War in Ukraine: The crushing material losses on both sides

How big is the conflict in Ukraine in terms of munitions attrition? A crucial question as the answer – and especially its extension – can give us clues about the endurance of each side to continue this violent war. So in a review done by the well-known site www.oryxspioenkop.com, which records the losses of material on both sides, making sure to register only those for which there are photographic documents or even video recording (so the numbers are clearly smaller than reality), it gives us an impressive image. First let’s look at the losses in comparison (based on the most recent data update), by weapon type:

From the above table we notice that in many categories of main material the Russian losses are three times to four times the Ukrainian ones. And with a large proportion of Russian systems ending up on the Ukrainian side, which uses them as replacements for losses, although the reverse is also the case. E.g. In tanks, out of 1,657 Russian tanks that have been lost, 546 have been captured by the Ukrainians, while conversely, out of 459 Ukrainian, the Russians have taken 144.

There are also differences in quality, e.g. in ships, Ukraine has lost 25, essentially the entirety of its small navy, but Russia’s 12 losses include the cruiser Moskva and the amphibious assault ship Saratov, two major units whose tonnage dwarfs the Ukrainian disaster.

At the level of tanks, Russia records losses of many modern ones such as 383 T-80 (various versions) and 46 T-90 as well as 472 T-72B3 (the most modern of the type), while Ukraine has lost 40 T-80 and 99 T-72 (again of various types).

In the aircraft there is surprisingly a relative balance (always with the Oryx figures we say again, they only count what is recorded in an image being destroyed). Here Ukraine counts 16 MiG-29s, 7 Su-27s, 16 Su-25s and 13 Su-24s, which is about half of its air force. Russia for its part has lost one MiG-31, Su-30, Su-35, 25 Su-25, 9 Su-24, 18 Su-34.

What conclusions can we draw from the above?

with the necessary caveat of course as the numbers listed are certainly a “portion” of the whole.

1. Russia has much higher losses in land materiel, which is explained by being the aggressor with many of the losses occurring early in the war.

The materials she loses include a significant portion of her best weapons. Despite this, it still maintains incredible reserves, mainly in tank potential (it is estimated that there are at least 10,000 tanks in storage but they need a lot of work to make them battle-ready). Ukraine has bled badly, but not so much as to go dormant, but it’s clear why it’s pushing so hard for western material.

2. The conflict is mainly on land, the role of aviation has been reduced on both sides,

as the preference has shifted to missile bombardment and now also unmanned “kamikaze” (Russia) and various types of unmanned, many modified commercial quadcopters (Ukraine). Here to say that the 15 losses of armed Ukrainian drones that appear in the list, are all Bayraktar TB2. The “withdrawal” of aviation above the battlefield can be explained by the heavy losses (mainly concerning Ukraine) but also the reluctance to overexpose in a saturated battlefield by anti-aircraft (Russia). Thus, Russian fighters and bombers for several months now prefer the safe release of missiles from a distance, rather than the very dangerous ground support attacks where they also had serious losses.

3. The two sides using common/similar materials provides the opportunity for “feedback”.

So tanks, armored vehicles, trucks, etc. they are traded on the battlefield, cannibalized for parts and ammunition, changed “flags” and re-entered the hopper of war. A clear indication that the material you know – even if it is outdated – is what you can use for a long time. However, the Ukrainians stand out here because they manage to quickly utilize Western material, even if it wears out quickly. But war doesn’t “obey” usage norms and attrition charts…

4. Clearly the above stream of losses is exhausting. We are talking about 11 months and over 12,000 systems (of all types) have already been destroyed or seriously damaged (for both sides),

while the feeling is certain that the actual losses will be much higher. So we understand here that measurements of the type “a country has a thousand tanks” can be presented very little in the face of a relatively “balanced” conflict of high intensity, which will be extended beyond a few weeks.

5. The large material damages on both sides is also a special event: As two huge stocks “collide”.

On the one hand, the extravagant Soviet of the Cold War (with production of tens of thousands of tanks) and on the other, the combined stock of the West in old and new systems, which, even with various delays, manages to send it to Kyiv, although it often resembles a carnival in terms of variety/multitype.

Our assessment

It is closing time in this war that Russian aggression has seen a significant loss of prestige and material and of course human life, while Ukrainian resilience also hides a devastating bleeding of people and infrastructure. This rate of “consumption” is a mutual destruction and can hardly continue, at least at the same intensity. That is why this year too we have the forecast for some “big conflict” at the beginning of the year (both sides are accumulating weapons and personnel) which will either defuse the war action, or completely exhaust both sides.

Unfortunately, we have a bad track record here in Ukraine. When the two large Russian-speaking regions in the east, Donetsk and Luhansk, seceded in 2014, a silent war began on the front lines: with skirmishes, artillery duels, patrols and snipers, which lasted until 2022 and the Russian invasion. Since 2015 this conflict has been almost daily, with no big wins/losses but an open wound. So there is a “tradition” in the region that may be repeated, that is, after a great exhausting conflict, to consolidate a permanent front line, a “gray zone” in perpetuity. The worst for both countries and for our world.