Paris, January 29, 1940: For five months now, France has declared war on Germany. Nothing spectacular has happened since then, except of course the collapse of helpless Poland. In one of the Parisian Bistrots, a group of young men who have not been drafted since they are students, gather around the radio. Prime Minister Edouard Daladier’s speech to the French people entitled “The Nazis’ goal is slavery” begins:
“We will do much more than win the war!” declares the French prime minister. “…those madmen who rule in Berlin,” he continues, “want to create a world of masters and slaves! France will win in the name of freedom and human dignity!”
The young friends are inspired by Daladier’s speech. Yesterday the newspaper Le Parisien explained in an article the military superiority of France, listing weapons systems and divisions. Le Figaro had a report from the mighty Mazino line. “They didn’t learn their lesson last time,” says one of the friends. “Tomorrow I will interrupt my studies and enlist!” says another and the rest are immediately convinced to do the same. They also want a share of the triumph – after all, it will be a triumph! None of them have heard the term Blitzkrieg. No one can imagine the humiliating defeat that is to follow.
Learning from the past
Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine… Military analysts and war schools must constantly study the lessons of the most recent conflicts. The armed forces must assimilate these lessons and adapt as quickly as possible, which is not easy, especially in the modern era where the speed of technological developments is relentless. But what about the not-so-recent, more conventional wisdom? History, unfortunately for those who ignore it or fortunately for those who study it, has a tendency to repeat itself. In our view, World War II—that vast reservoir of knowledge about modern military art—remains extremely relevant to the study of revisionist countries such as Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran. And the purpose of this article is to contrast similarities and lessons from World War II with the modern conflict relationship.
Blitzkrieg: No new doctrine, no new weapons. It was nothing new
Even those who are not interested in defense issues have heard the term Blitzkrieg, i.e. the lightning war, with which Germany swept Holland, Belgium and France at the beginning of World War II. A completely unexpected result, since France alone (without British help) had the upper hand on paper: 3,254 tanks, including the heavy Char B1, against 2,439 German Panzer III and IV. 4,360 fighter aircraft against 3,270 German. More guns. More men. the impregnable Mazino line of fortifications.
In terms of doctrine, Blitzkrieg was actually nothing new. The trenches of the First P.P. it was a historic break. If one studied a little further back (eg the Franco-Prussian war of 1870), one would notice that the Prussian military tradition, forced to find solutions in the face of more numerous opponents, had assimilated this idea much earlier. Carl Von Clausewitz, after all, had described it with another name, that of Schwerpunkt (center of gravity/power), observing that military commanders often disperse their power instead of concentrating it at points. So the doctrine of Blitzkrieg was not something new, but the application of an old idea to modern weapons and tactics.
In terms of weapons systems, the Germans based the Blitzkrieg of 1940 heavily on Stuka and Me-109 aircraft, as well as Panzer III and IV tanks, and motorized artillery. None of the above was a radical innovation (disruption) in its time. The French D.520 fighter, for example, was considered equal, if not superior, to the German Me-109. German Panzers were less powerful in armor and armament than those of the Allies. But they were agile and used in point concentration, rather than being spread across a large front in an infantry support role, like the allies. Not even from a technological innovation point of view, then, is there any obvious explanation for the unexpected result.
The modern doctrine
Before we proceed to explain the success of the Blitzkrieg in 1940, let’s take a look at today’s military tactics. Investment in the defense industry has focused on two areas: Unmanned (all kinds) and electronic warfare. These two – combined – appear to be part of a new doctrine, which describes how a revisionist country intends to fight, without the use of nuclear weapons, if and when it chooses to do so.
The systems with which it is going to do this do not constitute or rely on any global innovation. Electronic warfare, for example, has been an operational aspect since World War II. But investing in systems that would allow it to closely monitor or even interfere with the adversary, and then hit it safely with a cheap or expendable unmanned one, as in Syria, where a highly capable Pantsir AA system, apparently blinded, he is hit unsuspectingly by an otherwise not difficult to intercept UAV.
The relatively low cost and mass domestic production of these weapons is part of the new doctrine that could be summed up in the simplistic term: “Lots of cheap machines against people with a lightning strike.”
- Lesson 1: Preparation – the difference from the start
As hindsight turns out, what made a big difference in the Germans’ favor in 1940 was not the innovation of weapons or doctrine – but the methodical preparation based on that doctrine. Once they adopted it, the Germans reorganized their formations, trained to fight this way, adjusted logistics, communications, recruiting, manuals, everything.
The Allies, on the contrary, entered the war clinging to the beginnings of the First World War – after all, only 22 years had passed since its end. Typical examples are the outdated system of recruitment of the French, the lack of materials and spare parts in the combat units, the slow promotion of materials and people to the front, the newly formed and still untrained motorized formations and many others. One could say that the really great achievement of the Germans was actually the war preparation for blitzkrieg action, more than the blitzkrieg itself in the field.
China, Iran, Russia and Turkey in the last two decades under the rule of the same politicians respectively, have made leaps and bounds in the defense industry, but also in the assimilation of new technologies, weapon systems and tactics by their armed forces.
- Lesson 2: Test, improve, apply – Guernica, Warsaw, Paris
World War II Germany first tested the new methods of warfare during the Spanish Civil War. A second, larger test followed in 1939 in Poland. That is, before spilling over against the Allies, the German Armed Forces had the opportunity to identify failures and correct them, where the intensity of operations and the stakes were lower. Accordingly, Russia, Turkey, China and Iran have tested their new weapons and doctrines in real operations in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Nagorno Karabakh, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan. As if they have finished with the pilot projects and feel ready to implement the new doctrine against a strong opponent.
- 3rd Lesson: Early Warning, The Battle of Britain
For many of us, the first image that conjures up the Battle of Britain is the Supermarine Spitfire. This is because, already at that time, this iconic aircraft was deliberately projected as a symbol of victory. The truth is, of course, that his contribution to the British victory was much smaller. More important factors were the organization of the Fighter Command (i.e. the Interceptor Command), the more numerous Hurricanes that carried the weight of the interceptors, the resistance of the population to the bombings, the tireless spotters on the beaches and above all… Radar. The early warning it gave the British so they could take off in time and direct interceptor swarms correctly, but also the Germans’ inability to neutralize it, was perhaps the most decisive factor in this battle.
- 4th Lesson: Capture of a strong island – The Battle of Crete
It is widely believed that the Battle of Crete was the tombstone of the German Blitzkrieg, due to the unbearable losses suffered by the German paratroopers. This is not accurate, since the Germans continued to apply the general principles of their doctrine, in North Africa, Arnem and elsewhere. In fact, only the paratrooper arm was not used again on a large scale, and this could be due more to a lack of corresponding strategic targets, like that of Crete, than to Fallschirmjäger losses. The result, however, was that, despite the enormous difficulty of the undertaking, their absolute air superiority allowed the Germans to win an even Pyrrhic victory and to understand their Objective Goal.
The difficulty of an operation to seize a large island, even with local air superiority, is not something that should allow for complacency. China, Russia, Turkey and finally Iran have the numbers in machines as well as people to pursue even a Pyrrhic victory, if it judges that the result is worth it (in the case of the occupation of Taiwan, it would not be a Pyrrhic victory because of its incorporation by force into mainland China, except other things, would indicate to the whole world the “inability” of the US to defend its allies). And they are constantly investing in new landing vehicles, in many new helicopters for airborne landings, constantly training their forces in such operational scenarios.
- 5th Lesson: Naval battles and island hopping – The Battle of the Pacific
At 04:30 on the morning of June 4, 1942, as the first Japanese planes took off to attack Midway, Japan had overwhelming forces in the Pacific theater. Before that day was over, everything would be turned upside down. Japan had suffered a heavy defeat and for the next three years would play a fierce defense, delaying the inevitable.
In the Pacific theater, for the first time, the airplane completely decided an encounter at sea. The main reason for this is the vastness of the Pacific ocean, so the seemingly limited theater of the Black Sea, the China Sea opposite Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, the Persian Gulf, and the Aegean Sea also has a special relationship. The problem of distances was solved in the Pacific Ocean with the aircraft carrier. In the aforementioned theaters of war (Black Sea) and potential future theaters of war (the China Sea off Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, the Persian Gulf, and the Aegean Sea) geography has already solved this and creates similar conditions – opposing fleets, if confronted each other, they will do so under constant and intense aerial threat. The saturation will come not from swarms of torpedo planes and vertical attack bombers, but from waves of cruise missiles and cruise bombs launched by fighters, unmanned aircraft, unmanned surface vehicles, coastal artillery and, if necessary, surface ships. It is therefore necessary for the allied fleet to emphasize countering such saturation attacks from aerial threats with acceptable cost and ammunition adequacy solutions.
Also, in the Pacific theater the allies carried out the so-called island hopping, “jumping” from island to island, creating in each one the bridgehead for jumping to the next. In this sense, in a long-term war in the potential theaters of war in the China Sea (Taiwan, Japanese islands, Philippine islands), Aegean Sea, Persian Gulf, no large island is theoretically out of danger, since the marine environment is ideal for island hopping. In order for this not to happen, it is necessary that the defending countries do not allow the adversary to control the maritime space.
- 6th Lesson: Denial of Sea Area – The Battle of the Atlantic
What Germany attempted to do in the Atlantic in World War II was to create a denial of sea area with its submarines, thus strangling the British Isles from supplies of war material, food, raw materials, oil. At first it enjoyed a considerable advantage and the successes of the German U-boats were terrifying. Gradually Germany lost the advantage in terms of tactics (allied escorted convoys), technology (sonar which equipped Allied destroyers and corvettes) and information (uncovering its submarine communication codes via Enigma cryptographic devices). The reasons, however, why Germany failed even in the first phase of the battle to impose a complete denial of maritime territory are twofold:
- The vast expanse of the Atlantic.
- Allied resilience to heavy losses of ships and men.
In a possible conflict with the above-mentioned revisionist countries, it is obvious that China, Russia, Turkey, Iran will try to strangle the islands (Taiwan, Japanese islands, Philippine islands, Greek islands, Persian Gulf) by cutting off their supply of aid, munitions , while on some islands even with the necessities for survival. We see that neither of the above two factors that helped the allies in the Battle of the Atlantic apply to Taiwan-USA, Japan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Greece. On the one hand, the specific sea areas are very small-medium in size, with specific passages that can be adequately controlled with few relevant means such as submarines and/or mining the waters. On the other hand, the defended countries cannot under any circumstances suffer terrible losses in animate and inanimate material and continue to fight.
It is therefore a matter of life and death for the sovereign of the islands to be the first to secure control around them and to deny sea territory to the adversary who will attempt to cross the sea to attack them. This mission is not the air force’s but, first and foremost, the navy’s, which can remain long in the theater ensuring control above and below the waves. The Navies of the defended countries will have to increase numerically and qualitatively-technologically, both in relation to their old self and in relation to the opponent.
- Lesson 7: The Battle of the Factories – Sherman vs Tiger
The reasons why German arms production could not keep pace with that of the Allies are many and beyond the scope of this analysis. However, the consequences of this imbalance were decisive for the outcome of the war. A related myth is that of the appearance on the battlefield of 5 American Sherman tanks for every German Tiger. Regardless of how accurate it is, the more interesting conclusion is that there were clearly more Allied tanks than the Germans could throw into battle (and more guns, aircraft, ammunition, etc.).
As far as American defense production is concerned, this was due not only to the vast resources of the US but also to their proper use. Instead of focusing on the design and production of a super-tank like the Tiger I and II, the Americans focused elsewhere: They enlisted the principles of mass production from the automotive industry to build die-cast tanks, that is, quickly, cheaply and reliably, instead of they rely on experienced and underpaid welders and craftsmen. The production philosophy affected the entire supply chain, logistics, maintenance and repair in the field and so on. The result was a flood of chariots and vehicles that “carried the children on their backs all the way to Berlin.” And if each fell short against the formidable 88-gauge cannon and the armor of the Tiger, little harm. Most Tigers on the Western Front were not destroyed in tank battles but abandoned in the field due to lack of fuel, spare parts (usually suspension), or were destroyed by air.
In the corresponding ratio (China-Taiwan/USA, China-Japan/USA, China-Philippines/USA, Russia-Ukraine/EU, Turkey-Greece/EU, Iran-Saudi Arabia/Israel), it is the authoritarian revisionist countries that have the resources, but also those who have invested in the local production of a large number of “cheap” weapons. On the contrary, democratic-liberal-type democracies seem to prefer ordering expensive, scarce, complex and difficult-to-replenish superweapons, following the fantasy of the German Wunderwaffen (“miracle weapons”).
- 8th Lesson: Wunderwaffen or weapons for all
There is no need to harp on the failure of the German Wunderwaffen, since the term itself has become synonymous with futility. The only weapon – magic wand in history that perhaps justified the title, is probably the “Liquid Fire” of the Byzantines and this, not by itself. But in use with a powerful fleet and in specific historical periods.
Thus, in the current theaters and potential theaters of war respectively (Black Sea, Aegean Sea, Blue Sea, Persian Gulf) we should not expect that a handful of missiles with higher capabilities than the enemy, such as the Meteor or the Aster-30, will bring the desired result. The adversary, according to his doctrine, will oppose numerous and cheap targets, which he can replenish rapidly, without suffering loss of human life. If the West fights this way, it has already lost.
Conclusions
For example, it’s easy to place an order for 1,000 rounds of ammo once you have the funds. But it is much more difficult to “absorb” it regularly and strategically. That is, to create the corresponding Company or even an Anti-Tank Platoon at the level of an infantry battalion, to rewrite the tactics, the manuals, to change the information collection form, to train commanders, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, to conduct exercises, to draw conclusions about what new offers you as a weapon, to make corrections again from the beginning. That is, to create defensive “value” from the ammunition, and not just to register it as “available”.
In general, it is much easier and natural inclination of all people to prioritize what they know and can immediately complete, than to open the door to the unknown. The West, however, has the misfortune of neighboring revisionist countries that did so more than two decades ago. Since then they have continued to prepare with speed and dedication, pressing for time like the Germany of the Second World War. The declarations of the Chinese President that Taiwan will be integrated into China either peacefully or by force, the declarations of the Russian President that he will launch a nuclear attack against Germany and Britain, the audacity of the declarations of the Turkish President “we will come one night suddenly”, and Iran’s declarations of a nuclear attack on Israel are not necessarily the result of some mental illness, but rather of their belief that the Europeans, the Americans, the Taiwanese, the Japanese, the Greeks, the Israelis are unprepared for the new war doctrine, as they were the allies in 1940, the Armenians in 2020, and the Ukrainians in 2021. The Western countries, however, cannot afford to be unpleasantly surprised in a military confrontation. Their preparation, after a period of fifteen years in which they did not pay the necessary attention, slowed down and the opponents are running, must have both speed and depth at the same time: That is, to go much deeper than ordering one or the other weapon system.
