French defense planning for the next decade has produced a lot of news about Paris’ efforts to increase its defense power without “escaping” the costs. Thus, according to the most recent revision, a total of 400 billion Euros is expected to be spent in the period 2024-2030, starting from 47 billion in 2024 and then with successive increases of 3% to 4% per year, reaching 69 billion in 2030. these amounts do not include pension costs for military personnel, so we can consider them “exclusively for defense”.
In the field of aviation equipment specifically, the forecast is that from 141 Rafale currently available in France in the Air Force and Navy, these will reach 178 in 2030 and 225 in 2035, while by then the Mirage 2000D will have been retired. The important issue for France is that its multinational program for a 6th generation fighter, the SCAF as it is called, is not expected to deliver aircraft before 2040 and that at best. Indicatively, a prototype is scheduled to appear in 2030, which is also not a given.
Thus, France will rely for decades more – at least 3 and probably more – on the Rafale. Where the current plan is to deliver more aircraft to the F4 standard (with its evolving sub-versions), to upgrade older aircraft to the same standard and also to introduce a new standard, the F5 which is expected sometime in 2035!
What that will be is obviously under discussion and will be studied in the coming years. It has been reported, e.g. from meta-defense.fr, that it will be more targeted at Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions with new anti-radar weapons (not currently in the French arsenal) and sensors, that it will have a new host/software package, that it will integrate stronger and more sophisticated self-defense system with high jamming power (something critical for all modern fighters as the efficiency of air-to-air missiles has increased) but also how several parts of the current aircraft will be improved. For example we may see the introduction of conformal tanks (they are designed) to increase the range of the fighter, as well as the improvement of engines as the requirement of electrical power increases (another issue, also evident for future air warfare), i.e. up to a very different new type Rafale.
In the discussion, the CEO of Dassault, Eric Trappier, who spoke a few days ago to a committee of French senators, also mentioned the design of an escort drone for the Rafale F5 (or for the FCAS later) which will make use of the know-how acquired from the nEUROn research program.
It should be emphasized here that nEUROn, which reached extensive prototype testing with multiple flights, was a technology demonstration program and was never intended to go into production as a UCAV.
His technology is not completely “reviving”, but the research that was done offered many useful elements. So what Dassault will show somewhere in the next decade is still unknown, but it may look like the nEURON – after all, we have already seen its aerodynamic form in Russian and American versions now.
A third point of great interest is Trappier’s “communication dimension” between the F-35 and Rafale. This was conveyed to the public that the two fighters are not “talking” to each other. This is not the case, Link 16, i.e. today’s standard NATO communication protocol, allows both fighters to communicate and cooperate efficiently.
The problem is that the F-35 also has its own – closed – high-speed encrypted data link (MADL) communication ecosystem, in addition to the capabilities of Link 16. And at this “higher” level that allows the fusion of elements, the sophisticated common aviation image and cooperative action, there is – mutual in our estimation – reluctance to cooperate.
Thus Dassault is developing its own rapid communication ecosystem, while the “splitting” of the market into camps, if one can call them that, i.e. F-35 users and users of other types (such as the Rafale) seems to be strengthening. For example, Eric Trappier appeared reluctant for Belgium to join the FCAS consortium (now France-Germany-Spain participate) as, as he said, this country is already buying F-35s.
European defense or a Gallic village?
These complex issues are not unrelated to the development of the European defense industry. The initial intention of all participants, within the EU, e.g. with the PESCO initiative or with multilateral special collaborations, such as the OCCAR coordination program, or the FCAS, is to further develop European defense with “national-European” systems. And already the cooperation has paid off significantly with joint development programs, such as e.g. the FREMM frigate, the PAAMS-SAMP/T air defense system with Aster missiles, the armored Boxer, the A400 transporter, etc.
But the F-35, which is now very aggressively entering our “local” fighter market, taking contracts one after the other, such as in Finland, Germany and Switzerland, has stirred up the waters. France rightly wonders what is the point of continuing the development of the 6th generation fighter if it is not wholeheartedly supported by its partners to secure the necessary orders. Furthermore, France, which expects to lead the “defense” of the E.U. and at a much “deeper” level, such as joint satellite surveillance and defense, joint cyber security and cyber attack, joint telecommunication networks, joint production of weapons, development of joint protocols, he now sees this edifice “braking”. Not to be cancelled, there is no such thing on the horizon, but definitely to be left behind the developments.
For example, we have the over-equipment of Poland, which not only spends exorbitant amounts, but also “opened” the European market to South Korea (with orders for hundreds of tanks and cannons, dozens of aircraft, etc.), thus putting another international played within the euro-walls! At the same time, Britain having left the E.U. follows its own path of armaments, and with a close relationship with the USA, while Germany has also woken up and is looking for armaments, but willing to pay either the USA (with an F-35 order), or its own national industries, or to this costs.
