The apparent effort to initiate some dialogue and negotiation between the Turkish government and the Assad government in Damascus largely reflects the Turkish government’s attempt to ensure that any settlement of the Syrian issue does not include any version of a quasi-state Kurdish entity on Syrian soil. .
It also reflects Turkey’s attempt to disengage to some extent from a conflict of which it has been a part for years and certainly to be able to secure the return of the large number of Syrian refugees who are on Turkish soil and who have already begun to be treated relatively more negatively , in contrast to the intense solidarity of previous years.
At the same time, it is an attempt at reconciliation that is viewed positively by the other two countries participating in the “Astana process”, that is, Russia and Iran, the countries that initially sided with the Damascus government.
But, that doesn’t mean it’s an easy process. First, Turkey has not given up on the goal of a new ground operation against the Kurds in Syria, an operation that has so far been delayed due to the explicit opposition of the US (for which the Kurds are the main partner force on Syrian soil and operations against the Islamic State) but also Russia.
Turkey’s Islamist allies
But the bigger problem is what Turkey will do with its allies inside Syria itself. We should not forget that Turkey at one point abandoned the policy of reconciliation it had with the Assad government and thought that there could be a reversal of it that would form a new relationship. In this context, it became involved from relatively early on in the civil conflict in Syria by supporting certain sections of the opposition, the ones that today staff the Syrian National Army, which it equips and finances to a great extent.
From one point onward in the Turkish planning, in addition to the desire to influence things in the Syrian civil conflict, it also measured the issue of the Kurds. The Kurdish question along with the risk of exporting the terrorist dynamics of the Islamic State to Turkey – although Turkey had to some extent strengthened the armed Islamist opposition organizations, also played a role in forcing cooperation with Russia and Iran as well, precisely because both forces had a clear stance against the creation of any Kurdish state form on Syrian soil.
But, at the same time, Turkey was interested in having allies on Syrian soil. After all, it actually controls a part of Syrian territory. These armed organizations, which were part of the Syrian National Army, were also important in the context of Ankara’s plans to have a say in the “next day” in Syria, but also in the various plans for pushing back the Kurds and relocating the Syrian refugees who are in Turkey in these areas near the border in order to modify the population composition and reduce the weight of the Kurdish element.
This also explains why Turkey was opposed to the attempt by the Syrian government forces with the cooperation of Russia to attack the Idlib enclave, the last enclave dominated by the armed opposition organizations and especially Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the evolution of Al Qaeda in Syria.
The difficult balances
This effort is not particularly easy as Turkey simultaneously tries to handle the prospect of reconciliation with Damascus, to get a “green light” for a new operation against the Kurds and to be able to deal with the contradictions between the armed opposition groups.
First, it must face Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s attempt to take advantage of the situation to strengthen itself against the trends supported by Turkey outside Idlib, to claim the character of a “political opposition” and not a terrorist organization, and to emerge as a key representative of “spirit of the revolution”.
He will then have to deal with backlash in opposition-held areas against rapprochement with the Damascus government, which has also prompted Hulusi Akar to warn Ankara-backed armed opposition groups of the risk of “provocations” after the protests that took place. In fact, the Turkish National Intelligence Service had asked the armed organizations supported by Turkey to prevent demonstrations against Turkey, but to no avail.
And of course he has to see what he will do with the Syrian National Army that he has long supported in various ways. The question here is whether the model tested in other areas of southern Syria that involved two options, either integrating the rebels into the Syrian armed forces, or withdrawing them to other areas, will be able to work. And the question is about two issues, to what extent will the armed opposition organizations accept it, and to what extent will it simply cause new rifts among the opposition, which Turkey will have to handle.
There is also the question of whether such a direction will involve the risk of fighters of these organizations who do not want the proposed solution moving to Turkey as a safe haven, adding yet another headache to the Turkish government.
