It is common knowledge that the war in Ukraine is not only a conflict between Russia and Ukraine but also a “proxy war” between Russia (for some the emerging convergence of Russia and China) and the US (and by extension the West). Although NATO countries have avoided direct involvement of NATO military personnel in the conflict, they have contributed decisively in weapons systems, training and intelligence support.
Such a confrontation, as during the first Cold War, raises the question of whether it will escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, with unforeseen consequences.
We recall that in the 1970s in particular, scenarios for a land war in Europe dominated, where the use of conventional weapons would be combined with the use of “limited theater” tactical nuclear weapons to shape the relationship.
After all, both Russia and the US maintain such strategic nuclear weapons (in the form of the “nuclear triad” of nuclear-tipped missile submarines, strategic bombers and ICBMs) that they fit into a deterrent doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” , as well as tactical nukes for use on a limited scale.
How the issue of nuclear use came back during the war in Ukraine
During the war in Ukraine this issue came back to the fore. This was primarily through repeated reports in the Western public sphere that Russia was considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons to respond to a major Ukrainian counterattack, even though the consequences of the use of such weapons would extend to Russian-controlled areas as well.
The concern was reinforced by the way the Russian side repeated that the Russian defense doctrine includes the use of nuclear weapons in the event that Russia’s territorial integrity is threatened. Although this side of the defense doctrine has remained stable for many years the constant reminder was a legitimate concern. Statements by Putin that “this is not a bluff” or by Dmitry Medvedev that Russia will defend itself even with the use of “strategic nuclear weapons” contributed to this.
This was made more intense by the fact that Russia in recent years has upgraded its nuclear arsenal, mainly with the addition of hypersonic missiles. On the other hand, we must also note the way the USA has for years withdrawn from the agreement on anti-ballistic missiles, which was a key means for no country to have the “temptation” of being able to have a “first strike” without consequences. However, the US and Russia have extended the validity of the New START agreement to further reduce strategic nuclear weapons, until February 2026.
Lavrov blames the US
The issue was brought up again on December 27, 2022 by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, during an interview with the Tass news agency in which he accused the US of planning a “decapitation strike” against the Kremlin.
Lavrov’s reference was to a Sept. 29 Newsweek story that said there was a split between the Biden administration and its military advisers over the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and what is the most effective deterrence policy against Vladimir Putin. An unnamed source told the publication that “we are the closest we have come to using nuclear weapons in more than 50 years.”
The report said the Biden administration favored non-nuclear options over the potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia in Ukraine. Although the military did not oppose a pre-emptive nuclear strike, they nevertheless believed that the US should include the threat of using nuclear weapons in its rhetoric. Nevertheless, according to the publication, the priority in American planning remained the use of non-nuclear means, albeit with some particularly aggressive plans, such as a strike on the Kremlin to kill Putin there.
And although the US insists it has no plans to use nuclear weapons, there has recently been a major upgrade in the operational readiness of its nuclear forces, both strategic bombers, which can carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, and submarines. with nuclear-tipped missiles (with the US now also having submarine-based missiles with a relatively “small” warhead that could be used for a “tactical” strike.
At the time, the Russian embassy in Washington had spoken of “paranoid arguments” and had underlined that the Russian side starts “from the fact that Washington is aware of the escalating nature of such frothy rhetoric”.
But the fact that the ever-cautious Lavrov decided to recall these plans to “decapitate” the Russian leadership, with all the escalating nature of any Russian response, in an interview in which he denounced that “a strategic goal of the US and of NATO is to win a victory against Russia on the battlefield in order to weaken or even destroy our country,” indicates that the debate over the possible use of nuclear weapons remains active and that both sides are preparing for such possibility.
