It was the American authorities themselves who recently made public their opposition to certain choices of the Ukrainian government.
1. There was the report by US intelligence agencies that attributed the large-scale sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline to Ukrainian intelligence agents. The attribution of this action to the Ukrainians, which is disputed as it is considered very difficult for a small group with a small yacht to have been able to organize such an operation, has at the same time an indirect character of disapproval on the part of the Ukrainian side, especially since this particular sabotage was basically seen as that he wanted to forcibly cut off Europe from all natural gas flows from Russia.
2. Then there were repeated leaks and postulations about how the US side considers the Ukrainian government’s insistence that Russia can be defeated to such an extent that it will be forced to give up even Crimea to be groundless, while the US almost explicitly believes that the de facto border changes of 2014 can hardly be reversed.
3. It was the way the American authorities have declared in all tones that they disagree with the Ukrainian tactics around Bakhmut, which in their eyes seems like an excessive obsession with a city of no particular strategic importance. In fact, it is interesting that in addition, it is the Americans themselves who feed the public sphere with evidence of the “excessive consumption” of ammunition, especially artillery shells from the Ukrainian side in Bakhmut, consumption that exceeds the ability of the USA to produce ammunition.
All this could be interpreted both as a partial distancing from the Ukrainian government, and as pressure for a change of course and a different tactic of the Ukrainian side on the military fronts (please also read the analysis titled “The West does not yet want an end to the War in Ukraine“).
The US is still seeking to defeat Russia
The distance that the US appears to be taking from the Ukrainian side does not negate the fact that at the same time it not only seeks the defeat of Russia in the conflict with Ukraine, but also has largely pushed things towards a war conflict. And this is because the escalation of tension on the “contact line” in Donbas probably would not have happened if the Ukrainian government did not feel that there would be Western support if there was an escalation of the conflict, and it is also quite clear that from one point on the Western governments and the US chose to prevent Ukraine from any peace negotiations, prioritizing its military, political and economic reinforcement so that it could resist the Russian special military operation.
This has to do with the overall way that the US has long anyway (even before the Ukrainian crisis of 2014) viewed Russia as a potential adversary, as a force that needed to be weakened in order to assert American primacy. This was intensified by the way the possibility of a Eurasian convergence with China emerged as a historical possibility, which could constitute a more comprehensive questioning of American hegemony.
And this is a way of thinking that permeates a very large part of the American political, diplomatic and military establishment and explains why essentially for a long time US practice has been a search for foci of tension that could potentially weaken Russia as well.
Obviously, there was an awareness that a direct conflict could have an extremely dangerous development, since we are talking about nuclear superpowers, but this does not negate various variants of “proxy war”, culminating in what is happening in Ukraine.
And this explains why Ukraine was considered to be Putin’s “big mistake”, the one that could, under the weight of a Russian defeat on the battlefields, lead to a “regime change”.
The reality on the battlefield
But, at the same time, there is also the correlation of power on the battlefield itself. The focus of the battles remains Bahamut. Ukrainian forces still do not want to leave this city, despite suffering significant losses and at the same time being forced to use huge amounts of ammunition every day in an attempt to stop the Russian advance. This has to do with how they estimate that any fall of Bahamut will shape a new relationship across the front, one that could mean more pressure to move forward with some sort of peace negotiation. This explains why they persist in this tactic despite the great cost in lives and equipment. However, at the same time this is already beginning to have an impact on the morale of the Ukrainian forces themselves.
And it is this reality that also explains why there is so much pressure from the Ukrainian government to the West for weapon systems that could shape a new situation, such as more advanced fighter jets and missile systems that would allow strikes even on Russian soil .
Accordingly, the willingness or not to offer such advanced weapons systems also reflects the dividing lines within the Western alliance between forces that favor the escalation of the conflict by all means and forces that to some extent have second thoughts.
In this condition, it does not seem easy that some Ukrainian counter-attack could unfold in the next period that could radically change the relationship. Nor, on the other hand, does Russia show the will to make a major offensive move beyond the gradual attempt to secure positions and at the same time increase the pressure through bombing Ukrainian infrastructure.
The fear of “accident”
Against this background, we can also see the incident with the downing of an unmanned aircraft by a Russian fighter against the USA. Regardless of whether it was shot down or down as an indirect result of the handling of the Russian aircraft, it is clear that we are dealing with an incident that showed the danger of a direct contact between Russian and American forces. It is characteristic that although the US accused Russia of doing it consciously, it was nevertheless clear that their tone did not refer to the logic of “retaliation”, although such voices were also heard in the US.
However, it is clear that as Western and American involvement in the war grows, as material shipments increase, as much material is sent that may also need advisers or trainers (although the training of Ukrainian military personnel in Western weapons systems takes place mainly outside Ukrainian territory), as usage increases e.g. of aircraft (manned and unmanned) near the collision area, the greater the risk of an accident.
The extension of the impasse
This entire treaty has the effect of making it very difficult if not impossible for the US to take initiatives that would have the immediate goal of a ceasefire and a lasting peace in the next year.
And this is because such a process would not be equivalent to “Russia’s defeat, since the latter would effectively secure the border change not only of 2014 but also as a degree of the “special military operation”, while it would hardly be possible to initiate “regime change” .
At the same time, the prolongation of the war means very high economic costs for the Western allies, possible social discontent for this reason and the constant risk of a large-scale “accident” that would bring closer a “direct” confrontation between the West and the Russia.
And while most Western countries may not see much of a reaction to military involvement at the moment, it is not certain that this will continue indefinitely, given the costs.
At the same time, the way the West insists on engaging in this conflict means that it is actually not only accelerating what it supposedly wants to prevent, namely a more comprehensive convergence of Russia and China – the importance of Xi Jinping’s expected visit to Moscow is indicative –, but also a configuration of a landscape where space is created for other diplomatic initiatives – China’s initiatives are also indicative here.
However, at this stage there does not seem to be any more comprehensive initiative to change course. Even indirect pressures on Ukraine can hardly lead to a change of attitude.
