The results of the latest Eurobarometer survey show that there is no unified European public opinion regarding the response to Russian aggression. Greece in particular is one of the most cautious countries in the EU. in terms of supporting Ukraine.
In the question “Do you generally approve or disapprove of the support of the E.U. to Ukraine after Russia invaded Ukraine?’ 36% of EU citizens of the “27” absolutely approve, while only 14% of Greeks absolutely approve.
Only 7% of Europeans absolutely disapprove of EU support. towards Ukraine, while the percentage of Greeks who absolutely disapprove jumps to 20%. Greece is a European exception, with the percentage of those who strongly disapprove of support for Ukraine exceeding the percentage of those who strongly approve of European support for the defending country.
According to the Eurobarometer, 40% of EU citizens of the “27” somewhat approve of the support of the E.U. to Ukraine, with the corresponding percentage in Greece being 37%.
14% of Europeans somewhat disapprove of EU support. to Ukraine, with the relative percentage of Greeks rising to 20%.
Therefore, we have a difficult Greek public opinion regarding the support of the E.U. to Ukraine. There are areas – such as Northern Greece – where the rates of lack of understanding of European policy towards Ukraine and against Russia are even higher.
There is no doubt that the general trend of public opinion is largely binding on the governments of the EU countries. On the other hand, it is clear that the political forces in Greece have an obligation to educate public opinion in favor of supporting Ukraine and effectively dealing with Russian aggression. Otherwise, Greece will contribute to the maintenance of a crisis that can blow up its economy or even bring disaster to Europe.
The EU began to apply sanctions. against Russia in 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and the military reinforcement of separatists in eastern Ukraine.
The sanctions were a message to Putin that he could not continue his cooperation with the EU unhindered. and the West in general, in the new conditions.
But they were designed more to send a political message and less to bring an economic result.
It is characteristic that Merkel, who was pulling the strings in Brussels at the time, contributed to limiting the export of agricultural products and the cooperation of small and medium-sized European companies with the Russian economy, but at the same time she implemented a strategy to dramatically increase the energy cooperation between Germany and Russia.
Through the various committees of the European Parliament, I had the opportunity to witness the angry reaction of Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians and others to the Russian argument that the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline was a purely business decision without international political ramifications.
The flimsy argument of Merkel and a large part of the German Social Democrats completely collapsed with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
But he had managed to discredit the European sanctions against Russia in a large part of the European public opinion. Greek farmers and many small and medium-sized businesses who lost the Russian market could not understand why they had to suffer economic damage in the name of “punishment” of Russia, while Germany was spectacularly increasing its economically important energy cooperation with it.
The questions of Greek producers and small and medium-sized enterprises grew when they found that Turkey and Serbia, candidate countries for joining the EU, refused to apply sanctions against Russia. This meant in practice that the market share lost by the Greek agricultural sector in Russia could be claimed by the farmers of Turkey.
Of course, all this has no economic and political meaning. The poor and selective application of European sanctions against Russia from 2014 to 2022 contributed to the negative reaction of Greek public opinion.
After the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine at the end of February 2022, Merkel’s strategy to strengthen energy cooperation with Russia was gradually abandoned and fairly severe sanctions began to be applied. However, the damage had been done in terms of shaping Greek public opinion, while the continued exceptions – Turkey and Serbia still do not apply the sanctions against Russia – made the policy implemented more complex and contradictory.
