The Ukrainian government has recently engaged in a systematic effort to secure armoured battle tanks of, if not the latest, at least the most recent generation from its Western allies. This seems to result from two necessities that have emerged on the battlefield in Ukraine itself.
1. The first concerns the way in which the conflicts are conducted, often street by street, within the residential areas, which are also the only ones that offer some fortification in a landscape without many places with natural fortification. In them a tank, with a powerful cannon and a high degree of armor seems to be an effective form to conduct operations.
2. The second reason is that Ukraine does not want a new “line of contact” to be formed, as was done in 2014 and after, which would de facto enshrine Russian occupation of a significant part of Ukrainian territory. Therefore it is very important to gather Ukranian massive counterattack conditions in the spring when the weather conditions will improve. Except that such a massive counterattack requires a significant number of tanks and armored personnel carriers.
The reluctance of the European allies to contribute
So far the West has been quite generous in its aid to Ukraine. Most of the requests were quickly met, and some of them actually changed the terms of the war, such as sending HIMARS high-precision missile arrays. Some requests, it is true, were not met, such as the granting of long-range missile arrays that would allow strikes on Russian soil, for obvious reasons that would give Russia the right to complain about Western weapons striking Russian soil, but especially the Ukrainian artillery received brave reinforcements in both guns and ammunition.
But with armoured battle tanks things are a bit more difficult. It is true that Ukraine has received a fair number of Soviet-era and tank technology from neighboring countries that had them as well as various variants of armored personnel carriers, but not newer, larger and more powerful ones.
The US for example has so far refused to grant M1 Abrams tanks mainly citing issues of technical specifications and logistics (among other things because several of them have turbo engines that use jet fuel). Mostly, though, it seems to be a reluctance to send the big and expensive tanks into a battlefield where they will be pretty much destroyed.
Instead, the British have pledged to send Challenger 2 tanks, despite the fact that they use different ammunition to those of other countries.
All this means that the burden falls heavily on Germany. Leopard tanks, in their various variants, are the most widespread in Europe and are the main battle tank of several European military armies. However, Germany itself has so far refused to send and – even more importantly – refused to give permission for theirs and the countries to which it had sold them in the past to contribute. We note here that in the context of the chronic problems of the German armed forces, at the moment only a part of the Leopard 2 that the Bundeswehr has is combat-worthy and in operation, and this is another reason for the reluctance to send some of them to Ukraine.
The meeting of the Defense Ministers of the NATO countries at the Ramstein base
The pressure on Germany to send tanks to Ukraine and to allow other countries to send their German-made Leopards also intensified at the meeting between Western defense ministers, in the presence of their Ukrainian counterpart, at the Ramstein air base in Germany. However, again the new German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius refrained from taking a position, stating that there are strong reasons for sending tanks to Ukraine as well as strong reasons against the mission, and that the whole issue needs consultation and agreement between the allies. His other counterparts, such as the Pole, were more emphatic that heavy tanks would eventually be sent to Ukraine.
For his part, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized that in addition to new weapons systems, Ukraine also needs enough ammunition for the weapons systems it already has. We note here that on the fronts of the war in Ukraine, a huge amount of ammunition, especially artillery shells, has already been consumed by both sides.
The dilemmas of the West
Behind these oscillations are hidden more general strategic dilemmas. It is clear that right now the dominant line in the West is to strengthen Ukraine even more in the hope that this will change the balance of power and lead to the defeat of Russia. The last element, the defeat of Russia as the main target within the new global dividing lines, is a key parameter that explains why there are no proposals from the West for some type of peace process and cease-fire as any possible agreement, even with terms of compromises will mean that in the end Russia will be in control of a significant part of the territory of Ukraine until now, a condition that could not lead to cracks in the system of power of Vladimir Putin.
But, Russia right now. both with partial conscription and possible new conscription, but also through the industrial capabilities it has for the production of armaments, it seems to have compensated for the main advantage of the Ukrainian side which was that it could have large numbers of conscripts on the fronts and mainly in counterattacks. This has created a situation where Russia can now re-plan for large-scale attacks, even expanding the areas under its control, while continuing its war of attrition relentlessly targeting Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure.
This simultaneously creates pressure to provide even more aid and even more upgraded equipment to Ukraine, a pressure expressed by the Ukrainian government itself and by forces more friendly to it, but at the same time raises the question of whether it is feasible a Ukrainian victory on such a scale and therefore whether it is worth it to commit such expensive equipment to a conflict that is not certain to have the outcome the West would like.
