilnius is now history. What happened in Vilnius are regular moves in a geostrategic canvas concerning global geopolitical balances. An attempt was made to achieve a new balance, where Turkey is still considered “irreplaceable” for the West, as is evident from the tolerance towards heretical Ankara.
And from this fact alone, the losses for Turkey are shrinking. This mentality, however, ensures freedom of movement in Turkey, to the extent that beyond the tactical situation, it aims to outflank European diplomacy. And the unequivocal dependence of Greece (EU member states) on American policy ensures that it is only a matter of time before Turkey attempts to approach France as well, luring it with golden businesses in the field of armaments and nuclear technology.
Strategic relations between countries
Let us not forget that strategic relations between countries are based on common interests. The rest are communicative narratives that aim to cultivate the internal legitimization of politics in the interior of each interested country. So this is the strategic level. Why should Ankara’s looming attempt to approach the West be considered a defeat? Why not form a coldly cynical Turkish calculation to extract trade-offs? Or is it also the result of an increasingly obvious Western “fatigue” on the Ukrainian front that prefigures developments in the war? Zelensky’s image in Vilnius was typical (please also read the analysis titled “Ukraine will be divided like Germany after WWII, to end the War“).
Why is it not a successful Turkish maneuver, having diagnosed that the best scenario for the recovery of the troubled Turkish economy is the restoration of channels of understanding? And when at some point the new balances are found, he will decide, within the framework of his independent policy, how much he will approach Moscow again. Or does the new position of the Turks also imply an indirect opening to China, as a tool to limit Western pressures?
In this context, even if the intention of de-escalation in relations with Greece displayed by Turkey is sincere, it is of a tactical nature, aiming to serve the higher strategic goal. Greece behaves from the point of view of the “Stockholm syndrome”. It behaves as a country that does not recognize Turkey as its strategic competitor, but as a hegemon in the region, whose primacy it has fatalistically accepted.
The Trial of the Western Limits
No surprise then, that Turkey appears as a negotiator. He neither won nor was defeated! It will take as long as it wants, while Athens will celebrate the absence of tension in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. The West will continue to fight for Ankara’s eyes, offering it more and more in exchange to keep it on a Western course. But when the time for agreements comes, the pressure will be on Athens, so that another great opportunity is not lost…
Is Western behavior winner behavior? Everyone is saying that Turkey understood that if it continued on the path it had taken it would have very serious consequences. Agreed, but this also has a reverse reading! Turkish politics has always tested the limits! And when he found a wall, he took advantage of the “irreplaceable” and entered into negotiations to sell his turn, while others would have been on their knees from the first moment they would have been diverted, at levels far inferior to this supply of the Russian S-400!
1. Is Turkey a loser for forcing perhaps the most advanced European state in the field of human rights, Sweden, to change its legislation and make big discounts? Has anyone dared to say that this challenges European culture and legal culture?
2. Is Turkey a loser who considers strengthening the domestic defense industry to reduce as much as possible the dependence of the armed forces on international suppliers as a top goal? Washington is pushing for the lifting of any arms embargo, fueling the Turkish defense industry’s export activity.
3. Or won’t the White House push for the Turks to finally get the F-16s offsetting the advantage of the Greek investment? And if the disengagement is blocked by Congress, Erdogan holds in his hand the paper of non-ratification of the Swedish accession by the National Assembly, with which he will continue to press, as long as Washington gives him what he wants.
4. However, the illusion that the F-16s will not be used against Greece is also impressive. The Turks are already claiming that they are not using the fighters against Greece! If so, who killed the unforgettable Greek Air Force squadron leader Iliakis? What do the Turks do with the violations?
Greece seems to have forgotten that the 12 nautical miles extension of territorial waters is a unilateral right and for 30 years it has been declaring that it is reserving for the exercise of its legal rights! If Greece turns the range of territorial waters into a dispute with Turkey, it will have indirectly but clearly granted it the right to co-decide on Greek sovereignty.
Just as through the invasion and occupation it short-circuits everything in Cyprus (another strategic ally… but described with coordinates) by demanding 50% of everything, something similar will be claimed for the Aegean Archipelago, opposite Athens.
What does the High American Strategy require against Turkey?
The only way to control Turkish behavior that would ensure American interests is to sign an agreement to upgrade 80 Turkish F-16s to Block 70. However, it will be planned to complete the upgrade of a small number (12-20) by American hands and then Turkish behavior will be evaluated to continue the program. In the middle of the program there will be a decision on the new ones as well. If the Turks don’t accept it, that’s their problem.
